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 THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

The Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese of South 
Carolina; The Trustees of The Protestant Episcopal 
Church in South Carolina, a South Carolina Corporate 
Body; All Saints Protestant Episcopal Church, Inc.; 
Christ St. Paul's Episcopal Church; Christ the King, 
Waccamaw; Church of The Cross, Inc. and Church of the 
Cross Declaration of Trust; Church of The Holy 
Comforter; Church of the Redeemer; Holy Trinity 
Episcopal Church; Saint Luke's Church, Hilton Head; St. 
Matthews Church; St. Andrews Church-Mt. Pleasant 
Land Trust; St. Bartholomews Episcopal Church; St. 
David's Church; St. James' Church, James Island, S.C.; 
St. John's Episcopal Church of Florence, S.C.; St. 
Matthias Episcopal Church, Inc.; St. Paul's Episcopal 
Church of Bennettsville, Inc.; St. Paul's Episcopal 
Church of Conway; The Church of St. Luke and St. Paul, 
Radcliffeboro; The Church of Our Saviour of the Diocese 
of South Carolina; The Church of the Epiphany 
(Episcopal); The Church of the Good Shepherd, 
Charleston, SC; The Church of The Holy Cross; The 
Church of The Resurrection, Surfside; The Protestant 
Episcopal Church of The Parish of Saint Philip, in 
Charleston, in the State of South Carolina; The Protestant 
Episcopal Church, The Parish of Saint Michael, in 
Charleston, in the State of South Carolina and St. 
Michael's Church Declaration of Trust; The Vestry and 
Church Wardens of St. Jude's Church of Walterboro; The 
Vestry and Church Wardens of The Episcopal Church of 
The Parish of Prince George Winyah; The Vestry and 
Church Wardens of The Church of The Parish of St. 
Helena and The Parish Church of St. Helena Trust; The 
Vestry and Church Wardens of The Parish of St. 
Matthew; The Vestry and Wardens of St. Paul's Church, 
Summerville; Trinity Church of Myrtle Beach; Trinity 
Episcopal Church; Trinity Episcopal Church, Pinopolis; 
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Vestry and Church Wardens of the Episcopal Church of 
The Parish of Christ Church; Vestry and Church 
Wardens of The Episcopal Church of the Parish of St. 
John's, Charleston County, The Vestries and 
Churchwardens of The Parish of St. Andrews, 
Respondents. 
v. 
The Episcopal Church (a/k/a The Protestant Episcopal 
Church in the United States of America) and The 
Episcopal Church in South Carolina, Appellants. 
Appellate Case No. 2015-000622 
Appeal from Dorchester County 

Diane Schafer Goodstein, Circuit Court Judge  

Opinion No. 27731 

Heard September 23, 2015 – Filed August 2, 2017 

REVERSED IN PART AND AFFIRMED IN PART
Allan R. Holmes, Sr. and Timothy O. Lewis, both of Gibbs & Holmes, 
of Charleston, David Booth Beers and Mary E. Kostel, both of 
Goodwin Procter, LLP, of Washington, DC, Blake A. Hewitt and John 
S. Nichols, both of Bluestein Nichols Thompson & Delgado, of 
Columbia, Thomas S. Tisdale and Jason S. Smith, both of Hellman
Yates & Tisdale, of Charleston and R. Walker Humphrey, II, of Waters 
& Kraus, of Dallas, Texas, for Appellants.   
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C. Alan Runyan and Andrew S. Platte, both of Speights & Runyan, of 
Beaufort, Henrietta U. Golding and Amanda Bailey, both of McNair 
Law Firm, of Myrtle Beach, C. Mitchell Brown, of Nelson, Mullins, 
Riley & Scarborough, of Columbia, Charles H. Williams, of Williams 
& Williams, of Orangeburg, David Cox, of Barnwell Whaley Patterson 
& Helms, of Charleston, Thomas C. Davis, of Harvey & Battey, of
Beaufort, Harry Easterling, Jr., of Bennettsville, G. Mark Phillips, of 
Nelson, Mullins, Riley & Scarborough, of Charleston,  W. Foster
Gaillard and Henry Grimball, both of Womble, Carlyle, Sandridge & 
Rice, of Charleston, Keith McCarty, of McCarty Law Firm, of 
Charleston, William A. Scott, of Pedersen & Scott, of Charleston, Mark 
Evans, of Charleston, David B. Marvel and David L. DeVane, both of 
Prenner Marvel, of Charleston, John Furman Wall, III, of Mt. Pleasant, 
Allan P. Sloan, III and Joseph C. Wilson, IV, both of Pierce, Herns, 
Sloan & Wilson, of Charleston, C. Pierce Campbell, of Turner, Padget, 
Graham & Laney, of Florence, Robert R. Horger, of Horger, Barnwell 
& Reid, of Orangeburg, Saunders M. Bridges, of Aiken Bridges Elliott 
Tyler & Saleeby, of Florence, Lawrence B. Orr, of Orr Elmore & 
Ervin, of Florence, Francis M. Mack, of St. Matthews, Robert S.
Shelton, of The Bellamy Law Firm, of Myrtle Beach, William A. 
Bryan, of Bryan & Haar, of Surfside Beach, Harry Oxner, of Oxner & 
Stacy, of Georgetown, Susan MacDonald and Jim Lehman, both of 
Nelson, Mullins, Riley & Scarborough, of Myrtle Beach, Brandt 
Shelbourne, of Shelbourne Law Firm, of Summerville, Stephen S. 
McKenzie, of Coffey, Chandler & Kent, of Manning, John B. 
Williams, of Williams & Hulst, of Moncks Corner, George J. Kefalos 
and Oana D. Johnson, both of George J. Kefalos, P.A., of Charleston, 
Stephen Spitz, of Charleston and Thornwell F. Sowell, III and Bess J. 
Durant, both of Sowell Gray Stepp & Lafitte, LLC, of Columbia, for 
Respondents. 
ACTING JUSTICE PLEICONES:  This is an appeal from a circuit court order 
holding that the Appellants have no legal or equitable interests in certain real and 
personal property located in South Carolina, and enjoining the Appellants from
utilizing certain disputed service marks and names.  In this lead opinion I explain
why I would reverse the entire order. 
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The Respondents are the Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese of South 
Carolina (Disassociated Diocese); the Trustees of the Protestant Episcopal Church 
in South Carolina (Trustees); and thirty-six individual parishes that have aligned 
themselves with the Disassociated Diocese (Parishes).  The Appellants are The 
Episcopal Church a/k/a The Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of 
America (TEC) and The Episcopal Church in South Carolina, the diocese that 
remains affiliated with the TEC (Associated Diocese). 
After a lengthy bench trial, and based upon the application of "neutral principles of 
law," the circuit court found in favor of the Respondents on both the property and 
the service mark causes of action.  Since the main purposes of this suit were 
requests for declaratory judgments and injunctive relief, I find that it sounds in 
equity.1 Doe v. S.C. Med. Mal. Liab. Joint Underwriting Ass'n, 347 S.C. 642, 557 
S.E.2d 670 (2001). The Court is therefore free to take its own view of the facts.  
Id. 
As noted above, much of the trial judge's decision making in this case was 
controlled by her interpretation of the "neutral principles of law" approach to 
deciding ecclesiastical disputes.  See Pearson v. Church of God, 325 S.C. 45, 478 
1 Acting Justice Toal maintains that because the declarations made in this case will 
determine the rightful ownership of property, the main purpose of this suit is legal.  
I, however, look not to the first paragraph of the complaint, but rather to the prayer 
for relief, which seeks a declaration (1) which of the competing entities is the true 
diocese, (2) that respondents' legal title to property trumps appellants' equitable 
claims, and (3) for other injunctive relief related to trade names.  The main purpose 
is to enjoin appellants from "interfering" with the respondents in "church matters" 
and thus this suit sounds in equity.  Compare, e.g., Williams v. Wilson, 349 S.C. 
336, 563 S.E.2d 320 (2002). To the extent the issues turn on property rights, the 
results turn on the validity and existence of certain trusts, matters which also sound 
in equity. E.g., Settlemeyer v. McCluney, 359 S.C. 317, 596 S.E.2d 514 (Ct. App. 
2004). Were Acting Justice Toal correct, and were the Court to find the main 
purpose of this suit were legal, then the Court would be compelled to reverse and 
remand for a new trial given the number of erroneous and prejudicial evidentiary 
rulings made by the trial judge and raised to us on appeal.  I note none of the
opinions that would uphold the trial court's order in whole or in part address these 
issues. 
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S.E.2d 849 (1996) (adopting this approach).  Specifically, she was guided by her 
reading of this Court's decision in All Saints Parish Waccamaw v. The Protestant 
Episcopal Church in the Diocese of South Carolina, 385 S.C. 428, 685 S.E.2d 163 
(2009) (All Saints). In the trial judge's view, the admissibility of evidence and the 
resolution of the property disputes at issue here were properly adjudicated solely 
on the basis of state corporate, property, and trust law, and she was required to 
ignore the ecclesiastical setting in which these disputes arose.  This error of law 
led, in turn, to a distorted view of the issues in this case.  
Before discussing the merits of the appeal, I briefly review a simplified history of 
TEC, and the church's history in South Carolina.  I next address, and would
reverse, the circuit court's finding that TEC is a congregational rather than a 
hierarchical church. I then address misperceptions of the "neutral principles of 
law" approach resulting in large part from the trial court's reading of All Saints, 
which I would now overrule in part.2  I conclude that the present property and 
church governance disputes are not appropriate for resolution in the civil courts 
and would reverse the order to the extent it purports to resolve these questions.  
Finally, I find the trial court erred in holding that the Respondents' state-registered 
trademarks prevail over TEC's federally-protected trademarks, and therefore would
also reverse that portion of the order. 
HISTORY
The Episcopal Church has a long history in South Carolina.  See All Saints, supra. 
In 1789, four years after its formation, the Protestant Episcopal Church in South 
Carolina (South Carolina Diocese) and six other dioceses came together to form
the national church (TEC).  The South Carolina Diocese was voluntarily associated 
with TEC since that date, save for a five-year hiatus surrounding the Civil War.  In 
1841, Article 1 was added to the South Carolina Diocese's Constitution.  This 
article, titled, "Of acceding to the constitutions and canons of the general 
convention," provided "The [South Carolina Diocese] accedes to, recognizes and 
adopts the general constitution and canons of [TEC] and acknowledges their 
authority accordingly." Similar language in which the Diocese acceded to TEC 
2 Acting Justice Toal misreads my opinion as retitling property owned by All Saints 
Waccamaw, ousting its vestry, and rewriting its charter.  It is unclear to me how 
Acting Justice Toal derives that conclusion as that congregation is not a party to 
this suit. 
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remained in the Diocese's governing documents until 2010.  Further, for more than 
200 years, a parish had to agree to conform to TEC's Constitution and Canons as 
well as those of the Diocese in order to become and remain a member of the South 
Carolina Diocese. Finally, the Trustee Corporation, which purports to be 
represented in this suit by the respondent Trustees, was chartered as a non-profit 
corporation in 1880 and again in 1902. 
In 1923, after requesting permission from TEC to divide the state into two 
Dioceses, TEC's General Convention agreed to the division and the state was 
divided into the Upper and Lower Dioceses of South Carolina.  The Lower 
Diocese was incorporated in 1973, with this corporate purpose: "[T]o continue an 
Episcopal Diocese under the Constitution and Canons of [TEC]." Both the 
Disassociated Diocese and the Associated Diocese claim to be the successor to the 
Lower Diocese. 
Overly simplified, the issue in this case is whether respondent Disassociated 
Diocese, the Trustees, and the Parishes or appellant Associated Diocese and its 
parishes "own" the real, personal, and intellectual property that the Appellants 
allege was held in trust for the benefit of TEC in 2009.   
I. TEC Organization
In All Saints, the Court reiterated its previous definitions of a congregational and a 
hierarchical church structure: "A congregational church is an independent 
organization, governed solely within itself…, while a hierarchical [or 
ecclesiastical] church may be defined as one organized as a body with other 
churches having similar faith and doctrine with a common ruling convocation or 
ecclesiastical head." All Saints, 385 S.C. at 443, 685 S.E.2d at 171 fn. 9 (quoting 
Seldon v. Singletary, 284 S.C. 148, 149, 326 S.E.2d 147, 148 (1985)).    
TEC is an unincorporated association comprised of subunits known as dioceses.  
Each diocese is, in turn, comprised of congregations known as parishes or 
missions.  Every three years, TEC sponsors a General Convention to which each 
diocese's standing committee sends a specified number of clerical and lay 
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representatives to conduct TEC's business, including electing and confirming3 new 
bishops. 
The evidence in the record demonstrates TEC's organization is three-tiered, with 
the General Convention at the top, approximately one hundred dioceses created 
along geographical lines in the middle, and the individual parishes and missions 
affiliated with a particular diocese forming in the bottom tier.  TEC is led by a 
Presiding Bishop, and each diocese is traditionally led by a bishop.  The record 
establishes that the ultimate authority in TEC rests with the General Convention, 
and that the written sources of authority include TEC's Constitution and Canons, 
the Book of Common Prayer, and the Holy Bible.  As noted above, until 2010, the 
Lower Diocese explicitly acceded to TEC's authority, and accession to both the 
Diocese and TEC was required of all parishes and missions.  Further, until 2010, 
the Trustees' corporate bylaws stated it would carry out its duties under the 
authority of TEC's Constitution and Canons. 
I find, based upon the evidence in this record, that TEC is a hierarchical church, 
and would therefore overrule the trial court's finding that it is, instead, a 
congregational church. Doe, supra. In reaching this decision, I join numerous 
other jurisdictions that have concluded that TEC is a hierarchical church.  See, e.g., 
Dixon v. Edwards, 290 F.3d 699 (4th Cir. 2002); In re Episcopal Church Cases, 45 
Cal.4th 467, 198 P.3d 66 (2009); Parish of the Advent v. Protestant Episcopal 
Diocese of Massachusetts, 426 Mass. 268, 688 N.E.2d 923 (1997); Masterson v. 
Diocese of Northwest Texas, 422 S.W.3d 594 (TX 2014); Falls Church v. 
Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States, 285 Va. 651, 740 S.E.2d 530 
(2013). I turn next to a discussion of All Saints. 
II. All Saints
As noted above, the trial judge's conduct of the trial and her rulings were governed, 
in large part, by her understanding of All Saints. As explained below, I would now 
overrule All Saints to the extent it holds that TEC's Dennis Canon and the Lower 
Diocese's own version of that Canon were ineffective in creating a trust over the 
property at issue here, and to the extent the opinion distorts the correct 
3 Although a diocese (s)elects its own bishop, the bishop is not the ecclesiastical 
authority for the diocese until, inter alia, a majority of the standing committees for 
the remaining dioceses confirm his (s)election.
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understanding of the neutral principles of law approach to resolving issues arising 
from a church schism.  In so doing, I focus especially on the effects of corporate 
actions taken by ecclesiastical institutions. 
In All Saints, the dispute was between the Lower Diocese and a congregation 
which sought to disaffiliate from the Diocese.  The legal questions were which 
faction of the splintered Episcopal congregation owned the parish property, and 
which faction controlled the parish's vestry.  All Saints decided the property issue 
by holding that TEC's 1979 "Dennis Canon" was ineffective in creating a trust over 
real and personal property titled in the name of the All Saints Parish.  Further, in 
deciding the "legitimate vestry" issue, the Court indicated that the "neutral 
principles of law" approach required that in order for a civil court to determine 
whether a church-related dispute could be adjudicated in that forum, the court must 
look only at state corporate and property law, ignoring the ecclesiastical context 
entirely. If the civil court could determine the dispute applying state law, then the 
case could be resolved by it. Thus, All Saints undertook to analyze the 
disagreement in that case by treating the "All Saints Corporation" as independent 
of the "All Saints Parish." I find this analysis to be a distortion of the neutral 
principles approach.  See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
In All Saints, the Court correctly explained "neutral principles of law" this way:
A clear recitation of the neutral principles of law approach as
adopted by this Court was enunciated in Pearson v. Church of 
God. In Pearson, we articulated the rule that South Carolina 
civil courts must follow when adjudicating church dispute 
cases.  We reaffirm and more fully explain this rule here.  The
Pearson rule provides: 
(1) Courts may not engage in resolving disputes as to 
religious law, principle, doctrine, discipline, custom, or 
administration; (2) courts cannot avoid adjudicating 
rights growing out of civil law; (3) in resolving such civil 
law disputes, courts must accept as final and binding the 
decision of the highest religious judicatories as to 
religious law, principle, doctrine, discipline, custom, and 
administration.
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325 S.C. at 52-53, 478 S.E.2d at 853. 
 
The Pearson rule establishes that where a civil court can 
completely resolve a church dispute on neutral principles of 
law, the First Amendment commands it to do so.  Nonetheless, 
where a civil court is presented an issue which is a question of 
religious law or doctrine masquerading as a dispute over church 
property or corporate control, it must defer to the decisions of 
the proper church judicatories in so far as it concerns religious 
or doctrinal issues. See Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese, 426 
U.S. at 709, 96 S.Ct. 2372 (finding that the controversy before 
the Court "essentially involve[d] not a church property dispute, 
but a religious dispute the resolution of which . . . is for 
ecclesiastical and not civil tribunals."). 
 
All Saints at 444-45, 685 S.E.2d at 172. 
 
Properly applied, the "neutral principles" approach requires that the civil court's 
initial inquiry be a "holistic" one.  The court must first determine whether the 
property/corporate dispute will require the court to decide issues of religious law, 
principle, doctrine, discipline, custom, or administration - in other words, is the 
property/corporate dispute actually ecclesiastical in nature.  If the dispute is "a 
question of religious law or doctrine masquerading as a dispute over church 
property or corporate control," then the Constitution of the United States requires 
the civil court defer to the decision of the appropriate ecclesiastical authority.  All 
Saints, supra. As explained below, this is the approach I expressly adopt and apply 
to decide the merits of the present dispute in § III, infra.4  Before proceeding to that 
analysis, however, I reexamine the legal analysis applied in All Saints and the 
conclusions drawn there. 
 
In 1979, the Supreme Court decided Jones v. Wolf, supra. Like the present case, 
Jones was a property dispute arising from a schism in a hierarchical church.  The 
Jones Court acknowledged the ability of civil courts to resolve most church-based 
property disputes using deeds, state statutes, the local church charters, and the 
national church's constitution.  The Court explicitly stated, however, that: 
4 Acting Justice Toal contends I 'skip' this step entirely:  I respectfully refer the 
reader to the penultimate sentence in the first paragraph under this section. 
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Through appropriate reversionary clauses and trust provisions, 
religious societies can specify what is to happen to church 
property in the event of a particular contingency, or what 
religious body will determine the ownership in the event of a 
schism or doctrinal controversy.  In this manner, a religious 
organization can ensure that a dispute over the ownership of 
church property will be resolved in accord with the desires of 
the members. 
 
. . . 
 
The neutral-principles approach cannot be said to "inhibit" the 
free exercise of religion, any more than do other neutral 
provisions of state law governing the manner in which churches 
own property, hire employees, or purchase goods.  Under the 
neutral-principles approach, the outcome of a church property 
dispute is not foreordained. At any time before the dispute 
erupts, the parties can ensure, if they so desire, that the faction 
loyal to the hierarchical church will retain the church property.  
They can modify the deeds or the corporate charter to include a 
right of reversion or trust in favor of the general church.  
Alternatively, the constitution of the general church can be 
made to recite an express trust in favor of the denominational 
church. The burden involved in taking such steps will be 
minimal.  And the civil courts will be bound to give effect to 
the result indicated by the parties, provided it is embodied in 
some legally cognizable form. 
 
Jones at 603-4; 606. 
 
In 1979, TEC, acting through the General Convention, responded to Jones by 
enacting the so-called Dennis Canon.  This Canon provides: 
 
All real and personal property held by or for the benefit of any 
Parish, Mission or Congregation is held in trust for this Church 
and the Diocese thereof in which such Parish, Mission or 
Congregation is located. The existence of this trust, however, 
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shall in no way limit the power and authority of the Parish, 
Mission or Congregation otherwise existing over such property 
so long as the particular Parish, Mission or Congregation 
remains part of, and subject to this Church and its Constitution 
and Canons. 
The Dennis Canon (Canon 1.7.4) is followed by Canon 1.7.5, which provides:
The several Dioceses may, at their election, further confirm the 
trust declared under the foregoing Section 4 by appropriate 
action, but no such action shall be necessary for the existence
and validity of the trust. 
In 1987, the Lower Diocese of South Carolina adopted a version of the Dennis 
Canon as part of its own constitution, as did many of the Parishes.5  Recall that 
accession to TEC's Canons, which included the Dennis Canon, and to the Lower 
Diocese's Constitution, which from 1987 forward included a diocesan version, 
were conditions of a parish or mission's membership in the Lower Diocese.  Recall 
also that until the 2010 Diocesan Convention, Article 1 of the Diocesan 
Constitution provided:  "The Church in the Diocese of South Carolina accedes to
and adopts the Constitution and Canons of [TEC] and acknowledges this authority 
accordingly."
In All Saints, this Court first addressed the validity of the Trusts created by the 
Dennis Canon and Diocesan Constitution as applied to property belonging to the 
All Saints Parish at the time the Parish sought to disaffiliate from the Episcopal 
Church. In resolving the issue of the effect of TEC's adoption of the Dennis Canon 
in 1979, and the Lower Diocese's incorporation of the Canon into its own
constitution in 1987, the Court reviewed the history of the All Saints Parish, 
extensively reporting and resolving title issues from 1745 until 1903.  On the 
merits, the All Saints opinion simply holds: 
5 The diocesan version of the Dennis Canon states:  "All real and personal property 
held by or for the benefit of any Parish, Mission, or Congregation is held in trust 
for [TEC] and the [Lower Diocese].  The existence of this trust, however, shall in 
no way limit the power and Authority of the Parish, Mission, or Congregation 
existing over such property so long as the particular Parish, Mission, or 
Congregation remains a part of, and subject to, [TEC] and the [Lower Diocese]." 
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Furthermore, we hold that neither the 2000 Notice [recorded by 
the Diocese in the county courthouse reflecting the trust created 
by the Diocese and that created by the Dennis Canon] nor the 
Dennis Canon has any legal effect on title to the All Saints 
congregation's property. A trust "may be created by either 
declaration of trust or by transfer of property . . . ."  Dreher v. 
Dreher, 370 S.C. 75, 80, 634 S.E.2d 646, 648 (2006).  It is an 
axiomatic principle of law that a person or entity must hold title 
to property in order to declare that it is held in trust for the 
benefit of another or transfer legal title to one person for the 
benefit of another. The Diocese did not, at the time it recorded 
the 2000 Notice, have any interest in the congregation's 
property. Therefore, the recordation of the 2000 Notice could 
not have created a trust over the property. 
 
For the aforementioned reasons, we hold that title to the 
property at issue is held by All Saints Parish, Waccamaw, Inc., 
the Dennis Canons [sic] had no legal effect on the title to the 
congregation's property, and the 2000 Notice should be 
removed from the Georgetown County records. 
 
All Saints at 449, 685 S.E.2d at 174. 
 
I would now overrule All Saints to the extent it held the Dennis Canon and the 
1987 amendment to the Lower Diocese's Constitution were ineffective in creating 
trusts over property held by or for the benefit of any parish, mission, or 
congregation in the Lower Diocese.  The result in All Saints was obtained without 
considering the religious documents and texts, including the Diocesan 
Constitution, which formed the foundation of the relationships between All Saints 
Parish, the Lower Diocese, and TEC, and by ignoring the premise of Jones that a 
hierarchical church could direct the disposition of property in case of a schism with 
a minimal burden.  Specifically, All Saints failed to acknowledge that, as a matter 
of church governance and administration, All Saints Parish had agreed to be bound 
by the "trust terms" found in the Dennis Canon and the Diocesan Constitution 
through its voluntary promises of allegiance, upon which the hierarchical church is 
founded, and by its conduct in remaining affiliated with TEC after 1979, and with 
the Lower Diocese after 1987. All Saints' failure to consider the entirety of these 
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ecclesiastical relationships, the governing documents, and the parties' conduct, as 
well as the assurances given by the Jones' majority that a hierarchical church could 
direct the ownership of property in the case of a schism, led to a violation of the 
command of Pearson that a court look at the entirety of the dispute, including the 
hierarchal church's constitution, canons, and rules, before determining whether the 
dispute can be resolved purely by the application of state law.
Further, I find that All Saints fell into error when it created an artificial division 
between All Saints' authority as a parish to withdraw from TEC and the Lower 
Diocese, and All Saints parish's corporate authority to withdraw by amending its 
bylaws and articles of incorporation in compliance with South Carolina law.  The 
All Saints decision focused only on the parish corporation's compliance with the 
provisions of the South Carolina Non-Profit Act, S.C. Code Ann. §§ 33-31-100, et 
seq. (2006 and Supp. 2016). The opinion concluded that the corporate formalities 
had been properly executed and thus the parish had effectively withdrawn from
TEC. The flaw in this section of the All Saints decision is that it relies on a false 
dichotomy between parish as ecclesiastical unit and parish as a corporate entity, 6 
and fails to acknowledge the dispositive statute in the Non-Profit Act.   
6 I find persuasive this passage from Justice Lehrmann's dissent in Masterson v. 
Diocese of Northwest Texas, 422 S.W.3d 594, 617-18 (TX 2014):
When deciding whether a matter invokes constitutional 
protection, I believe that we should err on the side of caution, 
upholding constitutional mandates when in doubt. 
The Court divides the questions of Good Shepherd parish's
authority to withdraw from TEC and Good Shepherd 
corporation's authority to withdraw by amending its bylaws and 
articles of incorporation . . . . In my view, however, the two 
inquiries are inextricably linked.  The Court goes on to 
conclude that, because the parish at issue was incorporated and
because there was no specific TEC or diocesan restriction on 
the corporation's authority to amend its bylaws and articles of
incorporation, the validity of Good Shepherd's withdrawal by 
amendment of those documents was not an ecclesiastical 
question . . . . I am unconvinced that the incorporated status of 
the parish removes the issue from the realm of church polity.  If 
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[the Bishop's] determination that the parish could not withdraw
from TEC is a binding ecclesiastical decision, it does not cease 
to be so because of the corporate form taken by the parish.  
Such a determination permits civil courts to conduct an end-run
around the First Amendment's prohibition against inquiry into 
and resolution of religious issues by effectively allowing the 
lower church entity's unilateral decision to trump the higher 
entity's authority over matters of church polity.
Notably, the Court recognizes that "what happens to the 
relationship between a local congregation that is part of a 
hierarchical religious organization and the higher organization
when members of the local congregation vote to disassociate is 
an ecclesiastical matter over which civil courts generally do not 
have a jurisdiction." Id. at 607 (citing Serbian E. Orthodox 
Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713-14, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 
49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976)).  "But what happens to the property is 
not," the Court continues, "unless the congregation's affairs 
have been ordered so that ecclesiastical decisions effectively 
determine the property issue."  Id. It follows that [the Bishop's] 
determination regarding the parish's authority (or, more 
accurately, lack of authority) to withdraw from TEC is a 
binding ecclesiastical decision, irrespective of the corporate 
form taken by the parish.  In turn, since Good Shepherd did not
validly withdraw from TEC, Good Shepherd remained a 
constituent thereof and consequently remained subject to TEC's 
and the Diocese's Constitutions and Canons. 
There appears to be no dispute that, as a TEC parish, Good 
Shepherd could not pick and choose those portions of the 
governing documents by which it wished to be bound.  And the 
Dennis Cannon [sic] and its diocesan counterpart expressly 
state that the church property is held in trust for TEC and the
Diocese. Thus, if Good Shepherd had no authority to withdraw, 
it had no authority to revoke its adherence to the Canons or to
revoke the trust placed on the property by virtue thereof.  
Moreover, the Canons condition Good Shepherd's authority 
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The omitted statute, § 33-31-180 (2006)7 provides:
§ 33-31-180. Religious corporations; Constitutional 
protections. 
If religious doctrine governing the affairs of a religious 
corporation is inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter on 
the same subject, the religious doctrine controls to the extent
required by the Constitution of the United States or the 
Constitution of South Carolina, or both.
Once effect is given to § 33-31-180, and the disaffiliated parish's actions in All 
Saints are viewed through the proper constitutional lens, it is patent that the civil 
courts of South Carolina were obligated to accept the ecclesiastical decision that 
the so-called "minority vestry" were the All Saints parish's true officers. Had the 
All Saints Court analyzed the issue under all the relevant authorities, it would have 
been clear that the Court could not adjudicate the corporate legitimacy claim, as 
the question which group was the "true vestry" was a matter of religious law and 
doctrine, and both the Constitution and § 33-31-180 required that the Court accede 
to TEC's and the Lower Diocese's determination of the "true vestry."  See Pearson, 
supra. 
Here, the trial court sought to faithfully apply the flawed analytical framework 
created by All Saints. In so doing, she unwittingly violated the constitutional 
precepts that underlie the "neutral principles of law" approach to the resolution of 
church disputes. 
over the church property on its "remain[ing] a part of, and 
subject to, this Church and its Constitutions and Canons."  By 
purporting to withdraw from TEC, then, Good Shepherd took 
the very action that would strip it of its rights in the property.  
Good Shepherd may not avoid the consequences of its actions -
- consequences to which it had freely agreed -- simply by 
voting to no longer be subject to those consequences. 
 
7  This statute was the foundation of the trial court's order in All Saints. 
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I now turn to the facts of this case in order to determine whether the trial court 
properly determined that the present property/corporate dispute was cognizable in 
the civil court.
III. Application 
While All Saints deemed the reason(s) for the disaffiliated parish's corporate 
actions irrelevant to the dispute, I find that the underlying reasons for the schism 
here are relevant to the determination whether this dispute is, at its core, one 
grounded in "religious law, principle, doctrine, discipline, custom, or 
administration" and thus not cognizable in civil court.  See Pearson, 325 S.C. at 
53, 478 S.E.2d at 851-2.  Although the trial judge understandably sustained 
respondents' objections to much of the evidence offered to explain the 
Disassociated Diocese's decision to leave TEC in light of All Saints, I find there is 
sufficient evidence in the record to support my finding that doctrinal issues were 
the trigger. Doe, supra. A brief overview of that evidence follows. 
In 2006, the Lower Diocese of South Carolina convened to select a new bishop and
the Diocesan Convention elected Mark Lawrence.  There was evidence that Bishop 
Lawrence was understood to be disenchanted with TEC's direction.8  His 2006 
election did not garner the support of a majority of TEC's other dioceses, however, 
a requirement for a bishop's election to be valid.  In 2009, Bishop Lawrence was 
ordained as Bishop of the Lower Diocese following his reassurances to the other 
dioceses he would make the requisite vows of conformity to TEC's Canons and 
Constitution. The record reflects that Bishop Lawrence did make these vows. 
The record demonstrates that Bishop Lawrence and others in the Lower Diocese 
determined to leave TEC and to take with them the property of those parishes in 
the Lower Diocese that were intending to disaffiliate.  For example, a former 
8 Prior to 2006, TEC's General Convention confirmed the selection of the first 
openly homosexual bishop in TEC.  Bishop Lawrence testified the Disaffiliated 
Diocese had become "uncomfortable with the trajectory of the general convention 
of the Episcopal Church." In referring to the Presiding Bishop of TEC, Katharine 
Jefforts Schori, Bishop Lawrence testified she had gone "contrary to the historic 
teachings of the church and the Holy Scriptures" and admitted this involved "the 
sexuality issue." 
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president of the Lower Diocese's Standing Committee testified that the Diocese's 
bank accounts were moved to "friendly bankers" out of fear that the accounts 
might be frozen if Bishop Lawrence were to be disciplined by TEC.  This witness 
testified he received a call in 2009 from another priest in the Lower Diocese who 
expressed concern that Bishop Lawrence was "not moving quickly enough to take 
the [Lower Diocese] out of [TEC]," and reminded the witness that they had elected 
Lawrence "to take us out of [TEC]." 
Following this Court's opinion in All Saints, which held that the All Saints Parish 
was not bound by TEC's Dennis Canon or by the Diocesan Constitution's version 
of the Canon, and that a parish could disaffiliate from the Diocese simply by 
amending its corporate documents, Bishop Lawrence and his supporters undertook 
certain actions. 9  Among other things, the Diocesan Convention began the process
of amending the Lower Diocese's governing documents, and began providing 
Parishes with quitclaim deeds purporting to disclaim any interest of the Diocese in 
each Parish's property. Parishes, however, were asked to delay recording these 
deeds until 2011 because, as a witness for respondents testified, there was fear 
TEC would discipline Bishop Lawrence if the quitclaim deeds were recorded and 
his actions became public. 
Following the All Saints decision, certain leaders in the Lower Diocese, among the 
Trustees, and within the leadership of various parishes in the Diocese undertook to 
sever the relationship between themselves and TEC through corporate 
amendments. On October 19, 2010, Bishop Lawrence executed Nonprofit 
Corporation Articles of Amendment which purported to amend the language 
concerning the purpose of the Lower Diocese set forth in its 1973 incorporation.  
9 Acting Justice Toal ignores the evidence in the record, and concludes that in 
creating and disseminating these deeds and in purporting to alter the Lower 
Diocese's governance documents, "Bishop Lawrence [was] clearly acting on the 
[TEC's] behalf . . . ."  This astounding conclusion is supported by the equally 
stunning assertion that "[TEC] was fully aware of what Bishop Lawrence's 
intentions were when he was made a bishop . . . ."  The evidence reflects, in fact, 
that TEC was (rightfully) concerned about the Bishop's intentions and that his 2006 
election not receive the consent necessary from the diocesan standing committee 
for years, and then only after his written assurances (1) that he would make the 
requisite vows of conformity to TEC's Canons and Constitution and (2) that "[his]
intention is to remain in the Episcopal Church, period."
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The amendment purportedly altered the purpose from "to continue the operation of 
an Episcopal Diocese under the constitutions and canons of the Protestant 
Episcopal Church in the United States of America" to "to continue operation under 
the Constitution and Canons of The Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese of 
South Carolina." Other corporate actions were taken during this period which 
purported to alter the governance structure of the Diocese, and many of the 
Parishes undertook similar corporate alterations.  During 2010, the Trustees met to 
amend their corporate bylaws, which stated the corporation would carry out its 
duties under the authority of TEC's Constitution and Canons, to remove these 
references. 
On December 5, 2012, Bishop Lawrence was informed that TEC's Presiding 
Bishop accepted his renunciation of orders, and shortly thereafter, a letter 
confirmed the action.10  On January 4, 2013, the Respondents filed this suit for a 
declaratory judgment seeking a declaration that respondent Disassociated Diocese 
was the true Diocese in the lower part of South Carolina, that all property at issue 
belonged to that faction, and for injunctive relief against the Appellants.  On 
January 26, 2013, Charles vonRosenberg was elected and ordained as the Bishop 
of appellant Associated Diocese.   
The finding that TEC is hierarchal requires that I defer to its highest ecclesiastical 
body. Pearson, supra. TEC's acceptance of Bishop Lawrence's renunciation of 
orders and the subsequent ordination of Bishop vonRosenberg are decisions that 
the civil court "must accept as final and binding . . . ."  Pearson, 325 S.C. at 52-53, 
478 S.E.2d at 853. Because TEC has recognized the Associated Diocese to be the 
true Lower Diocese of South Carolina with Bishop vonRosenburg as its head, a 
civil court cannot inject itself into this church governance dispute and reevaluate 
that decision applying state law principles because this is a question of church 
polity, administration, and governance, matters into which civil courts may not 
10 The letter stated in pertinent part:  "In accordance with Title III, Canon 12, 
Section 7 of the Constitution and Canons of [TEC] and with the advice and consent 
of the Advisory Committee to the Presiding Bishops, I have accepted the 
renunciation of ordained ministry of this church made in writing on November 
17th, 2012, by the Right Reverend Mark Joseph Lawrence, Bishop of South 
Carolina." Bishop Lawrence contends he never made such a renunciation.  
November 17, 2012, is the date the Disassociated Diocese held a Special 
Convention affirming the Diocese's disaffiliation from TEC.  
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intrude. The circuit court erred in allowing itself to become entangled in the 
questions of which competing claimant was the true successor of the Lower 
Diocese. 
Further, the civil courts in South Carolina cannot decide disputes which are 
governed by church polity and governance concerning property ownership.  For 
the reasons given above, I have determined that the real and personal property 
disputes sought to be adjudicated in this civil lawsuit are "question[s] of religious 
law or doctrine masquerading as a dispute over church property [and] corporate 
control . . . ." See All Saints at 445, 685 S.E.2d at 172. I find, therefore, the Court
"must defer to the decision of the proper church judicatories . . . ."  Id. "What 
happens to the relationship between a local congregation that is part of a 
hierarchical religious organization when members of the local congregation vote to 
disassociate is an ecclesiastical matter over which civil courts generally do not 
have a jurisdiction." Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 
(1976). Here, the church governing documents establish that as of 2010, the 
Lower Diocese had agreed since at least 1822 to be part of TEC and to be bound 
by its Constitution and Canons. These documents make clear that since at least 
1979, and explicitly since 1987, the Lower Diocese, the Trustees, and the Parishes 
accepted that the property in dispute in this case was held in trust for TEC, and was 
controlled by the Diocese, the Trustees, and the Parishes only so long as they 
remained part of TEC. Here, both TEC and Lower Diocese had in place provisions 
governing the disposition of property in the event of a disaffiliation as 
contemplated by Jones. I believe the Court is "[constitutionally] bound to give 
effect to the result indicated" by TEC and the Lower Diocese, especially since both 
entities enacted these provisions "before the dispute erupt[ed]."  Jones, supra at 
606. I would therefore reverse the circuit court's decision to the extent it declined 
to give effect to the Dennis Canon and its diocesan counterpart, and to the extent it 
held that the Disassociated Diocese, the Trustees, and parishes controlled or owned 
the disputed real and personal property.11 
11 As Acting Justice Toal acknowledges, the determination that this dispute is
ecclesiastical is tantamount to recognizing the validity of the trusts.  By denying 
the ecclesiastical nature of this dispute, Chief Justice Beatty, Justice Kittredge, and
Acting Justice Toal free themselves from First Amendment constraints and, among 
other things, impose a requirement that each local church must specifically accede 
to the Dennis Canon before it can be bound.  Such a requirement entangles the 
civil court in church matters, for TEC's Canons specifically provide that "no such 
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IV. Service Marks
The trial court upheld the Respondents' claim that state trademarks it began filing 
in 2010 were being infringed upon by the Appellants in violation of S.C. Code 
Ann. § 39-15-1160 (Supp. 2016) and §§ 16-17-310 and 320 (2016), leading to 
confusion. It therefore enjoined the Appellants from "using, assuming, or 
adopting" certain "names, styles, emblems, or marks" claimed by the Respondents.  
I agree with the Appellants that in light of the evidence of the confusion created by 
the Respondents' use of the term 'episcopal,' with TEC's federally-registered 
trademarks, which include "The Episcopal Church" and "The Protestant Episcopal 
Church in the United States of America," state law dictates that the Appellants 
right to these marks is superior, and that therefore the Respondents' state marks 
must be cancelled.  See S.C. Code Ann. § 39-15-1145(3)(f) (Supp. 2016).  I would 
therefore reverse the injunctive relief granted by trial court.
CONCLUSION
I would overrule All Saints to the extent it held the Dennis Canon and the diocesan 
equivalent did not create effective trusts in South Carolina, and to the extent that it 
holds that corporate actions taken by Episcopal dioceses, parishes, missions, and 
related corporations can be reviewed without reference to TEC's Constitution, 
Canons, and other authorities, and without reference to § 33-31-180.  Further, the 
question of which diocese is "legitimate" is a question of church governance and 
not a matter to be resolved in the civil courts of South Carolina.  I would therefore 
reverse the circuit court's order to the extent it rejected the efficacy of the Dennis 
Canon and the Diocesan Constitution, and to the extent it declined to accept TEC's
recognition of the Associated Diocese as the true Lower Diocese of South 
action shall be necessary for the existence and validity of the trust."  Canon 1.7.5, 
and the Diocesan Constitution expressly provided for accession to, adoption of, 
and acknowledgment of the authority of TEC's Constitution and Canons. Jones
requires only that "a religious organization . . . ensur[ing] that a [church property]
dispute . . . will be resolved in accord with the desires of the members . . . ." 
indicate those desires in "some legally cognizable form . . . ."  Jones does not 
require that these "cognizable forms" be created in a way that satisfies the specific 
legal requirements in each jurisdiction where the church property is located.
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Carolina. In addition, I would reverse the injunction granted to respondents on 
their service mark claim. 
Finally, while all individuals are guaranteed the freedom to disassociate from a 
religious body, here the question of the disposition of ecclesiastical property 
following the disaffiliation from the TEC by the Disassociated Diocese, the 
Trustees, and the Parishes, is a question of church governance, which is protected 
from civil court interference by the First Amendment. 
For the reasons given above, I would reverse the circuit court's order and also join 
Justice Hearn's opinion. 
HEARN, J., concurring in a separate opinion. BEATTY, C.J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part in a separate opinion.  KITTREDGE, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part in a separate opinion.  Acting Justice 
Jean H. Toal dissenting in a separate opinion.
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JUSTICE HEARN: I concur fully with Acting Justice Pleicones's thorough and 
well-reasoned lead opinion, but write separately because of the magnitude of this
case and its far-reaching effects not only on the Episcopal Church ("the National
Church") but also all other hierarchical religious organizations.12 
The primary issue before the Court is which of two competing dioceses is the 
true Episcopal diocese in the lower half of South Carolina and thus has the right to 
control the property at issue which consists of thirty-six parish churches and Camp
Saint Christopher on Seabrook Island. Because the National Church has ordained 
Charles vonRosenberg and recognizes him as the Bishop in the Lower Diocese, this
Court, under long-settled principles, must defer to that decision. Consequently, I 
would find the actions of the breakaway bishop, Mark Lawrence, and his followers 
in leaving the National Church and attempting to take its property with them, are 
ineffective. Additionally, consistent with the majority of state court decisions which 
have considered this issue, under neutral principles of law, the Dennis Canon13 
controls and imposes an express trust on the property in favor of the National
Church. Therefore, I concur with the lead opinion and would confirm title to the 
property at issue in the National Church and reverse.14 
12 I emphasize that our holding does not, as the dissent claims, affect all trusts in 
South Carolina; rather, our holding is limited to ecclesiastical decisions protected by 
the First Amendment, as will be explained herein. 
13 A canon is "[a] law, rule, or ordinance in general, and of the church in particular.  
An ecclesiastical law or statute."  Black's Law Dictionary 206 (6th ed. 1990).
14 At the outset, I find the trial was permeated by errors which necessarily dictated
the outcome. The threshold issue in resolving this dispute was an analysis of the 
structure of the National Church––whether it is hierarchical or congregational––and 
the nature of the relationship between the thirty-six parishes and the National 
Church.   After repeatedly stating  on  the  record that  the  church's structure was 
"irrelevant," and refusing to admit evidence on this issue, insisting that South 
Carolina was not a "hierarchical state," the trial court found in its order that the
National Church "is not organized in a fashion that its governance controls the 
Dioceses or the parish churches. Authority flows from the bottom, the parish 
churches, up." Additionally, although there can be no question that the individual 
parishes have been affiliated with the National Church for decades, the trial court 
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 As the lead opinion thoroughly explains, there can be but one conclusion 
based on the record before us and the overwhelming consensus of our sister 
jurisdictions, and that is the National Church is hierarchical in nature.15 With that in 
mind, I turn to the claims raised by the respective parties.  
ANALYSIS 
I. ECCLESIASTICAL DEFERENCE 
I believe it is clear this dispute arises out of doctrinal differences between the 
National Church and the Breakaway Diocese. I therefore find that we are required 
in this instance to exercise restraint and defer to the highest ecclesiastical body of 
this hierarchical church. Though the Breakaway Diocese has attempted to frame this 
as a matter of simple corporate law fit for resolution in civil court, we are bound by 
the Constitution and our own precedent from interjecting ourselves into religious 
matters masquerading as disputes over property or corporate control. See Serbian 
E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. and Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709–10 
found in its order that "[n]one of the Plaintiff parish churches have ever been 
members of [the National Church]." 
The significance of this error in refusing to recognize the National Church's 
hierarchical design and the historical relationship of the individual parishes to the 
National Church cannot be overstated. By mischaracterizing the structure of the 
National Church and the nature of the relationship between it and the individual 
parishes, the trial court employed an erroneous framework in resolving this dispute.   
15 See, e.g., Dixon v. Edwards, 290 F.3d 699, 716 (4th Cir. 2002) ("Our examination 
of this record, and our study of the organization and operation of the Episcopal 
Church, compels the determination that the court was correct in both its analysis and 
in its conclusion: The Episcopal Church is hierarchical."); Episcopal Diocese of 
Massachusetts v. Devine, 797 N.E.2d 916, 921 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003) ("Based on 
our review of the record we conclude . . . that the Episcopal Church is hierarchical.");
Episcopal Diocese of Rochester v. Harnish, 899 N.E.2d 920, 921 (N.Y. 2008) ("The 
National Church has a hierarchical form of governance. Its governing body, the 
General Convention, adopted––and periodically amends––a constitution and canons 
that manifest its doctrinal law.").  
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(1976); All Saints Parish Waccamaw v. Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese 
of South Carolina, 385 S.C. 428, 445, 685 S.E.2d 163, 172 (2009).
The use of the word "masquerade" by the United States Supreme Court in 
Milivojevich is particularly germane here. Whether used as a noun ("a disguise or 
false outward show")16 or as a verb (to "have or put on a deceptive appearance"),17 
the word aptly describes the actions of Bishop Lawrence and the Breakaway 
Diocese. Despite the vows and written assurances made by Bishop Lawrence 
concerning his loyalty to the National Church, within a few short years  of his  
ordination, the masquerade began.18 Bishop Lawrence and his followers provided 
parishes with quitclaim deeds designed to disclaim any interest of the Diocese in
each parish's property.  In furtherance of a pretense of loyalty, these quitclaim deeds 
were not made public; rather, parishes were asked to delay their recording.  Bishop
Lawrence's group also quietly changed the Diocese's bank accounts, seeking out 
"friendly bankers" who would provide assurances that the accounts would not be 
frozen when litigation commenced. Importantly, the fuse which ignited this powder 
keg was without question the divergent views on the doctrines and teachings of the
National Church. 
Although the trial court barred the National Church from introducing evidence 
as to the reason for the Breakaway Diocese's actions, it is clear from the record that 
doctrinal issues concerning marriage and the role of women were the trigger.  A
witness for the dissociated parishes testified that it was "a doctrinal issue" which 
prompted St. Andrew's in Mt. Pleasant to leave the National Church. Another parish 
witness stated that the National Church "seemed to be moving away from the Christ
teaching [sic] that marriage is between a man and a woman." Other parish witnesses 
testified they were leaving the National Church because of the way it was treating 
Bishop Lawrence, obviously referring to the National Church's discipline of Bishop 
Lawrence as a result of his actions in leading the Breakaway Diocese out of the 
16 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 770 (2d College ed. 1982).
17 Id. 
18 Although the dissent takes issue with my recitation of Bishop Lawrence's role in 
this rift, the facts contained herein are undisputed in the record and many are based 
upon direct admissions from Lawrence himself. Moreover, I find these facts highly 
relevant––if not essential––in addressing Bishop Lawrence's alleged breach of 
fiduciary duties owed to the National Church, as discussed infra. 
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National Church. Bishop Lawrence testified the Breakaway Diocese had become
"uncomfortable with the trajectory of the general convention of the Episcopal 
Church." In referring to the then-Presiding Bishop of the National Church, 
Katharine Jefforts Schori, Bishop Lawrence testified she had gone "contrary to the 
historic teachings of the church and the Holy Scriptures" and admitted this involved 
"the sexuality issue." 
Given this background, I find this case is factually distinguishable from our 
holding in All Saints and more analogous to the dispute in Milivojevich where the 
Supreme Court found the issues were inextricably tied to "a matter of internal church 
government, an issue at the core of ecclesiastical affairs." 426 U.S. at 721.  
Furthermore, our holding is not wholly contradictory to All Saints; rather it is 
grounded in one of the very principles that case reaffirmed. 385 S.C. at 445, 685 
S.E.2d at 172 (finding that if a question of religious law or doctrine is masquerading 
as a dispute over property or corporate control, the court must defer to the 
ecclesiastical body). 
In essence, resolving this dispute would require us to decide which faction is 
the "true" Episcopal Church. Because the National Church has recognized the 
remaining diocese to be the true Lower Diocese of South Carolina with Bishop 
vonRosenburg at its head, we cannot inject ourselves into this dispute in such a 
manner as to overrule that determination. See Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 721. This 
Court has repeatedly acknowledged its constitutional mandate to refrain from
wading into matters of internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom or law.
All Saints, 385 S.C. at 445, 685 S.E.2d at 172; Pearson v. Church of God, 325 S.C. 
45, 49–50, 478 S.E.2d 849, 851–52 (1996). This decision is unquestionably a matter 
of church polity and governance, matters into which civil courts should not intrude.  
On this basis alone, I would reverse the decision of the trial court.   
With the guarantees of the First Amendment in mind, the National Church 
purposely and consciously decided to structure its organization in the manner 
espoused in its constitution and canons. Dating back to the early 19th century, 
churches were built, congregations grew, and members attended services, all with 
voluntary acceptance of the National Church's governing framework. In fact, Title 
II, Canon 6.1 of the National Church's constitution and canons states, "No Church
or Chapel shall be consecrated until the Bishop shall have been sufficiently satisfied 
that the building and the ground on which it is erected are secured for ownership and 
use by a Parish, Mission, Congregation, or Institution affiliated with this Church 
and subject to its Constitution and Canons." (Emphasis added.) Thus, by these 
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very terms, houses of worship cannot be members of the "Episcopal Church" unless 
they are subject to the National Church's governing authority. 
The National Church's constitution and canons are as much a part of its 
identity as a religious organization as the scriptures themselves. As a Court, we can 
no more decide what it means to be part of the "Episcopal Church" than we can 
dictate how the National Church chooses to worship. The inextricable link between
the National Church's religious structure and the dispute before the Court is
supported by abundant evidence. Accordingly, I find the current litigation before
the Court is, at its heart, controlled by matters of religious doctrine, and therefore I 
would defer resolution to the ecclesiastical authorities of the National Church. 
Nevertheless, in light of the Breakaway Diocese's insistence that the case is
ripe for resolution in this Court, I continue to address equally compelling grounds to 
support the lead opinion's holding.
II. NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES 
Even were we to wade into this dispute and resolve it solely on neutral 
principles as the dissent insists, I would still find the trial court erred in holding the
Dennis Canon ineffective and in giving effect to Bishop Lawrence's attempts to 
change the corporate charter and form. More importantly, I believe the writings, 
conduct, and relationship between the parties all evince the necessary intent to create 
a legally cognizable express trust, enforceable in favor of the National Church.  
In considering the application of neutral principles, I turn to Jones v. Wolf, 
443 U.S. 595 (1979), and the response of the National Church and the Lower Diocese 
to its holding. In Jones, the four dissenting Justices would have gone even further 
than the majority to hold that a rule of compulsory deference was necessary in order 
to protect the free exercise rights of those who had formed a religious association.  
The majority's response to that criticism resulted in this passage which is critical to
our resolution today:
At any time before the dispute erupts, the parties  can  
ensure, if they so desire, that the faction loyal to the 
hierarchical church will retain the church property. They 
can modify the deeds or the corporate charter to include a
right of reversion or trust in favor of the general church. 
Alternatively, the constitution of the general church 
can be made to recite an express trust in favor of the
39 

 denominational church.  The burden involved in 
taking such steps will be minimal.  And the civil courts 
will be bound to give effect to the result indicated by the 
parties, provided it is in some legally cognizable form. 
Id. at 606 (emphasis added).  
Two months after the decision in Jones, and in obvious response to the 
invitation contained therein, the National Church adopted the Dennis Canon, which 
recites an express trust in favor of the denominational church.  That same year, the 
National Church also adopted a companion canon which stated, "The several 
Dioceses may, at their election, further confirm the trust declared under the [Dennis 
Canon] by appropriate action but no such action shall be necessary for the 
existence and validity of the trust." (Emphasis added.)  Significantly, in 1987 the 
Lower Diocese did exactly that––confirming its acknowledgement of the trust by 
adopting its own mirror image of the Dennis Canon.19  The dissent fails to mention 
the Diocesan canon or analyze its importance in its opinion, perhaps for the same 
reason it does not discuss the hierarchical nature of the National Church and why 
that is critical to the resolution of the case before us. 
There is no question that South Carolina adheres to neutral principles in 
resolving church property disputes.  See Pearson, supra; All Saints, supra. 
However, that does not mean we are "not a hierarchical state," as the trial court 
repeatedly stated.  Adherence to neutral principles does not require us to ignore the 
clear language of the United States Supreme Court in Jones as to how hierarchical 
churches like the National Church may protect their property, nor the actions of the 
Plaintiffs before us.  In fact, the proper application of neutral principles entails a 
holistic analysis of deeds, corporate charters, and the constitution and governing 
documents of the general church.  In 1841, the delegates to the Diocesan Convention 
of South Carolina voted unanimously to accede to the National Church's constitution 
                                        
19  That canon stated, "All real and personal property held by or for the benefit of any 
Parish, Mission, or Congregation is held in trust for the Episcopal Church and the 
Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese of South Carolina.  The existence of this 
trust, however, shall in no way limit the power and Authority of the Parish, Mission, 
or Congregation existing over such property so long as the particular Parish, 
Mission, or Congregation remains a part of, and subject to, the Episcopal 
Church and the Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese of South Carolina." 
(Emphasis added.) 
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and canons. When the Diocese of South Carolina wished to divide into two dioceses,
permission was sought from the National Church to do so and was granted. When 
the Lower Diocese was incorporated in 1973, its stated corporate purpose was "to 
continue an Episcopal Diocese under the Constitution and Canons of the Protestant 
Episcopal Church in the United States of America." Representatives from the 
Diocese were present at the General Convention in 1979 when the Dennis Canon 
was adopted. In 1987, the Diocese adopted its own language reaffirming the trust 
imposed by the Dennis Canon. Accordingly, Respondents acted consistently both 
before and after the enactment of the Dennis Canon by the General Convention as 
though the National Church held a trust interest in the property at issue, going so far 
as to expressly acknowledge the existence of the trust in their own Diocesan canon. 
The highest courts in many other jurisdictions have concluded that the Dennis 
Canon applies to defeat claims of ownership and control over church property by 
disassociated parishes, "even in cases in which record title to the property has been 
held in the name of the parish since before enactment of the provision." Episcopal 
Church in the Diocese of Connecticut v. Gauss, 28 A.3d 302, 321 (Conn. 2011); In 
re Episcopal Church Cases, 198 P.3d 66, 84 (Cal. 2009); Bishop & Diocese of 
Colorado v. Mote, 716 P.2d 85, 108–09 (Colo. 1986); Rector, Wardens, Vestrymen 
of Christ Church in Savannah v. Bishop of Episcopal Diocese of Georgia, Inc., 718 
S.E.2d 237, 254 (Ga. 2011); Daniel v. Wray, 580 S.E.2d 711, 719 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2003); Episcopal Diocese of Rochester v. Harnish, 899 N.E.2d 920, 925 (N.Y. 2008) 
("We conclude that the Dennis Canons clearly establish an express trust in favor of 
the Rochester Diocese and the National Church."); In re Church of St. James the
Less, 888 A.2d 795, 810 (Pa. 2005); Falls Church v. Protestant Episcopal Church 
in U.S., 740 S.E.2d 530, 540 (Va. 2013) ("In the present case, we need look no 
further than the Dennis Canon to find sufficient evidence of the necessary fiduciary 
relationship. As a number of courts in other states have noted, the Dennis Canon 
'merely codified in explicit terms a trust relationship that has been implicit in the
relationship between local parishes and dioceses since the founding of [the National
Church] in 1789.'"). Unlike the dissent, none of these jurisdictions based the validity
of the Dennis Canon on the formal execution of trust documents following its 
enactment.   
In my view, the language in Jones that "[a]t any time before the dispute erupts,
the parties can ensure, if they so desire, that the faction loyal to the hierarchical
church will retain the church property" by reciting an express trust in favor of the
denominational faction has clearly been met here. As noted by the Connecticut
Supreme Court in Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Connecticut, Jones v. Wolf
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"not only gave general churches explicit permission to create an express trust in 
favor of the local church but stated that civil courts would be bound by such a
provision." 28 A.3d at 325 (emphasis in original). The dissent ignores the United
States Supreme Court's admonition that the "burden" on national churches in taking 
steps to impose an express trust over church property "will be minimal." Jones, 443 
U.S. at 606 (emphasis added). There is no question but that the National Church 
more than met this minimal burden in enacting the Dennis Canon, and under Jones, 
this Court is bound to recognize the trust it created. The Dennis Canon, the Diocesan 
Canon, and the mandate found in the National Church's canons declaring that 
affiliated parishes are bound by its governing laws satisfy the legally cognizable 
form and the intent to create a trust which Acting Justice Toal claims are absent. See 
Hope Presbyterian Church of Rogue River v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), 291 
P.3d 711, 720 (2012) (explaining "the neutral principles approach does not free the 
courts from examining and potentially giving legal effect to church documents"). 
To suggest that to comply with the blueprint laid out by the United States 
Supreme Court, the National Church would be required to obtain a separate trust 
instrument from each of the thirty-six parishes would impose a constitutionally 
impermissible burden on the National Church and violate the First Amendment. As 
it stands now, the trial court's order shows no regard for the self-governance of the 
National Church and instead attempts to wrongfully supplant enforceable religious 
canons. Thus, I join the lead opinion in departing from All Saints to the extent it
held that the Dennis Canon and subsequent acquiescence by individual parishes were 
insufficient to establish a trust in favor of the National Church.20 
20 I fear the approach urged by the dissent would ultimately lead to confusion, 
voluminous litigation, and uncertainty for religious organizations. Of what 
importance is it that a religious body be hierarchical in nature, if any individual
church can choose to disassociate from the higher body and take all property with 
it? For decades, religious organizations have structured their affairs to comply with
the roadmap drawn out in Jones where the Supreme Court expressly annunciated a
minimal burden for them to ensure a continuing body. If we were to ignore this, it 
logically follows that any hierarchical church would struggle to maintain itself. At 
any doctrinal difference, an individual parish could decide it disagrees with the 
teachings of the national body, break away and proclaim itself the "true" church.  In 
a hierarchical church, the individual parishes look to the head of the church to 
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I agree with Justice Kittredge's dissent in recognizing the unique nature of 
trusts as applied to religious organizations, but I cannot embrace his conclusion that
the trust imposed by the Dennis Canon is revocable at any time––a finding 
unsupported by any authority. To give credence to the terms of the Dennis Canon 
only to conclude that it is revocable at the whims of the parishes surely renders this 
a trust in name only. I find compelling the language used by the majority in Jones 
v. Wolf that "the parties can ensure, if they so desire, that the faction loyal to the
hierarchical church will retain the church property." 443 U.S. at 606 (emphasis 
added). If we conclude the trust is merely revocable, then certainly the parties cannot 
ensure the National Church retains the property, and Jones v. Wolf's clear effort to
prevent property disputes in the wake of church schisms is rendered meaningless.    
Justice Kittredge also posits that the provisions of the South Carolina trust 
code which unquestionably render the trust irrevocable are not enforceable here 
because, he argues, the National Church's entire case is based on the derogation of 
our trust code. At the outset, I find this to be a mischaracterization of the National 
Church's position because it did not contend strictly that the trust imposed by the
Dennis Canon was wholly independent from South Carolina law; to the contrary, the 
National Church repeatedly argued for the existence of an express trust, created 
pursuant to our established trust law. Furthermore, I find this reasoning inconsistent
with Justice Kittredge's subsequent claim that Respondents withdrew their accession 
to the Dennis Canon "in accordance with state law." What we cannot do is pick and 
choose which state laws to apply in order to justify a desired result. Thus, I would 
not be so selective in adhering to one law addressing the manner in which 
Respondents may revoke the trust, while at the same time disregarding the very 
statute that controls whether the trust, once created, is revocable. 
Respectfully, I disagree with my colleague and would apply the appropriate 
statute which resolves the issue: South Carolina Code Section 62-7-602(a) (Supp. 
2016) (common law default rule of irrevocability applies to trusts created before the 
effective date of the statute [January 1, 2006]). When faced with a similar schism 
in the Presbyterian Church, the Supreme Court of Oregon––also applying the 
Uniform Trust Code and adhering to neutral principles––found the express trust in 
favor of the denominational church was irrevocable because it was created before 
provide guidance and steer the course of worship, not the other way around. Were 
we to adopt the dissent's approach, the tail would be wagging the dog. 
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Oregon's adoption of the UTC. See Hope Presbyterian Church, 291 P.3d at 726– 
27. I would follow the approach taken by Oregon and look to our statutory code, 
which provides this simple answer to any question of revocability: the trust is 
irrevocable because it was created prior to the implementation of the SCTC.  S.C.
Code Ann. § 62-7-602(a). 
With regard to the dissent's proposition that eight21 of the dissociated parishes 
formerly affiliated with the National Church were nevertheless free to ignore the 
provisions of the Dennis Canon, I believe this issue is not properly before the Court
because, from my review of the record, the argument was not raised by Respondents 
at the trial court level, nor was it argued on appeal before this Court. To base its 
opinion on such reasoning now signifies the dissent's departure from this Court's 
longstanding adherence to issue preservation rules. See I'on, LLC v. Town of Mt. 
Pleasant, 338 S.C. 406, 420, 526 S.E.2d 716, 723 (2000). 
Justice Kittredge suggests that I am ignoring Rule 220(c) by insisting that the
Court should not reach this issue of the seven or eight churches. I am aware of the 
language in subsection (c) which provides that the "appellate court may affirm any 
ruling, order, decision or judgment upon any ground(s) appearing in the Record on
Appeal." (Emphasis added.) However, case law from this Court which interprets the 
Rule provides guidance on when this provision should be utilized. In I'on this Court
streamlined the procedure for the use of additional sustaining grounds, and held only 
that the basis for a respondent's additional sustaining grounds "must appear in the
record on appeal." 338 S.C. at 420, 526 S.E.2d at 723. Here, Acting Justice Toal 
purports to satisfy that principle by plucking this argument concerning the seven or 
eight churches, not from anything mentioned by Respondents in the pleadings, the 
record, or the brief, but rather from the post-trial motion filed by the National 
Church. In doing so, she ignores this language from I'On which I view as critical to
an appellate court's decision as to whether or not to exercise the discretion afforded 
by the Rule to affirm on this basis: "Of course, a respondent may abandon an 
additional sustaining ground under the present rules––just as a respondent could 
under the former rules––by failing to raise it in the appellate brief." Id.  This is
precisely what I believe occurred here, and while I agree that this Court may affirm 
on any ground contained in the record on appeal, as provided by Rule 220(c), I 
believe this is surely one of those instances where it "would be unfair or unwise to 
21 There is a discrepancy as to the precise number of parishes alleged to fall within 
the scope of this argument. 
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resolve a case on a ground never mentioned by the respondent," given the dearth of 
evidence on this issue in this voluminous record. See Jean Hoefer  Toal et  al.,  
Appellate Practice in South Carolina 62 (2d ed. 2002). Quite simply, too many
discrepancies exist to resolve the issue on this record, the most glaring being the 
actual number of entities to be affected––by the National Church's count the number 
is seven while Acting Justice Toal asserts it is eight. Accordingly, it is not the case, 
as Justice Kittredge posits, that I am ignoring the language in Rule 220(c), but rather 
that I would honor the language in I'On and elect not to reach this issue where it was 
never raised by Respondents and doing so injects an alarming degree of uncertainty 
into this case. 
Moreover, I fear the dissent mischaracterizes the National Church's argument 
regarding the twenty-nine parishes with documentation reaffirming their allegiance 
to the National Church. In my view, the National Church is correct in its assertion 
that even without these individual reaffirmations made post-Dennis Canon, the 
relationships between the National Church and the parishes reveal that an express 
trust exists, created as the majority envisioned in Jones v. Wolf. That the National 
Church could locate twenty-nine reaffirmations made after the enactment of the 
Dennis Canon simply serves to point out the magnitude of the trial court's 
inexplicable error in finding no express trust was ever created by any of the parishes.  
However, the creation of a trust was never contingent upon the presence of these 
documents. Likewise, the dissent fails to give any effect to the trust imposed by the 
Diocesan canon. If the Dennis Canon has no effect on these seven parishes because 
it was unilateral, the same cannot be said about the Diocesan canon, which 
unequivocally bound its affiliated parishes. Even without the Dennis Canon, the 
hierarchical structure of the National Church results in the Diocesan canon binding 
all affiliated parishes, including the seven in question. 
Lastly, even accepting arguendo the dissent's assertion there was no writing 
to create an express trust binding the remaining seven parishes, I would find South 
Carolina's doctrine of constructive trusts would operate to impose a trust in favor of 
the National Church. A constructive trust arises "whenever the circumstances under 
which property was acquired make it inequitable that it should be retained by the 
one holding the legal title." Lollis v. Lollis, 291 S.C. 525, 529, 354 S.E.2d 559, 561 
(1987). The impetus to impose a constructive trust "results from fraud, bad faith, 
abuse of confidence, or violation of a fiduciary duty which gives rise to an obligation
in equity to make restitution." Id. Importantly, in construing whether a constructive 
trust exists, this Court acts as the finder of fact in accordance with its own view of
the evidence. Id. at 530, 354 S.E.2d at 561. For decades, if not longer, these parishes
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very clearly held themselves out as being affiliated with the National Church, agreed
to be bound by its constitution and canons, attracted new members based on their 
affiliation with the Episcopal faith, participated in church governance, and in all
other ways acted consistently with the National Church's structure. As mentioned 
earlier, parishes must agree to be bound by the National Church's constitution and
canons before their buildings can be consecrated as churches of the Episcopal faith.  
In light of the evidence presented by both parties, I believe equity requires that a
constructive trust be imposed, lest this Court condone the seven parishes 
camouflaging themselves as loyal adherents to the National Church without
objection for nearly 30 years after the Dennis Canon was adopted, only to pivot and 
proclaim that relationship never existed when it no longer suited them.   This is  
precisely the type of bad faith which constructive trusts were designed to reconcile.22 
In sum, regardless of the effects, if any, of the absence of reaffirmations given 
by the seven parishes in response to the Dennis Canon, the record is rife with 
evidence that the National Church and Respondents structured their relationship in 
such a manner that Respondents were to act as trustees on behalf of the National 
Church. This Court must give effect to this trust under the neutral principles
approach. The dissent's suggestion that there were no written documents evincing a 
trust executed by Respondents is not supported by the record. Even beyond its clear 
accession to the Dennis Canon by its actions in remaining affiliated with the National 
22 Justice Kittredge conscientiously questions the propriety of declaring the National
Church the rightful holder of the parish property and depriving the disassociated
parishioners of the churches where they once worshipped. I answer his question 
with another equally compelling question: May we deprive the remaining 
constituents of the National Church of this same property when, for decades, they
attended services, donated funds, and invested time and labor into their respective 
parishes, all the while acting with the knowledge that the property was held in trust
for the National Church in accordance with the organization's widely-known 
religious canons? The dissenting justices attempt to answer these questions looking 
narrowly at state property law, but it comes at the expense of the First Amendment
freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. Justice Kittredge perceives an inequity in 
requiring the breakaway constituents to leave their property behind, but as a Court
we must be equally mindful of the past and present parishioners who devoted their 
time and talents to the individual parishes and relied on the fact that they were 
indivisible parts of the National Church.    
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Church upon its enactment, the Lower Diocese indisputably manifested its 
acknowledgement that all parish property was held in trust for the National Church 
through its adoption of its Diocesan version of the Dennis Canon in 1987. Through 
the hierarchical structure of the organization, the adoption of the Diocesan canon 
was binding upon all of its parish affiliates. Only by ignoring the hierarchical 
framework of the National Church could one believe the parishes were not bound by 
this Diocesan canon. 
Lastly I note, even if this Court resolved the matter solely under state 
corporate law, Bishop Lawrence disregarded corporate form and governance and 
therefore his actions were ineffectual.23 In 1973 the nonprofit corporation was 
chartered, establishing the governance of the diocese. This is significant for two 
reasons. 
First, the articles of incorporation expressly proclaimed the purpose of 
incorporation was "to continue the operation of an Episcopal Diocese under the
Constitution and Canons of The Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of 
America." Under a plain reading of the articles, the stated purpose incorporates by 
reference its alignment with the National Church, thereby subordinating the Diocese 
to the constitution and canons of the National Church. This stated intent to align and
subordinate to the National Church is further supported by the Legislature's 
expressed intention to allow religious doctrine to control over corporate form. See
S.C. Code Ann. § 33-31-180 (2006) ("If religious doctrine governing the affairs of 
a religious corporation is inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter on the same 
subject, the religious doctrine controls to the extent required by the Constitution of 
the United States or the Constitution of South Carolina, or both."). As such, the 
nonprofit corporation and those acting on its behalf are subject to all oaths and 
canons of the National Church. The exception for religious governance is critical 
here; while the trial judge found, and Justice Kittredge agrees, that Bishop Lawrence 
23 Interestingly, a recent decision from a California appellate court affirmed title to 
disputed property in the National Church following a similar series of events in the 
Diocese of San Joaquin, where, as a parish rector, Lawrence joined an attempt to 
lead the diocese out of the National Church prior to his election as bishop in South 
Carolina. See Diocese of San Joaquin v. Gunner, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d 51 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2016). In that case, the court resolved the dispute based on state corporate principles,
finding the attempts to amend the diocese's articles of incorporation and transfer 
property were ineffective.  Id. at 65–67.
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and the Breakaway Diocese made legally effective changes to the nonprofit
corporation, that result can be reached only by disregarding section 33-31-180 and 
relying on the default provisions of the nonprofit code. However, because the 
National Church has promulgated its own set of rules concerning corporate 
governance, including changes to the bylaws, section 33-31-180 requires that those 
rules trump the default provisions of the nonprofit corporate code. Thus, the actions 
of Bishop Lawrence and the Breakaway Diocese––which indisputably did not
comply with the National Church's governing rules––must be deemed ineffective.24 
Second, as the director of a nonprofit organization, the bishop owes a fiduciary 
duty of care, loyalty, and good faith to the Protestant Episcopal Church in the 
Diocese of South Carolina.  See S.C. Code Ann. § 33-8-300 (2006); see also Menezes
v. WL Ross & Co., LLC, 403 S.C. 522, 531, 744 S.E.2d 178, 183 (2013) ("The duty 
of loyalty requires corporate officers and directors act in the best interest of the 
corporation and prioritize the corporation's interest above their own."). It is 
troubling that the dissent would base its holding on the application of corporate law, 
yet at the same time inexplicably fail to consider Bishop Lawrence's derogation of 
his fiduciary duties. Bishop Lawrence's actions in this matter undermined the very 
organization he was charged (and swore an oath) to serve, thereby ignoring his 
prescribed fiduciary duties.25 This is evidenced by his issuance and delivery of 
24 I must part company with Acting Justice Toal in her dogged effort to impose South 
Carolina civil law at any cost, which in my view runs roughshod over the National 
Church's religious autonomy and indeed, elevates the concept of neutral principles 
to heights heretofore unknown. My own view of the appropriate application of 
neutral principles would honor the constitutional mandate to not disturb matters of 
religious governance in order to maintain religious institutions' independence from 
state intrusions, a principle repeatedly described by the United States Supreme Court 
as radiating "a spirt of freedom for religious organizations, an independence from 
secular control or manipulation––in short, [the] power to decide for themselves, free 
from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and 
doctrine." Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. E.E.O.C., 
565 U.S. 171, 185–86 (2012) (quoting Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of 
Russian Orthodox Church in North America, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952)).
25 In fact, when questions arose surrounding Bishop Lawrence's loyalty to the 
National Church and jeopardizing his potential ordination, he expressly represented
to the National Church his intention to abide by its doctrines and teachings. In a 
letter dated March 7, 2007, Bishop Lawrence wrote, "I will heartily make the vows 
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quitclaim deeds26  to disassociated parishes and instruction to those parishes not to 
immediately record the deeds; seeking out "friendly bankers" to discreetly handle 
church assets; and executing a formal residential lease of the diocesan property to 
himself in his individual capacity.  Bishop Lawrence's subterfuge took place over 
the course of several years, all the while keeping his actions secret from the National 
Church to which he had vowed his loyalty.  Further, the act of amending the 
corporate form was not in the interest of the corporation because it was contrary to 
the constitution and canons of the National Church.  Based upon both the articles of 
incorporation and the fiduciary duty owed to the nonprofit corporation, Bishop 
Lawrence acted outside his scope and authority in direct violation of his oath, the 
canons, and corporate governance.  Therefore, any attempts by Bishop Lawrence to 
unilaterally alter the Lower Diocese's relationship with the National Church cannot 
be given any effect. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Based on our doctrine of deference to ecclesiastical authority, the Appellants 
represent the true Lower Diocese of the Protestant Episcopal Church in South 
Carolina and are therefore entitled to all property, including Camp Saint Christopher 
and the emblems, seals, and trademarks associated with the National Church.  This 
holding is based on the National Church's recognition of Charles vonRosenberg as 
its Bishop and the express trust imposed on Respondents' property by the Dennis 
Canon, as well as on state corporate law principles.27    
conforming to the doctrine, discipline and worship of the Episcopal Church, as well
as the trustworthiness of the holy scriptures. So to put it as clearly as I can, my
intention is to remain in the Episcopal Church, period." 
26 Indeed, if Bishop Lawrence himself believed the National Church held no interest 
in the property of the various parishes, there would have been no reason for him to 
issue quitclaim deeds. 
27 To clarify the dissent's summary of this case's resolution, I join Acting Justice 
Pleicones and Chief Justice Beatty in reversing the trial court as to the twenty-nine
parishes that documented their reaffirmation to the National Church, but Chief 
Justice Beatty joins Acting Justice Toal and Justice Kittredge with respect to the 
remaining seven parishes. Four justices agree that the Dennis Canon created an
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enforceable trust as envisioned in Jones, but Justice Kittredge departs from the
majority and would find that the trust was revoked at the time of the schism.  
Moreover, though Acting Justice Pleicones and I believe ecclesiastical deference is
required in this case, both of our opinions find that all thirty-six parishes acceded to 
the Dennis Canon such that a legally cognizable trust was created in favor of the 
National Church. 
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CHIEF JUSTICE BEATTY: Given the divergent opinions, I am compelled 
to write separately because I believe my position is that of a centrist between the 
members of the Court. While I agree The Episcopal Church ("TEC") is hierarchical,
I disagree with the analysis and much of the result reached by the majority. Instead, 
applying neutral principles of law, I would find those parishes that did not expressly 
accede to the Dennis Canon should retain ownership of the disputed real and
personal property.28  Consequently, I concur in part and dissent in part.   
As evident by all of the well-written opinions, this case evokes strong views 
from each member of this Court. I cannot deny that each opinion is impassioned 
and persuasive. Although I appreciate the merits of each view, I do not believe that 
emotion or religious doctrine should control purely legal analysis. Rather, distilled 
to its simplest form, this case involves a property dispute. Thus, irrespective of the 
doctrinal context in which the case arose, this legal issue is our sole concern. 
In resolving this issue, I am guided by the neutral principles of law approach 
enunciated in All Saints and Jones and aptly discussed by former Chief Justice Toal.  
See All Saints Parrish Waccamaw v. Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese of 
South Carolina, 385 S.C. 428, 444, 685 S.E.2d 163, 172 (2009) (applying neutral 
principles of law in disputes arising between a congregation and its denomination
over title to church property and between the congregation's members over corporate 
control; stating, "the neutral principles of law approach permits the application of 
property, corporate, and other forms of law to church disputes"); Jones v. Wolf, 443 
U.S. 595, 603-04 (1979) (holding that a state is constitutionally entitled to adopt 
neutral principles of law approach as a means of adjudicating church disputes;
recognizing that "[t]he primary advantages of the neutral-principles approach are 
that it is completely secular in operation, and yet flexible enough to accommodate 
all forms of religious organizations and polity").   
Based on the neutral principles of law approach, I believe our analysis requires 
a discussion of the following sequential questions: (1) what is the legal efficacy of
the Dennis Canon?; (2) does accession to the Dennis Canon equate to a creation of 
a legally cognizable trust?; and (3) what is the import of a decision not to accede to 
the Dennis Canon? 
28 I express no opinion concerning the rights to the service marks as I believe this
determination should remain with the federal court.   
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The answer to each of these questions is not dependent on the doctrinal 
validity of the Dennis Canon or a determination that TEC is hierarchical. In fact, I 
look no further than our state's property and trust laws to determine whether the 
purported trust created by the Dennis Canon comports with the requirements of 
either an express or constructive trust.   
Although this writing arguably complies with the statute of frauds, like Justice 
Toal, I would find that, standing alone, it is not sufficient to transfer title of property 
or create an express or constructive trust under South Carolina law. See S.C. Code
Ann. § 62-7-402(a)(2) (2015) ("To be valid, a trust of real property, created by 
transfer in trust or by declaration of trust, must be proved by some writing signed by 
the party creating the trust. A transfer in trust of personal property does not require
written evidence, but must be proven by clear and convincing evidence, pursuant to 
Section 62-7-407."). Significantly, in the instant case, the party attempting to create
the trust was not the settlor. Instead, TEC was merely the drafter of the Dennis 
Canon as it had no interest in the property intended to comprise the corpus of the 
trust. Admittedly, there is no requirement that the drafter of a trust agreement be the 
settlor; however, in the absence of this status, TEC was nothing more than a 
demanding scrivener.
Further, in my view, the Dennis Canon, by itself, does not have the force and 
effect to  transfer ownership of  property  as it  is not the "legally cognizable form"
required by Jones. See Jones, 443 U.S. at 606 (recognizing that courts must give 
effect to churches' intent when deeds and trust documents executed by the general
church "provided [the documents] are embodied in some legally cognizable form").
While the Dennis Canon may use the term "trust," this word alone does not
unequivocally convey an intention to transfer ownership of property to the national 
church or create an express or constructive trust. See Lollis v. Lollis, 291 S.C. 525, 
530, 354 S.E.2d 559, 561 (1987) ("In order to establish a constructive trust, the
evidence must be clear, definite, and unequivocal.").
Yet, TEC argues that the parishes' accession to the Dennis Canon created the 
trust. Assuming that each parish acceded in writing, I would agree.  In my view, the
Dennis Canon had no effect until acceded to in writing by the individual parishes.   
Thus, in contrast to the majority, I would find the parishes that did not  
expressly accede to the Dennis Canon cannot be divested of their property. Because 
there was no writing purporting to create a trust and they took no other legal action 
to transfer ownership of their property, I believe these parishes merely promised 
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allegiance to the hierarchical national church. Without more, this promise cannot 
deprive them of their ownership rights in their property. However, I agree with the
majority as to the disposition of the remaining parishes because their express
accession to the Dennis Canon was sufficient to create an irrevocable trust.29 
In conclusion, I readily acknowledge the controversy surrounding this case
and the ramifications of the Court's decision. Even so, my decision cannot be driven 
by personal beliefs or a desired result. Strictly applying neutral principles of law, 
which I believe this property dispute mandates, I would affirm in part and reverse in
part the order of the circuit court. 
29 Additionally, I would find "The Trustees of the Protestant Episcopal Church" in 
the Diocese of South Carolina should retain title to Camp St. Christopher as my
decision in no way alters the clear language of the 1951 deed conveying ownership 
of this property. The conveyance of Camp St. Christopher was for the explicit
purpose of furthering "the welfare of the Protestant Episcopal Diocese of South 
Carolina."  In my view, the disassociated diocese can make no claim to being the 
successor to the Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese of South Carolina.   
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JUSTICE KITTREDGE:  Because I believe the proper application of "neutral 
principles of law," as enunciated in Jones v. Wolf,30 demands that all thirty-six 
local parishes retain ownership and control of their property, I would affirm the 
trial court in result.31 
This Court may—indeed, must—resolve this property dispute on the basis of civil 
law, without regard to religious doctrine or practice.32  I first address the twenty-
eight local churches that acceded in writing to the 1979 Dennis Canon.  Justice 
Toal presents a scholarly analysis of South Carolina trust law.  I take no exception 
to her presentation of general trust-law principles, and I join Justice Toal in result.  
However, for reasons I explain below, it seems to me that Jones v. Wolf creates 
some uncertainty as to what "neutral principles of law" means in the context of a 
church property dispute. As a result, I am not persuaded that a court may, within 
constitutional boundaries, simply apply general state trust law to decide this case.  
As best as I can interpret and apply Jones v. Wolf, it is my view that a trust was 
created as to the property of the local churches that acceded to the 1979 Dennis 
Canon. In what appears to be a pure application of neutral principles of law, 
Justice Toal would hold that accession to the 1979 Dennis Canon "was not a 
legally binding action to impose a trust under South Carolina law."  While I agree 
the national church could not unilaterally declare a trust over the property of the 
local churches, I would join Chief Justice Beatty and hold that the local churches' 
accession to the 1979 Dennis Canon was sufficient to create a trust in favor of the 
national church. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 606 (1979) (noting that courts 
30 443 U.S. 595 (1979). 
31 I join Justice Toal's opinion, save for Part II.C.1's conclusion that no trusts were 
created as to the twenty-eight churches that acceded to the 1979 Dennis Canon.  
32 By framing the issue before the Court as being which diocese is the "true" 
diocese of the national church, the lead opinion and concurrence preordain the 
result, for that is a question this Court clearly lacks authority to answer.  See id. at 
602 ("[T]he First Amendment prohibits civil courts from resolving church property 
disputes on the basis of religious doctrine and practice.").  Moreover, quoting from 
a case cited by Justice Hearn, "recognizing the Episcopal Church as hierarchical
does not resolve a property dispute such as the one here."  Diocese of San Joaquin 
v. Gunner, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d 51, 63 (Ct. App. 2016).
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must give effect to churches' intent when churches structure property arrangements 
"in some legally cognizable form"). 
I focus my comments on express trusts in light of First and Fourteenth Amendment 
considerations, for that is the basis on which the national church seeks to acquire 
control over the property of the local churches.  I do not depart from Justice Toal's
position lightly, for she faithfully interprets South Carolina's trust law as it applies 
to typical property disputes. Were the Court in the instant case permitted to apply 
the law of express trusts as we ordinarily would, the suggestion that any of the 
thirty-six local churches created a trust in favor of the national church would be 
laughable. Yet I find Jones v. Wolf teaches that a court must treat religious 
organizations differently in accordance with constitutional limitations and 
considerations. The burden the law imposes on a religious organization in creating 
a trust is reduced. 
In resolving church property disputes, we learn from Jones v. Wolf that "neutral 
principles of law" is a bit of a misnomer, for it is not really "neutral" after all.  If it 
were, why would the Supreme Court have taken pains to mandate that the burden 
imposed on a religious organization be "minimal"?  See id. at 606.  And why 
would the Supreme Court have specified ways churches could establish an express 
trust, without indicating concern for whether those methods were valid under any 
state's existing trust law?  See id. at 603. I believe where there is a dispute 
involving a local church's property rights vis a vis a national religious society and 
an affiliated local religious body, constitutional considerations require courts to 
analyze and resolve the property dispute through the framework of a "minimal 
burden" on the national religious organization.  See id. at 606. 
Two passages from Jones v. Wolf lead me to this conclusion.  First, the Court in 
Jones v. Wolf spoke forcefully about the many advantages of the neutral principles 
of law approach: 
The primary advantages of the neutral-principles approach are that it 
is completely secular in operation, and yet flexible enough to 
accommodate all forms of religious organization and polity.  The 
method relies exclusively on objective, well-established concepts of 
trust and property law familiar to lawyers and judges. It thereby 
promises to free civil courts completely from entanglement in 
questions of religious doctrine, polity, and practice.  Furthermore, the 
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neutral-principles analysis shares the peculiar genius of private-law 
systems in general—flexibility in ordering private rights and 
obligations to reflect the intentions of the parties.  Through 
appropriate reversionary clauses and trust provisions, religious 
societies can specify what is to happen to church property in the event 
of a particular contingency, or what religious body will determine the 
ownership in the event of a schism or doctrinal controversy. 
 
Id. at 603 (emphasis added).   
 
If this were the sum total of what Jones v. Wolf said about neutral principles, I 
would without hesitation join Justice Toal in full.  But the Jones v. Wolf Court 
went further. Specifically, the majority in Jones v. Wolf addressed the dissent, 
which preferred a rule of compulsory deference.33  In declining to mandate a rule 
of compulsory deference, the Court rejected the dissent's argument that the neutral-
principles method would frustrate the free-exercise rights of the members of a 
religious organization. The Court explained:    
 
The neutral-principles approach cannot be said to "inhibit" the free 
exercise of religion, any more than do other neutral provisions of state 
law governing the manner in which churches own property, hire 
employees, or purchase goods.  Under the neutral-principles approach, 
the outcome of a church property dispute is not foreordained.  At any 
time before the dispute erupts, the parties can ensure, if they so desire, 
that the faction loyal to the hierarchical church will retain the church 
property. They can modify the deeds or the corporate charter to 
include a right of reversion or trust in favor of the general church.  
Alternatively, the constitution of the general church can be made to 
recite an express trust in favor of the denominational church.  The 
burden involved in taking such steps will be minimal. And the civil 
33 In my view, Justices Pleicones and Hearn cast their votes based on the rule of 
compulsory deference that was rejected in Jones v. Wolf. See id. at 604–05 (noting 
the dissent in that case "would insist as a matter of constitutional law that 
whenever a dispute arises over the ownership of church property, civil courts must 
defer to the authoritative resolution of the dispute within the church itself" (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
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courts will be bound to give effect to the result indicated by the 
parties, provided it is embodied in some legally cognizable form. 
Id. at 606 (emphasis added).  It is this passage in particular that causes me to part 
company with Justice Toal's adherence to the normal rules of the road concerning 
the creation of express trusts.
As I interpret the above passages, Jones v. Wolf imposes a minimal burden on a 
national religious institution in the creation of what courts must recognize as an 
express trust over the property of an affiliated local church. Thus, while general 
principles of law mark the starting point in resolving a church property dispute, the 
harder question is determining where to draw the finish line—just how much of the 
general law must a religious organization follow?   
Here, as Justice Toal forcefully points out, the national church turns the law of 
express trusts on its head, as no local church (as "settlor") took steps to create a 
trust, but merely responded to ("acceded" to) changes to church governance 
documents proposed by the national church.  Nonetheless, given the Supreme 
Court's imprimatur concerning the minimal burden that may be imposed on a 
religious organization, I conclude that a trust was created in favor of the national 
church over the property of the twenty-eight local churches that acceded in writing 
to the 1979 Dennis Canon. 
The next question is whether these twenty-eight churches were irrevocably bound 
by the 1979 Dennis Canon. The national church accepted the invitation of Jones v. 
Wolf and created the equivalent of an express trust with a minimal burden.  If the 
national church had followed state law as described by Justice Toal and actually 
created an express trust in the normal course, the national church would have a 
strong argument on the issue of revocability.  But the national church cannot 
escape the method and manner in which it chose to create a trust, that is, by placing 
the trust provision in a church governance document that is inherently amendable.   
Justice Hearn invokes what she calls the "common law default rule of 
irrevocability" to argue that the local churches were eternally bound by the 1979 
Dennis Canon. However, this "default rule" is a presumption that is susceptible of 
evidence of a contrary intent.  In my judgment, as explained below, the 
circumstances here overcome the presumption of irrevocability. 
57 

  
  
 
 
                                        
 
"If the meaning of the trust instrument is uncertain or ambiguous as to whether the 
settlor intended to reserve a power of revocation, evidence of the circumstances
under which the trust was created is admissible to determine its interpretation."  
Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 330 cmt. b (1959). Among the factors that could 
indicate a settlor intended to reserve a right of revocation are the character of the 
trust property, the relationship between the settlor and the beneficiary, and the 
reasons that induced the settlor to create the trust. E.g., id. §§ 330 cmt. c, 332 cmt. 
a (1959). I believe these factors militate in favor of the trust's revocability.34  The 
disputed property includes land and buildings to which the local churches have 
long held title, in some cases for centuries.  And the impetus to create the trust 
came not from the settlors (the local churches), but the beneficiary (the national 
church). Furthermore, I would not myopically invoke the common law 
presumption of irrevocability where, as here, the national organization seeking to 
impose the trust placed the trust language in a document that is by its very nature 
subject to amendment. As the legislature observed in a comment to the South 
Carolina Trust Code, "An unrestricted power to amend may also include the power 
to revoke a trust." S.C. Code Ann. § 62-7-602 reporter's cmt. (Supp. 2016).  
In my view the circumstances described above—a trust provision drafted by a 
beneficiary and placed in an amendable church governance document—combine to 
overcome the common law presumption of irrevocability.  As a result, I would 
hold as a matter of South Carolina law that under these facts the local churches 
were not forever bound by the trust provision, and they retained the authority to 
withdraw their accession to it.35  That is precisely what they did—through proper 
34 I note that there is significantly less justification for adhering to the common law 
presumption of irrevocability where, as in this case, it is not consistent with the 
rationale behind the presumption—"[t]he theory . . . that most trusts are created by 
way of gift and a completed gift may not be rescinded by the donor merely by 
reason of a change of mind."  Mary F. Radford, George Gleason Bogert & George 
Taylor Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 998, at 235 (3d ed. 2006). Here, 
the trust was clearly not intended to effectuate a gift to the beneficiary (the national 
church); rather, the trust was drafted by the national church (the beneficiary) to 
benefit the national church. In addition, the settlors (the local churches) retained 
ownership of and continued to exercise exclusive control over the property. 
35 I reject any argument that the national church would be required to consent to 
any amendment of the trust provision, for the national church would never consent 
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action, by those with proper authority, the Diocese and local churches withdrew 
their accession to the 1979 Dennis Canon in accordance with state law prior to the 
filing of this litigation.36  Therefore, I would affirm the trial court in result and hold 
that those churches that had previously agreed to the 1979 Dennis Canon are no 
longer bound by it.37 
and the result would be a de facto irrevocable trust.  Chief Justice Beatty accurately 
describes the national church as "nothing more than a demanding scrivener." 
Allowing the national church to invoke the "minimal burden" approach of Jones v. 
Wolf in the creation of a trust is not a license to completely turn our back to neutral 
principles of law.  If it is determined that a settlor retains the right to revoke a trust 
and the manner of revocation is not specified, the trust may be revoked "'in any 
manner which shows a clear and definite purpose on the part of the settlor of the 
trust to revoke the same.'" Peoples Nat'l Bank of Greenville v. Peden, 229 S.C. 
167, 171, 92 S.E.2d 163, 165 (1956) (emphasis added) (quoting Broga v. Rome Tr. 
Co., 272 N.Y.S. 101, 106 (Sup. Ct. 1934)); see also S.C. Code Ann. § 62-7-602 
reporter's cmt. ("Where the right to revoke [is] reserved and no particular mode [is] 
specified, any mode sufficiently showing an intention to revoke [is] effective.").    
36 There is no question that Bishop Lawrence and the local churches had the legal
authority at the time to take the actions they did.  Justice Hearn's reliance on 
Diocese of San Joaquin v. Gunner is misplaced. In that case the attempted 
transfers of diocesan property by Bishop Schofield were ineffective because they 
"occurred after Schofield had been removed as bishop of the Diocese."  Diocese of 
San Joaquin, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 59. Not only that, but the entity to which Bishop 
Schofield attempted to transfer the property did not exist because he lacked 
authority under California law to change the diocese's corporate name.  Id. at 65– 
67. Conversely, notwithstanding the unrelenting vilification of Bishop Lawrence, 
it is manifest that Bishop Lawrence was duly ordained, appointed, and authorized 
to act at the time the property transfers and corporate amendments occurred, and 
they were conducted in accordance with South Carolina law. 
37 Despite Justice Hearn's claim to the contrary, reaching this conclusion does not 
require me to ignore the Nonprofit Corporation Act's exception for religious 
organizations. See S.C. Code Ann. § 33-31-180 (2006).  Section 33-31-180 grants 
supremacy to a religious corporation's governing documents only "to the extent 
required by the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of South 
Carolina." Id.  Therein lies the nub of this dispute, as "[t]he exact scope of 
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I turn now to the eight churches that never acceded to the 1979 Dennis Canon. 
Today, this Court allows (by a three-to-two vote with Chief Justice Beatty casting 
the deciding vote) the eight churches that were never subject to the 1979 Dennis 
Canon to keep their property. That is remarkable, for by a single vote the rule of 
law is preserved and property ownership is protected.   
Prior to today's opinion, the national church's focus in this property dispute has 
been whether the 1979 Dennis Canon imposed an express trust on the property of 
the local churches. The national church throughout this litigation has relied on the 
1979 Dennis Canon and the law of express trusts to support its claim of ownership 
over the church property of the thirty-six local parishes in question.  But it is 
undisputed that eight of the local parishes were never subject to the 1979 Dennis 
Canon. Yet two members of this Court would go further and transfer to the 
national church ownership of the property of the eight churches that never agreed 
to the Dennis Canon.  That is stunning.  The effort by two members of this Court to
strip the property from these eight churches confirms Justice Toal's observation 
concerning their motivation to "reach[] a desired result in this case." 
I first address the concurrence's view that the Court may not even consider the 
status of the eight non-acceding churches on issue preservation grounds.  The 
answer to this assertion is simple: "The appellate court may affirm any ruling, 
order, decision or judgment upon any ground(s) appearing in the Record on 
Appeal." Rule 220(c), SCACR (emphasis added).  The local churches, as winners 
at trial and respondents on appeal, were not required to play "what if we lose" in 
their briefs or during oral argument. 
Moreover, as Justice Toal points out, the national church itself brought up the non-
acceding churches. The national church acknowledged to this Court that only 
some of the thirty-six local churches involved in this litigation "made express 
promises in their governing documents to comply with the [n]ational [c]hurch's
rules" after the national church adopted the 1979 Dennis Canon.38  That obviously 
constitutional [l]imitations is less than clear and is subject to debate."  Id. § 33-31-
180 official cmt. (2006).  Justice Hearn and I simply disagree as to what the 
Constitution requires. 
38 The national church acknowledged in its brief that "29 of the 36 parishes made 
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makes an issue out of the churches that did not make such promises.  Although the 
concurrence may feign surprise at a majority of this Court addressing the status of 
the eight non-acceding churches, the national church surely cannot.     
As to the merits of the national church's claim to the property of the eight non-
acceding churches, in my judgment the dissent on this issue (Justices Pleicones and 
Hearn) misreads the Supreme Court's observation in Jones v. Wolf that complying 
with state property and trust laws would not impose an undue free-exercise burden 
on religious organizations as a command that states completely ignore their 
existing laws to placate hierarchical national churches.  Properly applied to the 
non-acceding churches, there is no neutral principle of law that supports the 
conclusion Justices Pleicones and Hearn desire.  As Chief Justice Beatty and 
Justice Toal note in their respective opinions, the framework set forth in Jones v. 
Wolf makes clear that, because of well-established South Carolina law, an express 
trust39 cannot be imposed on the property of those eight churches that never 
express promises in their governing documents to comply with the [n]ational 
[c]hurch's rules after those rules had been amended to include the Dennis Canon in 
1979." Brief of Appellants at 38.  The same point was repeated by the national 
church's counsel during oral argument. 
39 I do not address constructive trusts, because that issue is not preserved for our 
review. The national church has relied exclusively on the law of express trusts 
throughout this litigation.  The national church mentioned the term constructive 
trust just once in its fifty-one-page brief and not at all in its twenty-five-page reply 
brief. The sole reference to a constructive trust was a conclusory statement that 
"South Carolina's Trust Code and common law of constructive trusts" require the 
Court to enforce the Dennis Canon against all thirty-six parishes.  Accordingly, the 
law of constructive trusts cannot serve as a basis to reverse the trial court.  See, 
e.g., Brouwer v. Sisters of Charity Providence Hosps., 409 S.C. 514, 520 n.4, 763 
S.E.2d 200, 203 n.4 (2014) (refusing to consider an argument in the appellant's
brief that was "conclusory" and "not supported by any authority"); First Sav. Bank
v. McLean, 314 S.C. 361, 363, 444 S.E.2d 513, 514 (1994) (noting a claim is 
deemed abandoned when the appellant fails to support it with arguments or 
citations to authority); cf. I'On, L.L.C. v. Town of Mt. Pleasant, 338 S.C. 406, 421– 
22, 526 S.E.2d 716, 724 (2000) (stating that although an appellate court may affirm 
a decision on any ground appearing in the record, "[a]n appellate court may not, of 
course, reverse for any reason appearing in the record").  I add that the phrase 
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adopted the Dennis Canon. See S.C. Code Ann. § 62-7-401(a)(2) (Supp. 2016) 
(stating that express trusts in real property "must be proved by some writing signed 
by the party creating the trust"); see also Beckham v. Short, 298 S.C. 348, 349, 380 
S.E.2d 826, 827 (1989) (noting that under the then-applicable statute, "trusts in 
lands not manifested and proved by some writing signed by the party declaring the 
trust are utterly void and of no effect" (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
Nonetheless, the national church, with two members of this Court in support, 
desires the property of these eight churches by virtue of a "trust" the churches 
never acceded to. In short, these eight churches have never agreed to anything in a 
"legally cognizable form" indicating the slightest intention of transferring 
ownership of their property. Yet if Justices Pleicones and Hearn had their way, 
these eight local churches would lose their property today.  Under this approach, 
the 1979 Dennis Canon was unnecessary, for the national church would control the 
property of all local churches simply because the national church "said so."  
Perhaps this explains the wisdom of the Jones v. Wolf majority in rejecting the rule 
of compulsory deference that Justices Pleicones and Hearn invoke today.   
By a single vote, these eight local churches retain ownership of their property.  The 
message is clear for churches in South Carolina that are affiliated in any manner 
with a national organization and have never lifted a finger to transfer control or 
ownership of their property—if you think your property ownership is secure, think 
again. 
I dissent in part (concerning the twenty-eight churches) and concur in part 
(concerning the eight non-acceding churches). 
"constructive trust" was never mentioned in the approximately hour-long oral 
argument before this Court. In any event, Justice Toal correctly explains why the 
law of constructive trusts provides no lifeline to the national church.   
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ACTING JUSTICE TOAL: This is a very difficult dispute in which the trial 
court was asked by the plaintiffs to declare the status of title to church property.  
Just as the litigants in this matter are in disagreement about the legal issues raised 
in this case, so too our Court is sharply divided in our opinions about this matter.  
These divisions are the result of sincerely held views about the law, but we are 
united in our deep respect for each other's views and the sincerity which informs 
our opinions. The various writings are powerfully written and deeply researched.  
I am regretful that I cannot join my colleagues in the majority40 whose legal ability 
I respect so highly.  Therefore, I respectfully dissent.41  With regard to the question 
of who owns the disputed real and personal property, I would hold that the 
plaintiffs are the title owners in fee simple absolute to this property under South 
Carolina law and would affirm the decision of the trial court. With regard to the 
question of whether the defendants infringed on the plaintiffs' service marks, I 
would narrowly affirm the trial court under state law and defer to the federal court 
to answer any issues in this matter in which federal copyright and trademark law 
may be applicable. 
INTRODUCTION
The main points upon which I depart from my brothers and sister in the 
majority are as follows: 
(1) I would rely on over three hundred years of settled trust and property law 
in South Carolina to declare title to these disputed properties in the plaintiffs'
40 As there are five writings covering different aspects of this case, I refer to "the 
majority" when discussing the collective decisions of Chief Justice Beatty, Justice 
Hearn, and Acting Justice Pleicones. 
41 I likewise concur in the result reached by Justice Kittredge in his dissent.  Justice 
Kittredge believes that in Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979), the United States 
Supreme Court dictated a national church need not strictly adhere to a state's 
neutral trust law to establish a cognizable property interest in its constituents'
holdings. I cannot agree that complying with ordinary trust law requirements is 
overly burdensome, or that enforcing such requirements would violate the holding 
in Jones. However, Justice Kittredge nonetheless takes a reasoned approach to the 
applicability of our state's trust law in this instance.  I therefore concur in the result 
he reaches. 
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favor, as I believe the effect of the majority's decision is to strip a title owner 
of its property and give it to an organization with which the property owner 
has no affiliation, relying on documents and practices that do not create a 
trust under South Carolina law. 
(2) The lead opinion and concurrence42 (unsuccessfully) attempt to strip 
eight parishes of their titled property, despite the fact that these parishes 
have never agreed to or signed any document purporting to affect their 
ownership interests. 
(3) I believe the lead opinion is not consistent with the provisions of South 
Carolina statutory law regarding the organization and management of non-
profit and charitable corporations. 
(4) I believe the lead opinion uses an equitable standard of review in this 
action which is not consistent with the pleadings in this matter, and thus, 
misstates the question before this Court. 
(5) In my view, the lead opinion is contrary to settled First Amendment 
precedents from the United States Supreme Court. 
(6) Although the lead opinion specifically relies on and upholds our prior 
precedents—most importantly All Saints Parish Waccamaw v. Protestant 
Episcopal Church in the Diocese of South Carolina, 385 S.C. 428, 685 
S.E.2d 163 (2009)—essentially the effect of its holding is to reverse the 
result in All Saints. 
In my view, the result stemming from the majority's various decisions is a 
distinct departure from well-established South Carolina law and legal precedents, a 
departure which appears to be driven by a sole purpose:  reaching a desired result 
in this case. However, the Court's decision here affects law governing all trusts 
and titles as well as the operation of all non-profit and charitable corporations in 
this State. Thus, the effects of the majority's decision are sure to be pervasive, and 
42 For sake of clarity, I refer to Acting Justice Pleicones's opinion as the lead 
opinion and Justice Hearn's opinion as the concurrence.  I refer to Chief Justice 
Beatty's opinion as the Chief Justice's partial concurrence.  I refer to Justice 
Kittredge's dissent as the Kittredge dissent. 
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for this reason, I feel compelled to write separately. 
I. PARTIES AND POSTURE OF THE DISPUTE
The plaintiffs in this case are: (1) thirty-six individual church parishes, 
incorporated under South Carolina law and located in southeast South Carolina 
(the plaintiff parishes); (2) the Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese of South 
Carolina, a South Carolina corporation (the disassociated diocese); and (3) the 
Trustees of the Protestant Episcopal Church in South Carolina, a South Carolina 
corporation (the trustee corporation).  It is undisputed that the individual plaintiff-
parish corporations hold title in fee simple absolute to their parish's real and 
personal property. It is also undisputed that the disassociated diocese is the title 
holder of its service marks, seals, and emblems; and that the trustee corporation 
holds title in fee simple absolute to Camp St. Christopher. 
The defendants in this case are: (1) the National Episcopal Church, a 
voluntary unincorporated association (the national church); and (2) the Episcopal 
Church of South Carolina, a South Carolina corporation affiliated with the national 
church (the associated diocese).  As to the relationship between the plaintiffs and 
defendants, the disassociated diocese was once a member of the national church, 
and the plaintiff parishes were and are affiliated with the now-disassociated 
diocese. The associated diocese is comprised of the parishioners and churches who 
chose to continue their association with the national church when the disassociated 
diocese disaffiliated from that organization. 
Prior to the Revolutionary War, the South Carolina Commons House of 
Assembly created colonial parishes as part of the Church Act, granting the parishes 
both civil and ecclesiastical powers over the land and people. These colonial 
parishes were part of the Church of England, under the authority of the Bishop of 
London. However, the Church of England did not pay for the services provided to 
parishioners, nor did it pay for the properties used by the churches located within 
the parishes. Rather, the various colonial churches were locally funded, and the 
properties associated with them were titled in the local churches' names. 
In 1778, the first state constitution disestablished the Church of England as 
the state church and empowered existing parishes to petition the legislature for 
incorporation. The local churches previously under the aegis of the Church of 
England disassociated from that Church, and many sought to be legislatively 
incorporated. 
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Later, in 1785, the disassociated diocese formed as an unincorporated 
association of former Anglican churches.  In 1786, the twelve churches that then 
comprised the disassociated diocese adopted the first diocesan constitution.43  In 
this constitution, the churches—some of which predated the formation of the 
diocese by more than 100 years—reaffirmed that they wished to remain 
independent from the Church of England in ecclesiastical and civil matters.44 
Three years later, in 1789, the disassociated diocese and six other states' dioceses 
founded and voluntarily associated with the national church under terms dictated 
by the dioceses.45 
Except for a five year hiatus during the Civil War,46 the disassociated 
diocese continued its voluntary association with the national church until October 
2012. Throughout the history of the disassociated diocese's voluntary association 
with the national church, the plaintiff parishes likewise voluntarily associated with 
the disassociated diocese, and therefore, were only affiliated with the national 
church through their membership in the diocese.  Both before and after the 
association, the plaintiff parishes and their parishioners worshipped on property 
titled in the individual parishes' names, which the parishes owned in fee simple.  
Moreover, for as long as the disassociated diocese was affiliated with the national 
church, the national church and its dioceses, including the disassociated diocese, 
43 These churches included St. Philip's Church, Charleston; St. Michael's Church, 
Charleston; Prince Frederick, Plantersville; St. James' Church, Goose Creek; St. 
Thomas' Church, Berkeley County; St. Bartholomew's Church, Jacksonboro; 
Prince William's Church, Beaufort County; St. Andrew's Church, Mt. Pleasant; the 
Church of the Parish of St. Helena, Beaufort; the Episcopal Church of the Parish of 
Prince George Winyah, Georgetown; St. John's Parish, Colleton County; and the 
Episcopal Church of Christ Church Parish, Mt. Pleasant.  Some of these churches 
are parties to this action. 
44 Thus, these plaintiff parishes did not transfer title to their properties to the 
disassociated diocese. 
45 These states included New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, 
Maryland, Virginia, and South Carolina. 
46 Title to the properties owned by the disassociated diocese and its churches did 
not change hands either before or after the Civil War. 
66 

  
 
 
                                        
  
 
implemented various changes in their respective constitutions and canons, which 
are the governing documents for the organizations. 
In 1973, the disassociated diocese incorporated, becoming a non-profit 
corporation. Initially, the diocese's corporate purpose was "to continue the 
operation of an Episcopal Diocese under the Constitution and Canons of [the 
national church]."  Similarly, the trustee corporation's initial bylaws stated that it 
would carry out its duties under the authority of the national church's constitution 
and canons. Likewise, many of the individual plaintiff parishes had similar 
provisions in their governing documents. 
In 1979, the national church enacted the so-called "Dennis Canon," which 
reads: 
All real and personal property held by or for the benefit of any Parish, 
Mission or Congregation is held in trust for this Church and the 
Diocese thereof in which such Parish, Mission or Congregation is 
located. The existence of this trust, however, shall in no way limit the 
power and authority of the Parish, Mission or Congregation otherwise 
existing over such property so long as the particular Parish, Mission or 
Congregation remains a part of, and subject to this Church and its 
Constitution and Canons.
In 1987, the disassociated diocese adopted its own version of the Dennis 
Canon.47  The defendants contend that twenty-eight of the plaintiff parishes 
"acceded," in some form or another, either to the local or national version of the 
Dennis Canon.48  Eight of the plaintiff parishes never acceded to either Dennis 
47 That version of the Dennis Canon states: "All real and personal property held by 
or for the benefit of any Parish, Mission, or Congregation is held in trust for [the 
national church] and the [disassociated diocese]. The existence of this trust, 
however, shall in no way limit the power and authority of the Parish, Mission, or 
Congregation existing over such property so long as the particular Parish, Mission, 
or Congregation remains a part of, and subject to, [the national church] and the 
[disassociated diocese]." (Emphasis added). 
48 Some of these "accessions" occurred before the 1979 proclamation of the Dennis 
Canon by the national church. Some occurred before 1987 when the now-
disassociated diocese adopted its own version of the Dennis Canon.  Some 
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Canon.49  In all cases, however, the defendants concede that no formal trust 
documents were ever executed by the plaintiff parishes, the disassociated diocese, 
or the trustee corporation in favor of the national church specifying the title holder 
as the settlor or creator of the trust and the national church as the cestui que trust or 
holder of the beneficial title of the trust.  Instead, the defendants maintain that the 
Dennis Canon and other specific actions of the plaintiffs in amending their 
governing documents throughout their history (including before the existence of 
the Dennis Canon) "imposed" a trust in favor of the defendants.
In 2009, with the General Convention's approval, Bishop Lawrence became 
the ecclesiastical head of the now-disassociated diocese.  Shortly thereafter, a 
doctrinal dispute concerning marriage and the priesthood developed between the 
national church and the disassociated diocese, resulting in what was described as a 
"cold war" between the entities. 
As a result, the disassociated diocese, the trustee corporation, and the 
plaintiff parishes began to make significant changes to their corporate 
organizational structures and governing documents, in accordance with the civil 
laws by which the disassociated diocese and the national church structured its 
affairs in South Carolina. For example, in March 2010, the trustee corporation 
amended its bylaws to remove all references and accessions to the national 
church's constitution and canons.  Similarly, in October 2010 and February 2011, 
the disassociated diocese amended its constitution and canons to remove its 
occurred after both actions. 
49 The defendants do not reference any documentation of accession (and I have 
found none in the record) for the following plaintiff parishes: Christ the King, 
Waccamaw; St. Matthews Church, Darlington; St. Andrews Church-Mt. Pleasant 
Land Trust; St. Paul's Episcopal Church of Conway; The Episcopal Church of the 
Parish of Prince George Winyah, Georgetown; the Parish of St. Andrew, Mt. 
Pleasant; St. John's Episcopal Church of Florence; and St. Matthias Episcopal 
Church, Summerton. The defendants contend that St. Matthias and St. John's in 
effect "acceded" to the Dennis Canon because each was deeded some real property 
by the now-disassociated diocese that contained language tantamount to accession.  
However, neither of these churches ever directly acceded to the local or national 
version of the Dennis Canon, and the disassociated diocese disclaimed any interest 
in these churches' real property by quitclaim. 
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accession to the Dennis Canon and other canons of the national church, and to 
adopt a new corporate purpose:  "to continue operation under the Constitution and 
Canons of [the disassociated diocese]."  While these changes were being made, 
Bishop Lawrence was the duly-elected (by the national church) corporate officer 
empowered with the authority to undertake these actions in South Carolina under 
state law.50 
During the same time period, the disassociated diocese issued a series of 
quitclaim deeds to the plaintiff parishes, disclaiming any interest it might have in 
the plaintiff parishes' properties.  Further, the disassociated diocese applied to 
South Carolina's Secretary of State to register five "service marks"51: three similar 
names for the disassociated diocese, and two pictures of the diocesan seal.52  All of 
the amendments and registrations were accomplished through publicly-recorded 
legal documents. Additionally, at some point during this time, the national church 
had actual knowledge of these changes, but chose not to revoke Bishop Lawrence's 
authority within the church. 
In September 2012, the national church's disciplinary board found that 
Bishop Lawrence had abandoned the national church, and recommended 
disciplinary action against him.  On October 17, 2012, upon discovering the 
disciplinary board's recommendation to sanction Bishop Lawrence, the 
disassociated diocese ended its association with the national church.  The 
disassociated diocese's standing committee then amended its corporate bylaws to 
50 To the extent Justice Hearn's concurrence focuses on the alleged nefarious 
motives and actions of Bishop Lawrence and other parish officers and members of 
the disassociated diocese, as will be explained, infra, it is my opinion that such 
examination and recitation is inappropriate.  Because I believe this dispute should 
be resolved on neutral principles of law, reliance on this ecclesiastical and 
doctrinal background is improper to resolving this dispute. 
51 Service marks are similar to trademarks, but whereas trademarks identify and 
distinguish a person's or business's goods, service marks identify and distinguish a 
person's or business's services. Compare S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-1105(7) (1976) 
(defining "service mark"), with S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-1105(9) (1976) (defining 
"trademark"). 
52 In 2011, several of the plaintiff parishes also registered service marks. 
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add provisions prohibiting anyone from challenging the authority of the board of 
directors or removing any member of the board, including Bishop Lawrence, 
except by the process provided in the diocesan bylaws. 
Thereafter, loyalists within the disassociated diocese who remained 
committed to the teachings of the national church called a meeting.53  At this 
meeting, the defendants discussed replacing the disassociated diocese with a 
newly-created diocese—the associated diocese—and placing Bishop Charles 
vonRosenberg at its helm.
On November 17, 2012, the disassociated diocese held a Special 
Convention, at which the plaintiff parishes and their clergy overwhelmingly voted 
to affirm the diocese's disaffiliation from the national church, as well as voting to 
remove the diocese's accession to the national church's constitution.  On January 
26, 2013, following the national church's acceptance of Bishop Lawrence's 
renunciation of orders,54 the associated diocese was created and subsequently voted 
to reverse most of the changes made to the disassociated diocese's constitution and 
canons. That same date, Bishop vonRosenberg was officially installed as the 
national church's bishop to the associated diocese. 
After the plaintiffs withdrew from the national church, the defendants 
claimed ownership over all of the property held by the plaintiffs, arguing the 
plaintiffs only held such property in trust for the benefit of the national church and 
its associated diocese, and that the associated diocese was entitled to control and 
govern the assets belonging to the plaintiffs because the plaintiffs acceded to the 
Dennis Canon.
II. REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY
The question here is ultimately simple: what entities—the plaintiffs or the 
defendants—own the real and personal property at issue?  I fundamentally disagree 
53 The defendants called the meeting by emailing clergy from the disassociated 
diocese and inviting them to a clergy day purportedly sponsored by the 
disassociated diocese. This is just one of several instances in which the plaintiffs 
claim the defendants improperly used the disassociated diocese's registered name 
and seal without permission. 
54 Bishop Lawrence contends that he never renounced his orders. 
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with how the lead opinion and concurrence answer that question, as we are not 
asked to determine the "legitimacy" of either diocese, nor are we permitted to do so 
by the United States Constitution or South Carolina law. 
A. Standard of Review 
First, I strongly disagree with the lead opinion's statement of the standard of 
review. The lead opinion contends that because the plaintiffs are seeking 
injunctive relief, this is an equitable matter.  As a result, the lead opinion finds the 
Court is free to take its own view of the facts.   
However, by the terms of their complaint, the plaintiffs seek a declaratory 
judgment as to the rightful ownership, under South Carolina law, of the real, 
personal, and intellectual property of the disassociated diocese, the plaintiff 
parishes, and the trustee corporation.55  The plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief 
is clearly confined to the defendants' use of the plaintiffs' names, seals, and
emblems—which, as I explain further, infra, is ultimately a question of federal 
law. 
"A suit for declaratory judgment is neither legal nor equitable; rather, it is 
55 Specifically, the opening paragraph of the plaintiffs' second amended complaint 
states: 
Plaintiffs, by and through their respective undersigned counsel, bring 
this action against the Defendants seeking a declaratory judgment 
pursuant to §§ 15-53-10 et seq. of the South Carolina Code of Laws 
(1976) that they are the sole owners of their respective real and 
personal property in which the Defendants, The Episcopal Church
("TEC") has no legal, beneficial or equitable interest. The Plaintiffs 
(except for St. Andrew's Church, Mt. Pleasant) also seek a declaratory 
judgment that the Defendants and those under their control have
improperly used and may not continue to use any of the names, styles, 
seals and emblems of any of the Plaintiffs or any imitations or
substantially similar names, styles, seals and emblems and that the 
Court enter injunctions prohibiting the Defendants and those under 
their control from such uses pursuant to §§ 39-15-1105 et seq. and §§ 
16-17-310 and 320 of the South Carolina Code of Laws (1976). 
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determined by the nature of the underlying issue."  Sloan v. Greenville Hosp. Sys., 
388 S.C. 152, 157, 694 S.E.2d 532, 534 (2010).  Rather than looking to the relief 
sought, appellate courts must look to the "main purpose" of the underlying issue to 
determine whether the action is at law or in equity.  Verenes v. Alvanos, 387 S.C. 
11, 16, 690 S.E.2d 771, 773 (2010); Sloan v. Greenville Cnty., 356 S.C. 531, 544, 
590 S.E.2d 338, 345 (Ct. App. 2003). 
Here, the central issue of this dispute (as succinctly put by the lead opinion) 
is the determination of title to real property.  Therefore, the action is one at law.  
See Query v. Burgess, 371 S.C. 407, 410, 639 S.E.2d 455, 456 (Ct. App. 2006) 
("Where, as here, the main purpose of the [declaratory judgment action] concerns 
the determination of title to real property, it is an action at law."); see also Wigfall 
v. Fobbs, 295 S.C. 59, 60, 367 S.E.2d 156, 157 (1988) ("The determination of title 
to real property is a legal issue.").  In an action at law tried without a jury, this 
Court will not disturb the trial court's findings of fact unless there is no evidence to 
reasonably support them. Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Rhodes, 405 S.C. 584, 593, 748 
S.E.2d 781, 785 (2013). "However, an appellate court may make its own 
determination on questions of law and need not defer to the trial court's rulings in 
this regard." Id.
It is abundantly clear from the pleadings that the main purpose of this 
declaratory judgment action is the determination of title to real property. Thus, 
under South Carolina's jurisprudence, this is an action at law, and we must defer to 
the trial court's factual findings unless wholly unsupported by the evidence. 
B. First Amendment Jurisprudence 
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."  U.S. Const. 
amend. I; see also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (stating the 
Establishment Clause applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment).  
Undeniably, "the First Amendment severely circumscribes the role that civil courts 
may play in resolving church property disputes."  Presbyterian Church in the U.S. 
v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 
(1969). More specifically, "the First Amendment prohibits civil courts from
resolving church property disputes on the basis of religious doctrine and practice."  
Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for the U.S. 
& Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709–10 (1976); Presbyterian Church, 
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393 U.S. at 447 (discussing Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728–29 
(1871)); accord Banks v. St. Matthews Baptist Church, 406 S.C. 156, 160, 750 
S.E.2d 605, 607 (2013) (quoting Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 
116 (1952)). In other words, civil courts may not inquire into matters touching on 
"'theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the 
conformity of the members of a church to the standard of morals required of 
them.'"  Serbian E. Orthodox, 426 U.S. at 713–14 (quoting Watson, 80 U.S. (13 
Wall.) at 733).
However, "not every civil court decision as to property claimed by a 
religious organization jeopardizes values protected by the First Amendment."  
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 449; see also Jones, 443 U.S. at 605 (rejecting 
the suggestion that the First Amendment requires states to adopt a compulsory rule 
of deference to religious authorities in resolving church property disputes when the 
dispute does not involve a doctrinal controversy).  Instead, "a [s]tate may adopt any 
one of various approaches for settling church property disputes so long as it 
involves no consideration of doctrinal matters, whether the ritual and liturgy of 
worship or the tenets of faith." Jones, 443 U.S. at 602 (emphasis in original) 
(citing Md. & Va. Eldership of Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, 
Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 368 (1970) (per curiam) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
Thus far, the Supreme Court has expressly sanctioned two constitutionally 
permissible approaches for resolving church disputes: the deference approach and 
the neutral principles of law approach. See All Saints, 385 S.C. at 442, 685 S.E.2d 
at 171. Under the deference approach, "whenever the questions of discipline, or of 
faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest of 
[the] church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals 
must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on them."  Watson, 80 U.S. (13 
Wall.) at 727; see also Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. 
Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n, 565 U.S. 171, 185–86 (2012). The deference 
approach used to be the only approach taken by courts to resolve church disputes.  
All Saints, 385 S.C. at 443, 685 S.E.2d at 171.  However, as First Amendment 
jurisprudence developed, criticism of a pure deference approach arose because the
approach "is rigid in its application and does not give efficacy to the neutral, civil 
legal documents and principles with which religious congregations and 
denominations often organize their affairs."  See, e.g., id. at 444, 685 S.E.2d at 171. 
As an alternative, in Jones v. Wolf, the United States Supreme Court 
explicitly sanctioned the neutral principles of law approach to resolving church 
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disputes. 443 U.S. at 603 (holding a state is constitutionally entitled to adopt the 
neutral principles of law approach as a means of adjudicating church disputes); 
accord Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 449 ("[T]here are neutral principles of 
law, developed for use in all property disputes, which can be applied without 
'establishing' churches to which property is awarded."). 
Under the neutral principles methodology, ownership of disputed
property is determined by applying generally applicable law and legal 
principles. That application will usually include considering evidence 
such as deeds to the properties, terms of the local church charter 
(including articles of incorporation and [bylaws], if any), and relevant 
provisions of governing documents of the general church. 
Masterson v. Diocese of Nw. Tex., 422 S.W.3d 594, 603 (Tex. 2014). In Jones, the 
Supreme Court explained: 
The primary advantages of the neutral-principles approach are that it 
is completely secular in operation, and yet flexible enough to 
accommodate all forms of religious organization and polity.  The 
method relies exclusively on objective, well-established concepts of 
trust and property law familiar to lawyers and judges.  It thereby 
promises to free civil courts completely from entanglement in 
questions of religious doctrine, polity, and practice.  Furthermore, the 
neutral-principles analysis shares the peculiar genius of private-law 
systems in general—flexibility in ordering private rights and 
obligations to reflect the intentions of the parties.  Through 
appropriate reversionary clauses and trust provisions, religious 
societies can specify what is to happen to church property in the event 
of a particular contingency, or what religious body will determine the 
ownership in the event of a schism or doctrinal controversy.  In this 
manner, a religious organization can ensure that a dispute over the 
ownership of church property will be resolved in accord with the 
desires of the members. 
443 U.S. at 603–04. At the most basic level, the neutral principles approach 
embodies notions of fairness, as churches—like other private and public entities— 
can avail themselves of the protections of our state and local laws,56 and therefore, 
56 Here, the plaintiffs utilized local deed recordation systems and organized as 
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should be on an equal playing field when disputes arise under those laws.  As far 
back as 1871 in Watson—which was the architect of the deference approach as we 
know it—the United States Supreme Court acknowledged this basic principle of 
fairness: 
Religious organizations come before us in the same attitude as other 
voluntary associations for benevolent or charitable purposes, and their 
rights of property, or of contract, are equally under the protection of 
the law, and the actions of their members subject to its restraints. 
Conscious as we may be of the excited feeling engendered by this 
controversy, . . . we enter upon its consideration with the satisfaction 
of knowing that the principles on which we are to decide so much of it 
as is proper for our decision, are those applicable alike to all of its 
class, and that our duty is the simple one of applying those principles 
to the facts before us. 
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 714. 
In Pearson v. Church of God, this Court first adopted the neutral principles 
approach. 325 S.C. 45, 478 S.E.2d 849 (1996).  There, the Court articulated three 
general principles to assist the courts when resolving civil disputes involving a 
church. Id. at 52–53, 478 S.E.2d at 853. First, "courts may not engage in
resolving disputes as to religious law, principle, doctrine, discipline, custom, or 
administration."  Id. at 52, 478 S.E.2d at 853. Second, "courts cannot avoid 
adjudicating rights growing out of civil law," such as disputes determined by 
contract or property law.  Id. at 52 & n.3, 478 S.E.2d at 853 & n.3.  Third, "in 
resolving such civil law disputes, courts must accept as final and binding the 
decisions of the highest religious judicatories as to religious law, principle, 
doctrine, discipline, custom, and administration."  Id. at 52–53, 478 S.E.2d at 853; 
see also Jones, 443 U.S. at 602; Serbian E. Orthodox, 426 U.S. at 724–25. 
Prior to Pearson, this Court issued decisions resolving property matters 
using a purely deferential approach.57  However, following Pearson's
corporations under state law. 
57 See, e.g., Seldon v. Singletary, 284 S.C. 148, 326 S.E.2d 147 (1985) (deferring to 
hierarchical authority of the church in case involving ownership and control of 
church property); Adickes v. Adkins, 264 S.C. 394, 215 S.E.2d 442 (1975) (same); 
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pronouncements, South Carolina evolved into a State that exclusively applies a 
neutral principles approach to matters involving secular church disputes—and not
just property disputes. See, e.g., All Saints, 385 S.C. at 442, 685 S.E.2d at 170 
(applying neutral principles of law in disputes arising between a congregation and 
its denomination over title to church property and between the congregation's 
members over corporate control); Pearson, 325 S.C. at 45, 478 S.E.2d at 849 
(applying neutral principles of law in a contractual pension dispute); see also
Banks, 406 S.C. at 156, 750 S.E.2d at 605 (effectively applying neutral principles 
of tort law to a dispute between church trustees and the church pastor when 
deciding that the trustees' claims of negligence, defamation, and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress could be litigated in a civil court). 
Under the current analysis, a court must first determine if the dispute is 
ecclesiastical or secular.58  If the dispute is secular in nature, we have—until 
now—applied the neutral principles approach.  See id.  If the dispute is 
ecclesiastical in nature, we have applied the deference approach.  See Knotts v. 
Williams, 319 S.C. 473, 478, 462 S.E.2d 288, 291 (1995) (finding in a dispute 
about the ecclesiastical leadership of a church that "the courts' function is solely 
limited to interpreting the final action of the church"); accord Pearson, 325 S.C. at 
52, 478 S.E.2d at 853 (stating "courts may not engage in resolving disputes as to 
religious law, principle, doctrine, discipline, custom, or administration"). 
Only after deciding that the dispute is ecclesiastical should a court consider 
whether the church is hierarchical or congregational,59 and then defer to the 
decision of the highest authority in that body to resolve the dispute.  See Pearson, 
345 S.C. at 53 n.4, 478 S.E.2d at 853 n.4 ("In religious organizations of a 
hierarchical nature, courts would interpret the final actions of the highest 
ecclesiastical tribunal or body.  In religious organizations of a congregational 
nature, courts would interpret the final actions of the majority of 
congregations.").60  Thus, ordinarily, if a dispute is deemed to be a secular civil 
Bramlett v. Young, 229 S.C. 519, 93 S.E.2d 873 (1956) (same). 
58 The lead opinion agrees this is the correct starting-point in the analysis. 
59 See generally Md. & Va. Eldership, 396 U.S. at 369 n.1 (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (defining hierarchical and congregational organizations).
60 The lead opinion criticizes All Saints, claiming it stands for the proposition that 
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dispute, the question of whether a church is hierarchical or congregational does not 
even factor into the analysis. See All Saints, 385 S.C. at 444, 685 S.E.2d at 172 
("Church disputes that are resolved under the neutral principles of law approach do 
not turn on the single question of whether a church is congregational or 
hierarchical. Rather, the neutral principles of law approach permits the application 
of property, corporate, and other forms of law to church disputes."). 
Although the lead opinion states that it relies on this well-established 
framework, the lead opinion does not actually apply it.  In fact, in both of their 
analyses, the lead opinion and the concurrence do not first consider the nature of 
the cause of action, instead skipping straight to making a factual pronouncement 
that the national church is hierarchical.61  In so doing, both opinions persist in 
"the 'neutral principles of law' approach require[s] that in order for a civil court to 
determine whether a church-related dispute could be adjudicated in that forum, the 
court must look only at state corporate and property law, ignoring the ecclesiastical 
context entirely." This is a gross misstatement of the legal framework created by 
Pearson and perpetuated by the All Saints decision, in that both opinions clearly 
state that South Carolina still uses deference when appropriate—just not with 
respect to secular civil matters. 
61 As stated previously, I believe the lead opinion's exercise in fact-finding is 
wholly inappropriate under the proper "any evidence" standard of review, 
conveniently cast aside by the lead opinion to benefit its analysis.  Under the 
correct standard of review, we are required to uphold the trial court's finding that 
the structure of the national church is ambiguous due to displaying aspects of both 
a hierarchical and congregational organization.  In cases "where the identity of the 
governing body or bodies that exercise general authority within a church is a 
matter of substantial controversy," the United States Supreme Court has declared 
that "civil courts are not to make the inquiry into religious law and usage that 
would be essential to the resolution of the controversy."  Md. & Va. Eldership, 396 
U.S. at 369–70 & n.4 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (explaining that even when 
courts employ the deference approach and attempt to enforce the decision made by 
the highest ecclesiastical authority in a church, those courts "would have to find 
another ground for decision, perhaps the application of general property law, 
when identification of the relevant church governing body is impossible without 
immersion in doctrinal issues or extensive inquiry into church polity" (emphasis 
added)); see also Jones, 443 U.S. at 605 (stating that the deference approach is 
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committing a fundamental analytical error:  failing to first assess the nature of the 
dispute itself. By applying the framework in reverse order and declaring the 
church hierarchical as an initial matter, it is the lead opinion and concurrence 
themselves that imbue this dispute with ecclesiastical qualities, because the finding 
carries with it the implication that all decisions with respect to this dispute over 
property ownership flow from this leadership structure.  Thus, the lead opinion and 
concurrence essentially gut the neutral principles approach so carefully developed 
since Pearson. Under their formulations, there will never be a civil law suit 
involving a church that can be resolved without reference to ecclesiastical doctrine, 
law, custom, or administration.  In my view, the two opinions overrule Pearson
and its progeny in all but name.62 
In my opinion, the framework—properly applied—yields but one logical 
result. Because this is a dispute over title to property, we should apply neutral 
inappropriate when the locus of control is ambiguous (quoting Serbian E. 
Orthodox, 426 U.S. at 723)). Here, the record supports the trial court's finding that 
the national church's leadership structure is ambiguous.  I contend this ambiguity 
provides an additional basis on which this Court should look to neutral principles 
of property law to resolve this dispute.  See Jones, 443 U.S. at 605; cf. Serbian E. 
Orthodox, 426 U.S. at 714 ("[I]t is easy to see that if the civil courts are to inquire 
into all these matters, the whole subject of the doctrinal theology, the usages and 
customs, the written laws, and fundamental organization of every religious 
denomination may, and must, be examined into with minuteness and care, for they 
would become, in almost every case, the criteria by which the validity of the 
ecclesiastical decree would be determined in civil court.").
62 I note that until today, our precedents have conformed with the overwhelming 
majority of state courts (not to mention the United States Supreme Court) that 
would apply a neutral principles approach to this title dispute.  See, e.g., Jones, 443 
U.S. at 602 (upholding the neutral principles approach in a property dispute); Md. 
& Va. Eldership, 396 U.S. at 367; Diocese of Quincy v. Episcopal Church, 14 
N.E.3d 1245, 1258 (Ill. 2014); Masterson, 422 S.W.3d at 602 n.6 (collecting state 
cases). Notably, the lead opinion does not cite any cases to support its novel 
analysis, and instead primarily supports its departure from well-settled law using 
the non-prevailing analysis contained in the dissent to a Texas state court case 
which resolved a church property dispute using the neutral principles approach.  
See Masterson, 422 S.W.3d at 614 (Lehrmann, J., dissenting). 
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principles of South Carolina property and trust law. 
C. Application 
As noted previously, the lead opinion and concurrence declare this property 
dispute is ecclesiastical in nature based on their factual finding that the national 
church is a hierarchical institution.  In doing so, they rely on directives from the 
national church unilaterally creating trusts in the plaintiffs' properties, claiming 
these purported trust documents satisfy the requirements of Jones. This result is 
the exact opposite that I would reach in applying Jones's neutral-principles 
approach. 
Jones was a property dispute arising from a schism in a hierarchical church, 
in which the Supreme Court acknowledged the ability of civil courts to resolve 
most church-based property disputes using deeds, state statutes, the local church 
charters, and the national church's constitution.  There, the Supreme Court 
explained: 
Through appropriate reversionary clauses and trust provisions, 
religious societies can specify what is to happen to church property in 
the event of a particular contingency, or what religious body will 
determine the ownership in the event of a schism or doctrinal 
controversy. In this manner, a religious organization can ensure that a 
dispute over the ownership of church property will be resolved in 
accord with the desires of the members. 
Jones, 443 U.S. at 603–04.  I agree with the lead opinion that Jones offers religious 
institutions the ability to order their affairs and structure their property ownership 
through "appropriate" (i.e., secular) channels.  However, the lead opinion and I 
diverge at the point in its analysis where it fails to recognize Jones's mandate that 
any such undertaking must occur in a legally binding manner: 
The neutral-principles approach cannot be said to "inhibit" the free 
exercise of religion, any more than do other neutral provisions of state 
law governing the manner in which churches own property, hire 
employees, or purchase goods. Under the neutral-principles approach, 
the outcome of a church property dispute is not foreordained. At any 
time before the dispute erupts, the parties can ensure, if they so desire, 
that the faction loyal to the hierarchical church will retain the church 
property. They can modify the deeds or the corporate charter to
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include a right of reversion or trust in favor of the general church. 
Alternatively, the constitution of the general church can be made to 
recite an express trust in favor of the denominational church. The 
burden involved in taking such steps will be minimal. And the civil 
courts will be bound to give effect to the result indicated by the 
parties, provided it is embodied in some legally cognizable form. 
Jones, 443 U.S. at 606 (emphasis added).  The lead opinion and concurrence not 
only misinterpret this passage from Jones, but ultimately dispense with it. 
First, the lead opinion and concurrence extrapolate a requirement that any 
state law affecting a church's property rights may only be accomplished with 
minimal burdens on the national religious body.  More accurately, the Jones Court
was merely stating that only minimal efforts would be required on the part of 
national church organizations to bring their ownership interests within the ambit of 
state law and ultimately, to avoid litigation over property ownership in the event of
a doctrinal dispute or schism. Jones did not, as the lead opinion suggests, create a 
requirement that states amend their property laws so as to only minimally burden 
national religious organizations as they are attempting to structure their affairs with 
respect to property ownership in their member dioceses.  Further, contrary to the 
lead opinion's implication, South Carolina law does not place undue burdens on 
religious bodies seeking to create trusts in this State.  Our general trust law is 
similar to that of every other jurisdiction in this country, and therefore, it requires 
only minimal effort to comply with South Carolina trust law. 
Next, the lead opinion and concurrence dismiss completely the requirements 
that trust documents—which "ensure . . . that the faction loyal to the hierarchical
church will retain the church property"—must be adopted before the dispute begins 
and be "embodied in some legally cognizable form" in order to be enforceable 
under state law. To me, however, this language is the defining language of the 
Jones opinion with respect to this suit, and why the plaintiffs necessarily must 
prevail. 
The lead opinion finds that not only is accession to the Dennis Canon not 
required, but that the defendants were not required to take any further action under 
South Carolina law to ensure the validity of these "trusts."  Remember that eight 
parishes neither acceded to the Dennis Canon nor took any other legal action with 
respect to their property outside of membership in the national church.  Thus, the 
lead opinion finds trusts existed with respect to all of the plaintiff parishes merely 
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because these parishes were members in a voluntary organization where that 
organization has unilaterally claimed ownership in their property. 
By giving credence to this standard built only on "the national church said 
so," the lead opinion effectively ignores Jones altogether. Jones explicitly suggests 
state courts use "well-established concepts of trust and property law familiar to 
lawyers and judges" to resolve these disputes, "thereby promis[ing] to free civil 
courts completely from entanglement in questions of religious doctrine, policy, and 
practice." 443 U.S. at 603–04. In fact, in Jones, the United States Supreme Court 
remanded the case to Georgia to determine the property's ownership by applying 
Georgia's long-established property law.  Id. at 609–10. Yet, in direct 
contravention of Jones's directive to use state principles of property and trust law 
ingrained in the collective knowledge of our bench and bar to resolve church 
property disputes, the lead opinion instead does exactly what Jones warns against 
and dives headfirst into religious matters. 
Under South Carolina law, there are only two ways to create a trust: either 
expressly or constructively.  As will be explained, infra, it is my opinion that the 
defendants accomplished neither in this case.
1. Express Trusts 
The South Carolina Trust Code63 provides that an express trust may be 
created by either the "transfer of property to another person as trustee," or by a 
"written declaration signed by the owner of property that the owner holds 
identifiable property as trustee."  S.C. Code Ann. § 62-7-401(a)(1); see also All 
Saints, 385 S.C. at 449, 685 S.E.2d at 174.  However, it is axiomatic that the trust 
is created only if, inter alia, the settlor indicates an intention to create the trust.  
S.C. Code Ann. § 62-7-402(a)(2); State v. Parris, 363 S.C. 477, 482, 611 S.E.2d 
501, 503 (2005). Moreover, to satisfy the statute of frauds, "a trust of real property 
. . . must be proved by some writing signed by the party creating the trust."  S.C. 
Code Ann. § 62-7-401(a)(2); Whetstone v. Whetstone, 309 S.C. 227, 231–32, 420 
S.E.2d 877, 879 (Ct. App. 1992) (citing Beckham v. Short, 298 S.C. 348, 349, 380 
S.E.2d 826, 827 (1989)). Proof of express trusts must be made by clear and 
convincing evidence. Price v. Brown, 4 S.C. 144 (1873); cf. S.C. Code Ann. § 62-
7-407 (stating that the burden of persuasion for oral trusts is clear and convincing 
63 S.C. Code Ann. §§ 62-7-101 to -1106 (2009 & Supp. 2016).
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evidence). 
In examining the efficacy of the Dennis Canon, I would find that it does not 
satisfy the requirements for creating an express trust under South Carolina law.  
First, there was no transfer of title.  In fact, the defendants stipulated at trial that the 
property in dispute is (and has always been) titled in the plaintiff parishes' names. 
Thus, in order to create an express trust, the plaintiff parishes—as the title-
holders—must have made a written, signed statement of intent to transfer their 
property into a trust for the benefit of the national church.  Cf. Turbeville v. Morris, 
203 S.C. 287, 26 S.E.2d 821 (1943) (examining the document creating a purported 
trust in order to ascertain which church faction was the beneficiary of the trust).  
However, the Dennis Canon is merely the national church's statement of interest in 
the plaintiff parishes' properties.  "It is an axiomatic principle of law that a person 
or entity must hold title to property in order to declare that it is held in trust for the 
benefit of another or transfer legal title to one person for the benefit of another."  
All Saints, 385 S.C. at 449, 685 S.E.2d at 174.  Thus, I believe the only conclusion 
this Court could reach under South Carolina law is that the Dennis Canon is not a 
basis for asserting legal title to the plaintiffs' properties, nor does it create an 
express trust over the those properties. Id. (holding that the Dennis Canon does not 
create an express trust pursuant to South Carolina property law); cf. Jones, 443 
U.S. at 606 (stating that civil courts must give effect to deeds and trust documents 
executed by the general church "provided [the documents are] embodied in some
legally cognizable form" (emphasis added)).64 
With respect to the writing requirement, the defendants argue that twenty-
eight of the thirty-six plaintiff parishes "made express promises in their governing 
documents to comply with the [n]ational [c]hurch's rules after those rules had been 
amended to include the Dennis Canon in 1979," and that "[t]hese writings fulfilled 
the writing and signature requirements of South Carolina's Trust Code."65  I would 
64 For this reason, I believe the lead opinion errs in reexamining our holding in All 
Saints. I am just as firmly convinced now—as the Court was in 2009—that the 
Dennis Canon did not create an express trust under South Carolina law and that All 
Saints was correctly decided.  To the extent the lead opinion contends that it is not 
seeking to overrule the result of All Saints, its analysis of the issue does not 
comport with this assertion. 
65 A majority of the Court agrees with my analysis up to this point, finding we 
must apply neutral principles of South Carolina property law to resolve this 
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reject this argument for two reasons.
First, the twenty-eight parishes that made this alleged express promise at 
most merely acceded to the national church's constitution and canons.  However, 
their accession did not include a transfer of title in a form recognized under South 
Carolina law. Moreover, like the two prior disassociations—from the Church of 
England during the Revolutionary War, and from the national church during the 
Civil War—the plaintiffs associated and disassociated with the national church on 
their own terms, and at no point made a title transfer recognizable under South 
Carolina law. Thus, it is my opinion that the parishes' accession to the national 
church's rules does not constitute clear and convincing evidence that they intended 
to place their property in trust (either revocable or irrevocable) for the national 
church. See Price, 4 S.C. at 144 (requiring clear and convincing evidence of intent 
to place property in beneficial use for another).66 
dispute. However, on this argument, Chief Justice Beatty and I part ways.  He 
agrees with the defendants' argument, finding "the Dennis Canon had no effect 
until acceded to in writing by the [twenty-eight] individual parishes."  I explain, 
infra, why I respectfully disagree with him.  Essentially, I do not believe mere 
accession meets the requirements of South Carolina law for the creation of a trust. 
66 I note that the defendants ask that we resolve this title issue by deciding whether 
the parties complied with the rules set forth in their respective constitutions and 
canons—such as the Dennis Canon. While we can decide that the Dennis Canon 
(and other governing documents) are not legally binding trust documents because 
they do not comport with the secular formalities required by South Carolina law to 
impose a trust on the settlor's property, it would be completely improper under 
settled First Amendment jurisprudence for this Court to resolve this real property 
title issue by delving into the ecclesiastical doctrine of the national church.  See, 
e.g., Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 449 ("States, religious organizations, and 
individuals must structure relationships involving church property so as not to 
require the civil courts to resolve ecclesiastical questions."). 
The concurrence suggests the Court does not have enough information to 
determine, applying long-standing state property principles, the statuses of the 
titles of the various properties, and that at best, a remand would be required to 
allow the parties to litigate the issue.  However, this flies in the face of basic 
appellate principles.  Cf. Odom v. State, 337 S.C. 256, 261, 523 S.E.2d 753, 755 
83 

  
 
 
 
   
                                        
 
 
2. Constructive Trusts 
Likewise, I would find that constructive trusts did not arise with respect to 
the property at issue. 
"A constructive trust will arise whenever the circumstances under which 
property was acquired make it inequitable that it should be retained by the one 
holding the legal title." Lollis v. Lollis, 291 S.C. 525, 529, 354 S.E.2d 559, 561 
(1987); see also Carolina Park Assocs., L.L.C. v. Marino, 400 S.C. 1, 6, 732 
S.E.2d 876, 879 (2012). "A constructive trust results from fraud, bad faith, abuse 
of confidence, or violation of a fiduciary duty which gives rise to an obligation in 
equity to make restitution."  Lollis, 291 S.C. at 529, 354 S.E.2d at 561; Gordon v. 
Busbee, 397 S.C. 119, 141, 723 S.E.2d 822, 834 (Ct. App. 2011).  "In order to 
establish a constructive trust, the evidence must be clear, definite, and 
unequivocal." Lollis, 291 S.C. at 530, 354 S.E.2d at 561.
According to the testimony adduced at trial, the plaintiffs obtained their 
properties through (1) grants from current or prior parishioners; or (2) purchase 
with their own funds, and not funds from the national church.  The defendants
made no effort to demonstrate that the parishioner grants were intended to be 
grants to the national church or the local diocese affiliated with the national 
church. In fact, the deed granting Camp St. Christopher to the trustee corporation 
expressly names the trustee corporation as beneficiary due to its "good works."  
Therefore, I would find no "clear, definite, and unequivocal" evidence of fraud on 
the part of the plaintiffs in acquiring title to the properties. 
The defendants argue Bishop Lawrence and the disassociated diocese acted 
(1999) (holding successive PCR applications are disfavored because they allow the 
applicant more than one bite at the apple).  Here, each plaintiff painstakingly 
entered into evidence information about their individual titles.  In response, the 
defendants did not attempt to refute or distinguish any of the individual plaintiff's 
title information, but instead proceeded entirely on ecclesiastical theory, i.e., that 
they owned all of the disputed properties, without exception, because "the national 
church said so." In my view, the plaintiffs clearly established each of their titles 
under our state's property, trust, and corporate law, and the defendants failed to 
grapple with the implications of those neutral principles of state law, to their 
detriment. 
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deceptively and contrary to the national church's interests in issuing the quitclaim 
deeds, and that their amendment of the disassociated diocese's corporate charter 
was ultra vires. In the defendant's view, this provides evidence of fraud sufficient 
to make constructive trust appropriate in this situation.  I disagree. 
Essentially, the defendants ask that we determine the plaintiffs lacked the
canonical authority to issue the quitclaim deeds and amend their corporate charters.  
However, the Supreme Court has expressly forbidden courts from making such 
determinations.  See Md. & Va. Eldership, 396 U.S. at 370 (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (stating that even in applying the deference approach, "civil courts do 
not inquire whether the relevant church governing body has power under religious 
law to control the property in question.  Such a determination, unlike the 
identification of the governing body, frequently necessitates the interpretation of 
ambiguous religious law and usage.  To permit civil courts to probe deeply enough 
into the allocation of power within a church so as to decide where religious law 
places control over the use of church property would violate the First Amendment 
in much the same manner as civil determination of religious doctrine."). 
Rather, we may only determine whether the plaintiffs had legal authority and 
followed the appropriate steps under South Carolina's corporate law to issue the 
quitclaim deeds and amend their corporate charters.  I would find the plaintiffs had 
the legal authority and complied with the legal requirements to effectuate those 
changes, and the defendants do not argue otherwise to this Court.  Remember, the 
national church never revoked Bishop Lawrence's authority over the disassociated 
diocese while the diocese was issuing the quitclaim deeds or amending its diocesan 
constitution, canons, and corporate purpose.67  Indeed, the purported acceptance of 
Bishop Lawrence's renunciation of orders occurred after the amendments to the 
various constitutions and deeds were executed and publicly recorded.  To me, this 
constitutes overwhelming evidence of the national church's acquiescence to the 
changes in the plaintiffs' corporate forms, constitutions, and bylaws. 
Further, all actions by Bishop Lawrence were undertaken using the correct 
legal channels and proper corporate formalities under South Carolina law.  Not 
only was Bishop Lawrence clearly acting on the national church's behalf at the 
time, but the record shows that the national church was fully aware of what Bishop 
67 Likewise, the national church did not assert the plaintiff parishes lacked the 
authority to de-accede. 
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Lawrence's intentions were when he was made a bishop and that he was executing 
these deeds by the authority vested in him by the national church.68  Thus, whether 
or not trusts were created—which I contend they were not—the current status of 
the property is that it has been deeded back to the plaintiff parishes.  That these 
various corporate amendments and deeds are embodied in a "legally cognizable 
form" is irrefutable. 
The lead opinion utterly fails to account for the national church's subsequent 
action of quitclaiming the deeds back to the plaintiff parishes.  Even though the 
lead opinion and concurrence declare this dispute "ecclesiastical," the fact remains 
that Bishop Lawrence—acting with the full authority of the national church— 
legally transferred the deeds to the plaintiffs, and the deeds continue to be held by 
the plaintiffs. No level of deference to the national church at this point can change 
this. Thus, it remains unclear what legal basis the lead opinion is using to declare 
the national church the rightful owner of the plaintiffs' property. 
While I would decline to impose a constructive trust on the plaintiffs'
properties, I would additionally find that the property at issue is now titled in the 
plaintiffs' names by its bishop's actions. 
68 This is in stark contrast to the facts underlying the recent California case cited 
favorably by the concurrence.  In Diocese of San Joaquin v. Gunner, 202 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 51 (Ct. App. 2016), the California Court of Appeals applied neutral principles 
of state corporate law and held the attempts to amend the breakaway diocese's 
articles of incorporation and transfer the property away from the national church 
were ineffective. However, importantly, in that case, the bishop of the breakaway 
diocese had already been deposed by the national church one month before 
attempting to amend the diocesan articles of incorporation under state law, and two 
months before attempting to transfer the disputed property titles to the new 
corporation formed by the breakaway diocese.  This, of course, was not the case 
here, as Bishop Lawrence retained his full secular and religious authority over the 
disassociated diocese until well after all of the amendments were adopted and 
quitclaim deeds were issued. Thus, in my view, the analysis in Gunner supports 
my position, not the concurrence's.  See, e.g., id. at 63, 64 (including section titles 
to the court's opinion stating "Deference to the [national c]hurch does not resolve 
the dispute" and "The property was not held in trust for the [national c]hurch"). 
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D. Conclusion as to Title of Plaintiff Parishes' Property 
By applying neutral principles of South Carolina's longstanding property 
law, I would find that the national church has no "legally cognizable" interest in 
the plaintiff parishes' properties. See Jones, 443 U.S. at 606; Md. & Va. Eldership, 
396 U.S. at 367–68 (dismissing the appeal for want of a federal question after the 
state court resolved a church property dispute by examining the deeds to the 
properties, the state statutes dealing with implied trusts, and the relevant provisions 
in the church's constitution pertinent to the ownership and control of church 
property, and found that nothing in those documents gave rise to a trust in favor of 
the general church). Despite the lead opinion's and concurrence's statements to the 
contrary, this is not an instance where a "property right follows as an incident from 
decisions of the church custom or law on ecclesiastical issues."  See Kedroff, 344 
U.S. at 120–21. Rather, the properties at issue here are titled in the plaintiff 
parishes' names (and some have been for over two hundred years), and the majority 
is permitting the defendants to circumvent South Carolina law in authorizing this 
title-takeover, albeit not agreeing on the rationale for doing so. 
Let us not forget the defendants stipulated that the real property at issue is
titled in the plaintiff parishes' names, and that the plaintiff parishes "are not 
members of the [national c]hurch."  (emphasis added).  Aside from the fact that a 
majority of the parishes acceded to the Dennis Canon in some form or another— 
which I would find was not a legally binding action to impose a trust under South 
Carolina law—eight parishes never acceded in any form to either the national 
church's Dennis Canon or the diocesan version of the Dennis Canon created by the 
now-disassociated diocese.69  Under the lead opinion's formulation, these parishes, 
69 The concurrence takes Chief Justice Beatty, Justice Kittredge, and me to task for 
giving any credence to the fact that eight of the thirty-six plaintiff parishes did not 
accede to the Dennis Canon whatsoever.  I first point out the national church 
contended in both its motion to reconsider and its brief to this Court that twenty-
eight of the thirty-six plaintiff parishes "made express promises in their governing 
documents to comply with the [n]ational [c]hurch's rules after those rules had been 
amended to include the Dennis Canon in 1979," and that "[t]hese writings fulfilled 
the writing and signature requirements of South Carolina's Trust Code."  (emphasis 
in original). While the argument only addresses the twenty-eight churches that 
allegedly acceded, it raises a direct question about the other eight churches, 
implying that they are somehow different from the twenty-eight who "made 
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like all of the other plaintiff parishes, must surrender their lawful titles to the 
national church for the mere fact that the national church is a religious 
organization. This is extremely troubling.  The lead opinion offers no explanation 
or legal basis (and I know of none) that allows for an organization—religious or 
otherwise—to strip an individual, business, or charitable organization of title 
ownership because that organization unilaterally declares ownership in such 
property. However, the ramifications do not end there.  The rationale underlying 
the lead opinion would place many heretofore validly-titled properties in legal 
limbo.  If I were a member of a governing body of a religiously-affiliated hospital, 
for example, I would be gravely concerned, as the lead opinion declares today that 
different rules apply to religious organizations with respect to corporate 
organization and property ownership in this State. 
In my opinion, because it would dispense with the ancient formalities of 
property and trust law and the prior esteem with which courts in this state afforded 
such formalities, the lead opinion's rationale would dramatically alter our property 
law as we know it. Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court's decision that the 
defendants do not have an interest in the plaintiff parishes' real properties.
E. Camp St. Christopher 
In some respects, the title to Camp St. Christopher presents the Court with a 
more straightforward analysis, in that the Dennis Canon, by its own terms, does not 
apply. Specifically, the Dennis Canon states, inter alia, " All real and personal 
property held by or for the benefit of any Parish, Mission or Congregation is held 
express promises."  Second, and perhaps more importantly, the concurrence 
incorrectly construes our holding in I'On L.L.C. v. Town of Mt. Pleasant, 338 S.C. 
406, 526 S.E.2d 716 (2000), with regards to issue preservation as it relates to 
additional sustaining grounds.  A prevailing party need never raise an additional 
sustaining ground below, nor secure a ruling on it, in order for the issue to be 
preserved for appellate review. See Rule 220(c), SCACR (providing appellate 
courts may affirm the judgment of a lower court based on any ground appearing in 
the record). Undoubtedly, it is more prudent to raise an additional sustaining 
ground in the appellate brief, as it draws the appellate court's attention to the matter 
and encourages it to exercise its discretion to address the issue.  However, 
explicitly raising the issue is not a prerequisite for the court to affirm the decision 
of the lower court on an alternative ground. See Rule 220(c), SCACR. 
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in trust for this Church and the Diocese thereof in which such Parish, Mission or 
Congregation is located." (emphasis added).  It is undisputed the trustee 
corporation holds title in fee simple to Camp St. Christopher, and that it does so for 
the benefit of the disassociated diocese, rather than any individual parish, mission, 
or congregation. Because the trustees did not accede to the Dennis Canon, there is 
no basis in South Carolina trust law for the national church to claim an ownership 
interest in Camp St. Christopher.  Moreover, although the trustee corporation's 
initial bylaws stated that it would carry out its duties under the authority of the 
national church's constitution and canons, the trustees later took steps, using 
appropriate corporate formalities, to amend the bylaws and remove all references 
to the national church before the national church revoked Bishop Lawrence's 
authority. Accordingly, similar to the other plaintiff parishes', I would declare title 
to Camp St. Christopher in the trustee corporation, held for the benefit of the 
disassociated diocese, just as the original deed conveyed the property.
III. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Next, the plaintiffs assert their service marks are validly registered under 
state law and that they own the right to use the seals and symbols registered with 
the state. As a result, the plaintiffs claim the defendants' use of the plaintiffs'
marks amounts to service mark infringement.  The defendants take the position that 
the plaintiffs' service marks are too similar to the defendants' federally-registered 
service marks, and that because the defendants registered their marks with the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), the Lanham Act70 expressly 
preempts state law with respect to the validity of the plaintiffs' marks.
I would narrowly affirm the trial court's finding that the plaintiffs' service 
marks are validly registered under state law.  However, because there is already a 
pending federal case involving the applicability of the Lanham Act to these exact 
marks, I would defer to the federal courts regarding the applicability of federal 
copyright law.  
A. Standard of Review 
"Actions for injunctive relief are equitable in nature."  Grosshuesch v. 
Cramer, 367 S.C. 1, 4, 623 S.E.2d 833, 834 (2005).  "In an action in equity tried by 
70 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141n (2006).
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 a judge alone, the appellate court may find facts in accordance with its view of the 
preponderance of the evidence."  Goldman v. RBC, Inc., 369 S.C. 462, 465, 632 
S.E.2d 850, 851 (2006). "However, this broad scope of review does not require an 
appellate court to disregard the findings below or ignore the fact that the trial judge 
is in the better position to assess the credibility of the witnesses."  Pinckney v. 
Warren, 344 S.C. 382, 387, 544 S.E.2d 620, 623 (2001).  Moreover, appellants are 
not relieved of their burden of convincing an appellate court that the trial court 
committed an error in its findings.  Id. at 387–88, 544 S.E.2d at 623. 
B. Merits 
Pursuant to federal law, 
Any registration issued under the [Lanham Act] . . . and owned by a 
party to an action shall be admissible as evidence and shall be prima 
facie evidence of the validity of the registered mark and of the 
registration of the mark, of the registrant's ownership of the mark, and 
of the registrant's exclusive right to use the registered mark in 
commerce on or in connection with the goods or services specified in 
the registration subject to any conditions or limitations stated therein. 
15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) (emphasis added).  Moreover, 
The ownership by a person of a valid registration under [the Lanham 
Act] . . . shall be a complete bar to an action against that person, with 
respect to that mark, that— 
(A) is brought by another person under the common law or a 
statute of a State; and 
(B)(i) seeks to prevent dilution by blurring or dilution by 
tarnishment; or 
(ii) asserts any claim of actual or likely damage or harm to the 
distinctiveness or reputation of a mark, label, or form of 
advertisement. 
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15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(6).71 
"In the absence of an express congressional command, state law is 
preempted if the law actually conflicts with federal law, or if federal law so 
thoroughly occupies the legislative field as to make reasonable the inference that 
Congress has left no room for the states to supplement it."  City of Cayce v. Norfolk 
S. Ry. Co., 391 S.C. 395, 401, 706 S.E.2d 6, 8 (2011).  Under the Lanham Act, the 
USPTO must refuse to grant a subsequent mark if the "dominant element" of the 
subsequent mark is already registered in a previous mark.  In re Chatam Int'l Inc., 
380 F.3d 1340, 1341–45 (Fed. Cir. 2004).  Further, there are two "key 
considerations" in determining the dominant element of the previously-registered 
mark: (1) the similarities between the names of the previous and subsequent 
trademarks, and (2) the similarities between the previously and subsequently 
trademarked goods.  Id. at 1341–42.
71 South Carolina law provides: 
The secretary shall cancel from the register, in whole or in part:  . . . 
(3) a registration concerning which a court of competent jurisdiction 
finds that the: . . . (f) registered mark is so similar, as to be likely to 
cause confusion or mistake or to deceive, to a mark registered by 
another person in the [USPTO] before the date of the filing of the 
application for the registration by the registrant under this article, 
and not abandoned; however, if the registrant proves that the 
registrant is the owner of a concurrent registration mark in the 
[USPTO] covering an area including this State, the registration under 
this article may not be canceled for that area of the State . . . . 
S.C. Code Ann. § 39-15-1145(3)(f) (Supp. 2016) (emphasis added).  Similarly, 
A mark by which the goods or services of an applicant for registration 
may be distinguished from the goods or services of others may not be 
registered if the mark:  . . . (5) consists of a mark which:  . . . (b) when 
used on or in connection with the goods or services of the applicant is 
primarily geographically descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive of 
them . . . . 
S.C. Code Ann. § 39-15-1110(A)(5)(b) (Supp. 2016). 
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C. Conclusion as to Service Marks 
I would find the trial court failed to address the effect, if any, of the Lanham
Act on the plaintiffs' claims for service mark infringement.  However, because 
there is a pending federal case filed by Bishop vonRosenberg addressing the same 
issue, I would decline to address the effect of federal law on the parties' service 
marks. Thus, I would narrowly affirm the trial court's determination that the 
plaintiffs' marks are validly registered under South Carolina law, and would leave 
the application of the Lanham Act to the pending federal case. 
CONCLUSION
The lead opinion in this case is nothing less than judicial sanction of the 
confiscation of church property masquerading as an attempt to promulgate a new 
deference rule for determining title in this matter.  With no discussion of why the 
neutral principles of law approach to resolving church title determinations should 
be abandoned by the State of South Carolina, the lead opinion advocates overruling 
a framework that has heretofore taken the courts out of ecclesiastical controversies, 
instead encouraging the Court to devolve to the civil court the authority to undo 
centuries of well-settled church titles by judicial fiat.  Such an opinion, had it 
obtained the support of a majority of this Court, would have been a crushing blow 
to centuries of carefully crafted and well-reasoned South Carolina law. 
Aside from the fact that I do not believe there were ever any legal trusts 
created with respect to the property at issue, the simple fact is that the national 
church, for whatever reason, never acted to take away Bishop Lawrence's legal 
authority to act for it and the disassociated diocese.  Under the authority granted to 
him by the national church, Bishop Lawrence legally transferred the plaintiffs'
property back to them.  Thus, to the extent the lead opinion relies on deference to 
confiscate the plaintiffs' property, that concept cannot overcome the essential 
problem that the national church itself deeded the property back to the plaintiffs.
Further, many of the plaintiff parishes established their corporate existence 
under South Carolina corporate law or by legislative charter years before the 
Dennis Cannon was adopted. Additionally, after Jones, all of the plaintiff parishes 
and the disassociated diocese made sure that they were organized as corporations 
under South Carolina law.  None of these church corporations renounced or limited 
their ability to amend their charters and bylaws after initial adoption.  With a stroke 
of a pen, the majority vitiates South Carolina's charitable corporation law and 
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invalidates all of the plaintiffs' duly adopted corporate documents. 
Because I cannot find any legal basis to support the majority's decision in 
this case, I would affirm the decision of the trial court.  I respectfully dissent.72 
72 As I stated at the outset, this is unfortunately a difficult case leading us to five 
different, strongly-held opinions.  Because we all write separately, my summary of 
my understanding of the Court's holdings is as follows.  A majority of the Court— 
consisting of Chief Justice Beatty, Justice Kittredge, and me—agree that Pearson
and All Saints (and their progeny) remain good law in this state, and that in secular 
church disputes, our state courts should apply neutral principles of law to resolve 
the case. As it relates to this particular case, the same majority would find this is a 
secular church dispute, and the Court must therefore apply longstanding trust law 
to resolve the questions before us.  I would find the parties' actions did not comply 
with the formalities required to create a trust in this state. In short, I believe the 
parties did not embody their intentions to create a trust in favor of the defendants in 
a "legally cognizable form."  Justice Kittredge would find the parties created a 
revocable trust in favor of the national church, but the plaintiffs later took steps to 
revoke their accession to the trust.  Therefore, both Justice Kittredge and I would 
declare all of the disputed titles in favor of the individual plaintiffs, with no trust 
formed in favor of the defendants.  However, we are in the minority, because a 
different majority of the Court—consisting of Chief Justice Beatty, Justice Hearn, 
and Acting Justice Pleicones—would reverse the trial court and transfer title of all 
but eight of the plaintiffs' properties to the defendants.  While Justice Hearn and 
Acting Justice Pleicones would do so because they believe this is an ecclesiastical 
dispute and the Court must therefore defer to the national church's decision on the 
matter, Chief Justice Beatty would do so because he believes all but eight of the 
plaintiffs acceded to the Dennis Canon in a manner recognizable under South 
Carolina's trust law.  Thus, the result reached on title is:  1) with regard to the eight 
church organizations which did not accede to the Dennis Canon, Chief Justice 
Beatty, Justice Kittredge, and I would hold that title remains in the eight plaintiff 
church organizations; 2) with regard to the twenty-eight church organizations 
which acceded to the Dennis Canon, a majority consisting of Chief Justice Beatty, 
Justice Hearn, and Acting Justice Pleicones would hold that a trust in favor of the 
national church is imposed on the property and therefore, title is in the national 
church; and 3) with regard to Camp St. Christopher, Chief Justice Beatty, Justice 
Hearn, and Acting Justice Pleicones would hold title is in the trustee corporation 
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for the benefit of the associated diocese, whereas Justice Kittredge and I would 
hold that the trustee corporation holds title for the benefit of the disassociated 
diocese. 
As to the second issue on appeal, involving the plaintiffs' claims for service mark 
infringement, Chief Justice Beatty, Justice Kittredge, and I would find the marks 
are validly registered under state law, but leave the ultimate resolution of the 
parties' conflicting claims to the pending federal case. 
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WILLIAMS, J.:  In this civil matter, John Doe 2 (Doe) appeals the circuit court's 
grant of summary judgment to The Citadel, arguing the court erred in dismissing 
his claims of negligence/gross negligence and outrage.  We affirm. 
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FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
This case is one of many lawsuits stemming from a child sexual abuse scandal 
involving a summer camp at The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina 
(The Citadel), and Louis "Skip" ReVille.  On April 23, 2007, the father of a former 
camper at The Citadel's youth summer camp notified Mark Brandenburg, The 
Citadel's general counsel, that one of the camp's counselors had engaged in sexual 
misconduct at the camp with his son five years earlier.  The former camper's father 
told Brandenburg a counselor named Skip invited his son into his dorm room, 
where the two watched pornography together and masturbated.  Brandenburg 
subsequently spoke by telephone with the former camper, then nineteen years old, 
who confirmed that Skip had invited him into his room, showed him pornography, 
and convinced him to masturbate.  After reviewing camp records, Brandenburg 
was able to identify the counselor as ReVille, who worked at the camp for three 
summers from 2001 to 2003. 
On April 24, 2007, Brandenburg—along with Colonel Joseph Trez, an executive 
assistant to John Rosa, The Citadel's president—met with ReVille, a Citadel 
graduate who had also worked with college students as a part-time, temporary tutor 
at The Citadel's writing center from August 2006 to April 20, 2007.1  During the 
meeting, ReVille emphatically denied the former camper's allegations.  
Brandenburg continued to investigate the allegations from April through July 2007, 
and by May 2007, had informed President Rosa of the allegations.  On July 1, 
2007, Brandenburg traveled to Texas to meet with the former camper and his 
parents to discuss a possible settlement of potential claims against The Citadel.  At 
some point during that summer, however, Brandenburg fell out of touch with the 
former camper.  Brandenburg then contacted potential witnesses who may have 
been present during the commission of ReVille's alleged misconduct, but he failed 
to find one that could corroborate the former camper's accusations.  The Citadel
ended its investigation without reporting the complaint to law enforcement.2 
1 In March 2007, ReVille submitted his resignation from the writing center to The 
Citadel, indicating an effective stop date of April 20, 2007.
2 Neither the former camper nor his family reported the incident to law 
enforcement officials during this time.
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In October 2011, ReVille was arrested after confessing to abusing numerous boys 
while employed in various educational and athletic positions in the Charleston area 
over the span of nearly a decade.  On June 13, 2012, ReVille pleaded guilty to 
numerous charges involving the abuse of twenty-three boys in Charleston, 
Berkeley, and Dorchester counties and was sentenced to fifty years in prison.
ReVille met Doe—a young male about to enter the seventh grade—and his family 
in the summer of 2005, through ReVille's involvement with AAU basketball at 
Pinewood Preparatory School (Pinewood Prep) in Summerville, South Carolina.  
That summer, ReVille began "grooming" Doe and later abused Doe at ReVille's
residence, and he continued to abuse Doe throughout the 2005–2006 school year.  
At the time, ReVille was a teacher at Pinewood Prep.  Doe, however, neither 
attended Pinewood Prep nor any summer camps or educational programs at The 
Citadel. In the spring of 2006, ReVille was terminated from his teaching position 
at Pinewood Prep and accepted Doe's parents' offer to move into the mother-in-law 
suite connected to their house. While living there from May 2006 to June 2007, 
and for a short period after moving out, ReVille continuously abused Doe, 
although, according to ReVille, the abuse scaled back "tremendously" after 
ReVille's April 2007 meeting with Brandenburg.  ReVille's sexual abuse of Doe 
ended when Doe and his family moved to Georgia in the summer of 2007.
Doe filed the instant action against The Citadel on March 19, 2012, alleging claims
of negligence/gross negligence and outrage.  In his complaint, Doe claimed actions 
taken by The Citadel created a risk that ReVille would be placed in positions to 
enable him to victimize young boys, and subsequently, its failure to prevent this 
risk allowed ReVille to sexually abuse him.  Doe asserted The Citadel was in a 
unique position to warn or prevent ReVille from sexually abusing young victims 
like Doe because The Citadel knew of the reported sexual abuse and it had a 
special relationship with ReVille.  The Citadel filed a renewed motion for 
summary judgment on April 24, 2015.3  After conducting a hearing, the circuit 
court granted The Citadel's motion on July 6, 2015. 
3 The Citadel initially filed a motion for summary judgment in this and related 
cases on March 6, 2014.  On December 9, 2014, the circuit court denied The 
Citadel's motion.
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In its order, the circuit court dismissed Doe's negligence claims because it found 
The Citadel did not owe Doe a duty of care to prevent ReVille from sexually 
abusing Doe. Specifically, the court noted the majority of the abuse of Doe 
occurred before the April 2007 allegations by the former camper.  Moreover, the 
circuit court found it was "impossible to differentiate the injury that [Doe] suffered 
after The Citadel arguably should have stopped ReVille from abusing him from the 
unquestionably devastating injury that [Doe] suffered from his longstanding, 
ongoing abuse by ReVille." Accordingly, the court concluded Doe's injuries arose 
before, and were not proximately caused by, any breach of duty by The Citadel.  
The court also dismissed the outrage claim as a matter of law because it was barred
by the South Carolina Tort Claims Act4 (TCA) and alternatively found no evidence 
suggested The Citadel directed any conduct toward Doe.  This appeal followed. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"An appellate court reviews a grant of summary judgment under the same standard 
applied by the [circuit] court pursuant to Rule 56, SCRCP." Lanham v. Blue Cross 
& Blue Shield of S.C., Inc., 349 S.C. 356, 361, 563 S.E.2d 331, 333 (2002).  
Summary judgment shall be granted when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that . . . no genuine issue [exists] as to any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."  Rule 56(c), SCRCP.  When 
determining whether triable issues of material fact exist, the court must view the 
evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party.  Fleming v. Rose, 350 S.C. 488, 493–94, 567 S.E.2d 857, 860 
(2002). When the preponderance of the evidence standard applies, the nonmoving 
party is only required to submit a mere scintilla of evidence to withstand a motion 
for summary judgment.  Hancock v. Mid-South Mgmt. Co., 381 S.C. 326, 330, 673 
S.E.2d 801, 803 (2009). 
LAW/ANALYSIS 
I. Negligence/Gross Negligence 
4 S.C. Code Ann. §§ 15-78-10 through -220 (2005 & Supp. 2016). 
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Doe first argues the circuit court erred in finding The Citadel did not owe a duty to 
Doe. We disagree. 
To prove negligence, the plaintiff must show "(1) [the] defendant owes a duty of 
care to the plaintiff; (2) [the] defendant breached the duty by a negligent act or 
omission; (3) [the] defendant's breach was the actual or proximate cause of the 
plaintiff's injury; and (4) [the] plaintiff suffered an injury or damages."  Roe v. 
Bibby, 410 S.C. 287, 293, 763 S.E.2d 645, 648 (Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Doe v. 
Marion, 373 S.C. 390, 400, 645 S.E.2d 245, 250 (2007)).  Negligence is a mixed 
question of law and fact with the existence and scope of a duty being questions of 
law and a breach of duty being a question for the jury.  Miller v. City of Camden, 
317 S.C. 28, 31, 451 S.E.2d 401, 403 (Ct. App. 1994).  "In a negligence action, the 
court must determine, as a matter of law, whether the defendant owed a duty of 
care to the plaintiff." Faile v. S.C. Dep't of Juvenile Justice, 350 S.C. 315, 334, 
566 S.E.2d 536, 545 (2002). Negligence is not actionable without a duty of care.  
Bishop v. S.C. Dep't of Mental Health, 331 S.C. 79, 86, 502 S.E.2d 78, 81 (1998).
South Carolina law does not recognize a general duty to warn a third party or 
potential victim of danger or to control the conduct of another.  Rogers v. S.C. 
Dep't of Parole & Cmty. Corr., 320 S.C. 253, 255, 464 S.E.2d 330, 332 (1995).  
However, this rule has five recognized exceptions: (1) when the defendant has a 
special relationship to the victim; (2) when the defendant has a special relationship 
to the injurer; (3) when the defendant voluntarily undertakes a duty; (4) when the 
defendant intentionally or negligently creates the risk; and (5) when a statute 
imposes a duty on the defendant.  Faile, 350 S.C. at 334, 566 S.E.2d at 546. 
Doe does not argue the existence of any special relationship to qualify for the 
special relationship exceptions.  Rather, Doe asserts The Citadel is liable to Doe 
"for its own failure to act with due care in voluntarily undertaking the duties to 
investigate, arrest, and punish ReVille; for taking actions that negligently created 
the risk that ReVille would sexually abuse [Doe]; and for action[s] to conceal 
ReVille's pedophilia in violation of Title IX."5  We address each argument in turn.
A. Voluntary Undertaking 
5 Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 (2012).
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Doe first asserts The Citadel established a duty of care to Doe when it voluntarily 
undertook the duty to investigate claims of sexual abuse on its campus, turn 
offenders over to its own law enforcement entity, and arrest offenders.  We 
disagree. 
 
Under South Carolina law, the Restatement of Torts establishes the recognition of 
a voluntarily assumed duty and states, 
 
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to 
render services to another which he should recognize as 
necessary for the protection of the other's person or 
things, is subject to liability to the other for physical 
harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable 
care to perform his undertaking, if 
 
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the 
risk of such harm, or 
 
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other's 
reliance upon the undertaking. 
 
Johnson v. Robert E. Lee Acad., Inc., 401 S.C. 500, 504–05, 737 S.E.2d 512, 514 
(Ct. App. 2012) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (AM. LAW INST. 
1965)). 
 
In the instant case, The Citadel's general counsel, Brandenburg, conducted an 
investigation into the former camper's allegations of sexual abuse by ReVille after 
the former camper's father called The Citadel on April 23, 2007.  Under section 
323 of the Restatement of Torts, however, this undertaking cannot create a duty 
unless (1) Brandenburg's failure to exercise reasonable care actually increased the 
risk of harm to Doe or (2) Doe suffered harm because he relied upon 
Brandenburg's undertaking.  See id. at 505, 737 S.E.2d at 514. 
 
Upon our review of the record, we find no evidence supports a showing that 
Brandenburg's actions increased the risk of harm to Doe.  In fact, the record 
demonstrates that ReVille was already abusing Doe—for nearly two years—when 
the April 23, 2007 allegations were made, and ReVille scaled the abuse of Doe 
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back "tremendously" after his meeting with Brandenburg.  Thus, any failure of The 
Citadel to exercise due care in its investigation regarding a former camper could 
not have reasonably increased the risk of harm to Doe when the harm was already 
occurring. Moreover, the record indicates Brandenburg conducted his 
investigation as the college's general counsel to "find out what happened" and 
determine possible avenues for settlement for the protection of The Citadel.  It was 
not conducted as part of a criminal investigation.  See Goode v. St. Stephens United 
Methodist Church, 329 S.C. 433, 444–45, 494 S.E.2d 827, 833 (Ct. App. 1997) 
(finding an owner of an apartment complex did not undertake a duty to protect a 
social guest from a criminal assault occurring at the complex when providing 
security to the complex was taken for the protection of the tenants and not the 
general public). Last, because Doe had no prior relationship with The Citadel and 
no evidence indicates Doe relied on Brandenburg's investigation to prevent further 
harm, The Citadel did not create a duty when it investigated the April 23, 2007 
allegations. 
Nevertheless, Doe claims the evidence presented at summary judgment6 
established The Citadel violated its own policies7 from 1998 to 2005 by not 
investigating ReVille for sexual abuse of children.  Additionally, Doe argues The 
Citadel's policies required action following the April 2007 allegations and its 
failure to adhere to the policies demonstrated a lack of due care. 
We disagree with Doe's contention that The Citadel's deviations from its own 
policies and procedures, both prior to and following the April 23, 2007 allegations, 
6 While Doe states facts in support of his argument, we note that some of the facts 
cited are not supported by evidence in the record.  In particular, Doe asserts The 
Citadel was aware of ReVille's pedophilia as early as 1998, when he received 
services from the campus counseling center.  Moreover, Doe asserts that one of 
ReVille's victims (Camper Doe 6), a former camper and counselor, was fired by 
Jennifer Garrott, the camp's deputy director, when he attempted to report ReVille's
abuse to her in 2005.  Because these facts do not appear in the record, we do not 
consider them. See Rule 210(h), SCACR ("[T]he appellate court will not consider 
any fact which does not appear in the Record on Appeal."). 
7 The Citadel implemented new policies in 2001 for the supervision of its camp and 
counselors after it learned of the sexual abuse of campers by a former senior 
counselor.
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demonstrate a lack of due care and create a triable issue as to whether The Citadel 
voluntarily assumed a duty to investigate and arrest ReVille for sexual abuse of 
children. Indeed, we find the internal policies created by The Citadel do not 
establish a voluntary undertaking of a duty; rather, they can only serve as evidence 
of the standard of care if the duty was established by law.  See Doe ex rel. Doe v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 393 S.C. 240, 247, 711 S.E.2d 908, 912 (2011) ("[I]f no 
duty has been established, evidence as to the standard of care is irrelevant.  Only 
when there is a duty would a standard of care need to be established."); id. at 248, 
711 S.E.2d at 912 (holding Wal-Mart did not voluntarily undertake a duty despite 
creating an internal policy that its photo technician violated by destroying 
photographs depicting child abuse and not informing the store manager or keeping 
them as evidence, and finding the policy only served as evidence of the standard of 
care). Therefore, any violation of an internal policy does not give rise to the 
voluntary assumption of a duty and does not establish that The Citadel owed a duty 
of care as a matter of law.
B. Negligent Creation of the Risk 
Doe next asserts The Citadel is liable for negligently creating the risk that ReVille 
would sexually abuse Doe.  We disagree. 
In Edwards v. Lexington County Sheriff's Department, our supreme court imposed 
a duty of care on a county and its sheriff's department because it found the entities 
created a risk of injury to the appellant.  386 S.C. 285, 293–94, 688 S.E.2d 125, 
129–30 (2010). In that case, the appellant, a domestic violence victim, sued the 
respondents, the county and department, after she was attacked by her ex-boyfriend 
in a magistrate's court bond revocation hearing in which no security was provided. 
Id. at 287–88, 688 S.E.2d at 127.  An employee of the sheriff's department, who 
was aware of the ex-boyfriend's multiple bond violations and threats against the 
appellant, requested to schedule the bond revocation hearing, where the ex-
boyfriend subsequently attacked the appellant.  Id. at 288, 688 S.E.2d at 127.  
Despite being aware of the appellant's fear of her ex-boyfriend, the respondents 
strongly encouraged the appellant to be present at the bond revocation hearing.  Id.
at 293, 688 S.E.2d at 130. Our supreme court found the respondents could not 
claim a lack of knowledge of the ex-boyfriend's violent tendencies towards the 
appellant because the respondents were seeking to revoke his bond for his failing 
to obey a no-contact order, which was issued in response to his violent actions.  Id.
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The court found the respondents "created a situation they knew or should have 
known posed a substantial risk of injury to [the appellant]," and given their 
knowledge of the ex-boyfriend's demonstrated threats against the appellant, the 
respondents owed the appellant a duty of care. Id. at 294, 688 S.E.2d at 130.  
Importantly, the court noted the respondents' duty "is one of due care and whether 
[the respondents] acted reasonably, negligently[,] or grossly negligently is not 
before us." Id.
In the instant case, Doe argues The Citadel's duty to Doe is based upon "The 
Citadel's own affirmative actions that created the circumstances for ReVille to 
sexually abuse [Doe]," and The Citadel should have foreseen its negligent actions 
"would probably cause injury to someone in the form of sexual abuse by ReVille."  
Doe again cites evidence of The Citadel's policy violations and alleged 
concealment of ReVille's actions.  However, we again find any purported violation 
of the policy does not amount to the existence of a duty, but rather, focuses more 
on the standards of due care establishing the extent and nature of the duty, which 
would help a fact-finder determine whether a duty was breached. See Madison ex 
rel. Bryant v. Babcock Ctr., Inc., 371 S.C. 123, 135, 638 S.E.2d 650, 656 (2006) 
(rejecting defendants' all or nothing approach with regard to the existence of a duty 
and noting that argument "confuses the existence of a duty with standards of care 
establishing the extent and nature of the duty in a particular case").  Unlike 
Edwards, Doe does not present any evidence indicating The Citadel actively 
created a situation that increased the risk of harm to Doe—such as placing ReVille 
and Doe in the same room, encouraging the two to meet, or placing Doe in 
ReVille's custody. In fact, no evidence suggests The Citadel was even aware of 
Doe's very existence before the commencement of this lawsuit because Doe had no 
affiliation with The Citadel's programs or camps. 
Furthermore, the evidence does not demonstrate The Citadel was aware of 
ReVille's pedophilia prior to the April 2007 allegations, despite Doe's claims to the 
contrary. The record does not support Doe's assertions that The Citadel knew of 
ReVille's sexual misconduct while he was a counselor at the camp.  In particular, 
Doe asserts The Citadel should have investigated and arrested ReVille when 
Garrott found ReVille alone in his room with a camper in 2002, and again in 2003 
when she discovered him in his room rubbing "Icy Hot" on a junior counselor's leg 
following a run. However, the record does not indicate that any improper behavior 
was occurring at the time when Garrott "caught" ReVille to warrant termination or 
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an investigation. Garrott stated, at the time, she did not think either incident 
amounted to a violation of the camp policies.  Instead, she viewed the incidents as 
"lapse[s] in judgment."  Doe's arguments again "confuse the existence of a duty 
with standards of care establishing the extent and nature of the duty in a particular 
case." Madison ex rel. Bryant, 371 S.C. at 135, 638 S.E.2d at 656.  Inasmuch as 
Doe failed to prove the existence of a duty of care, any argument involving the 
standards of care are not properly before this court.  See Bishop, 331 S.C. at 86, 
502 S.E.2d at 81 ("An essential element in a cause of action for negligence is the 
existence of a legal duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff.  Without a 
duty, there is no actionable negligence.").
In conclusion, while ReVille's continued sexual abuse of Doe was beyond 
despicable, we find that, as it relates to any failure to respond after the April 2007 
allegations, The Citadel's purported failure to intervene did not create a risk of 
harm to Doe when Doe was already exposed to ReVille's abuse.  See, e.g.,
DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 201 (1989) 
("While the State may have been aware of the dangers that Joshua faced in the free 
world, it played no part in their creation, nor did it do anything to render him any 
more vulnerable to them."); Doe v. Rosa, 795 F.3d 429, 439 (4th Cir. 2015) 
("[A]llowing continued exposure to an existing danger by failing to intervene is not 
the equivalent of creating or increasing the risk of that danger."), cert. denied sub 
nom. John Doe 2 v. Rosa, 136 S. Ct. 811 (2016).
C. Title IX
Doe next argues the federal statute, Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 
1972, imposed a duty on The Citadel not to conceal ReVille's sexual abuse 
following the April 2007 allegations.8  We disagree. 
A plaintiff will prove the first element of a negligence claim—that the defendant 
owes him a statutorily-created duty of care—if the plaintiff shows two things: "(1) 
8 We do not find it necessary to address any of Doe's arguments that The Citadel's 
alleged violations of Title IX demonstrate its failure to act with due care because, 
as previously mentioned, these arguments involve the standards of due care, which 
presuppose the existence of a duty. See Edwards, 386 S.C. at 294, 688 S.E.2d at 
130.
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that the essential purpose of the statute is to protect from the kind of harm the 
plaintiff has suffered; and (2) that he is a member of the class of persons the statute 
is intended to protect." Rayfield v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 297 S.C. 95, 103, 374 
S.E.2d 910, 914–15 (Ct. App. 1988).  "Title IX prohibits discrimination occurring 
under any educational program or activity."  Doe by Doe v. Berkeley Cty. Sch. 
Dist., 989 F. Supp. 768, 770 (D.S.C. 1997).  Title IX provides that "[n]o person in 
the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be 
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education 
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."  20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) 
(2012). 
We find Doe's claim fails because he is not a member of the class of persons the 
statute intends to protect. Title IX intends to protect participants and students of 
educational programs.  See, e.g., Dipippa v. Union Sch. Dist., 819 F. Supp. 2d 435, 
446 (W.D. Pa. 2011) ("Generally speaking, parents of a student whose rights were 
violated do not have standing to assert personal claims under Title IX, but do have 
standing to assert claims on the student's behalf. . . .  On its face, the statutory 
language of Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., applies only to students and 
participants in educational programs." (citations omitted)); Doe v. Oyster River Co-
op. Sch. Dist., 992 F. Supp. 467, 481 (D.N.H. 1997) ("Ordinarily, only participants 
of federally funded programs . . . have standing to bring claims under Title IX.").  
In the instant case, both parties agree that Doe never attended The Citadel or its 
summer camps. Because Doe was never a student or participant in any educational 
program at The Citadel, he is not a member of the class of persons Title IX intends 
to protect. Thus, Doe failed to prove The Citadel owed him a statutorily-created 
duty, and we affirm the circuit court's grant of summary judgment.9 
II. Outrage 
Last, Doe asserts the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment to The 
Citadel on Doe's outrage claim because more than a scintilla of evidence exists to 
9 We do not address Doe's essential purpose requirement argument because we find 
the resolution of this issue is dispositive. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of 
Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (ruling an 
appellate court need not address remaining issues when its resolution of a prior 
issue is dispositive). 
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establish that The Citadel's conduct was outrageous and directed at Doe.  We 
disagree.
Under South Carolina law, outrage claims are limited to a defendant's egregious 
conduct toward a plaintiff. Upchurch v. N.Y. Times Co., 314 S.C. 531, 536, 431 
S.E.2d 558, 561 (1993). "It is not enough that the conduct is intentional and 
outrageous. It must be directed at the plaintiff, or occur in the presence of a 
plaintiff of whom the defendant is aware." Id. (emphasis added).   
In the instant case, while The Citadel's failure to notify law enforcement of 
ReVille's alleged abuse in 2007 is highly lamentable, Doe did not present any 
evidence that The Citadel directed any tortious conduct specifically toward him.
Indeed, The Citadel was unaware of Doe's very existence prior to the 
commencement of this lawsuit.  Accordingly, we uphold the circuit court's finding 
on this issue.10 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing analysis, the circuit court's grant of summary judgment to 
The Citadel is 
AFFIRMED.
KONDUROS, J., and LEE, A.J., concur.
10 Because our resolution of this issue is dispositive, we decline to address whether 
the circuit court erred in finding the TCA barred Doe's outrage claim.  See Futch, 
335 S.C. at 613, 518 S.E.2d at 598 (ruling an appellate court need not address 
remaining issues when its resolution of a prior issue is dispositive). 
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GEATHERS, J.: Michael Ashburn appeals the family court's order denying relief
from a previous order of paternity that found him to be the father of minor child E.A.
(Child). Ashburn argues it is no longer equitable that the paternity order, wherein 
Ashburn acknowledged paternity of Child, have prospective application because 
genetic tests show Ashburn is not Child's biological father. He also argues the family 
court failed to (1) conduct an analysis on the potential adverse impact of the 
determination on the public interest and (2) consider the best interests of Child. We 
reverse. 
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Ashburn and April Rogers (Mother) were involved in a relationship lasting 
from late 1999 to early 2000. Mother became pregnant during this time and she gave 
birth to Child in October 2000. Ashburn is Caucasian, Mother is African-American, 
and Child is biracial. Mother informed Ashburn that he was the only Caucasian with
whom she had been intimate. At the time, Ashburn was enlisted in the United States 
Marine Corps and stationed at Parris Island in Beaufort, South Carolina. Ashburn 
did not attend Child's birth and did not visit Child until the Marine Corps required 
him to when Child was seven months old.   
Subsequently, Ashburn was served with an Administrative Process Notice of 
Financial Responsibility and Paternity Determination, and an administrative 
conference was held on March 28, 2001. Although Ashburn was given the
opportunity to request genetic testing at the conference, he waived it. The family 
court prepared an Administrative Process Order of Financial Responsibility that 
Ashburn and Mother signed. The order required Ashburn to pay $100.00 semi-
monthly in child support. In the order, Ashburn admitted to being the natural father; 
the order states "[non-custodial parent] freely and voluntarily acknowledged 
paternity" of Child. 
In May 2002, Ashburn signed an agreement with the Department of Social 
Services (DSS) requesting genetic testing, but he failed to submit a sample. In 2003, 
Ashburn was re-stationed in Japan, and contact ceased between Ashburn, Mother, 
and Child. Thereafter, Ashburn did tours of duty in Iowa and Hawaii, and as of June
2014, he was serving in North Carolina.   
In November 2012, Mother requested the family court modify Ashburn's child 
support obligation. The following month, Ashburn requested visitation with Child,
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and the parties agreed to arrange a visit. Ashburn met with Child in Charleston, 
South Carolina. During this visit, Ashburn obtained a genetic sample from Child
and submitted his and Child's genetic samples with a drug-store DNA kit for 
paternity testing. The test excluded Ashburn as Child's biological father.   
Based on the results of the self-conducted DNA test, Ashburn filed an
independent action to disestablish paternity in April 2013 on the grounds of fraud 
and material mistake of fact. DSS scheduled genetic testing of Ashburn and Child, 
and the results confirmed Ashburn was not the biological father of Child.   
At the June 2014 hearing on the petition to disestablish paternity, Mother 
testified she could not understand the results of the DNA test because Ashburn was 
the only Caucasian man with whom she had been intimate. However, in responding 
to the family court's examination, Mother subsequently admitted she had become 
intoxicated one night while at a party with a Caucasian male friend and "something" 
could have happened—this was apparently around the time of Child's conception.  
The family court found there was no extrinsic fraud to support relief from the 
previous determination of paternity and Ashburn was the legal father of Child.  
Ashburn filed a motion for reconsideration arguing for the first time, pursuant to 
Rule 60(b)(5), SCRCP, "it [was] no longer equitable that the judgment should have 
prospective application." The family court denied the motion for reconsideration.  
This appeal followed. 
ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Did the family court err in finding Ashburn is Child's legal father despite 
genetic testing proving he is not Child's biological father? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"In appeals from the family court, the appellate court has the authority to 
correct errors of law and to find facts in accordance with its own view of the 
preponderance of the evidence." Mr. T v. Ms. T, 378 S.C. 127, 131–32, 662 S.E.2d 
413, 415 (Ct. App. 2008). However, the appellate court is "not required to ignore 
the fact that the [family] court, who saw and heard the witnesses,  was in a better 
position to evaluate their credibility." Fiddie v. Fiddie, 384 S.C. 120, 124, 681 
S.E.2d 42, 44 (Ct. App. 2009). Consistent with this de novo review, the appellant
retains the burden to show that the family court's findings are not supported by a 
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preponderance of the evidence; otherwise, the findings will be affirmed. Lewis v. 
Lewis, 392 S.C. 381, 392, 709 S.E.2d 650, 655 (2011).   
LAW/ANALYSIS
Ashburn contends he should be permitted to disestablish paternity for two  
reasons. First, Ashburn argues, pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5), it is no longer equitable 
that the previous order establishing paternity have prospective application.1 Second,
1 Ashburn asserts Rule 60(b) grounds via an independent action rather than by 
motion.  We acknowledge the distinction between independent actions and motions 
drawn by other jurisdictions applying Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. See Bankers Mortg. Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 73, 77–78 (5th Cir. 
1970) (recognizing "two [distinct] procedures for obtaining relief from a final 
judgment," one by motion and one by independent action); id. at 79 (listing elements 
of an independent action similar to those set forth in National Surety Co. of New 
York v. State Bank of Humboldt, 120 F. 593, 599 (8th Cir. 1903): "(1) a judgment 
which ought not, in equity and good conscience, to be enforced; (2) a good defense 
to the alleged cause of action on which the judgment is founded; (3) fraud, accident, 
or mistake [that] prevented the defendant in the judgment from obtaining the benefit 
of his defense; (4) the absence of fault or negligence on the part of [the] defendant;
and (5) the absence of any adequate remedy at law."); see also 47 Am. Jur. 2d 
Judgments § 718 (2017) (listing similar elements to Bankers Mortgage Co. that a
claimant must establish when seeking equitable relief from a judgment through an 
independent action). 
Under the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, however, a litigant is not 
restricted from asserting Rule 60 grounds for relief from judgment when that litigant 
brings an independent action rather than a motion. See Momani v. Van Surdam, 296 
S.C. 409, 410, 373 S.E.2d 691, 691 (Ct. App. 1988) ("[R]ule [60, SCRCP,] does not 
indicate that the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party 
from a judgment is limited to actions based on any particular reasons to the exclusion 
of the other reasons specified."); id. (reversing the circuit court's ruling that, in an
independent action under Rule 60, a litigant was limited to asserting as grounds for 
relief "60(b)(4) [when] the [j]udgment is void and 60(b)(5) [when] the [j]udgment 
has been paid"); see also James F. Flanagan, South Carolina Civil Procedure 513 
(3d ed. 2010) (stating our "jurisdiction permits an independent action in equity to 
challenge a final judgment" when "it is no longer equitable that an order have 
110 

   
                                        
  
 
  
   
  
  
  
 
 
  
  
  
 
  
  
 
 
  
 
  
  
 
Ashburn argues the family court failed to address the adverse impact of the 
determination on the public interest.2 Additionally, Ashburn argues the family court 
prospective application"). Additionally, although Mr. T cited the Eighth Circuit's 
characterization of an independent action in equity, similar to Bankers Mortgage 
Co., Mr. T further stated that nothing in the opinion "should be construed as a finding 
by this court as to a bright line test in which to consider the issues presented."  378
S.C. at 135, 139, 662 S.E.2d at 417, 419. Accordingly, we believe it is proper for 
this court to address Ashburn's inequitable-prospective-application argument
regardless of the procedural mechanism by which he brings it.  
2 Even though it was not raised by the parties, it is incumbent upon the court to 
address preservation when preservation is a close question. Ashburn's Rule 60(b)(5) 
argument was raised explicitly in his Rule 59(e) motion. However, a thorough 
review of the record shows the family court considered the application of Mr. T— 
which includes an extensive discussion of a putative father's ability to disestablish 
paternity pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5)—but, admittedly lacking conclusive guidance 
from the opinion, the family court distinguished Mr. T and upheld the previous 
determination of paternity based on finality. In our estimation, technical application 
of the procedural rule of preservation would work an injustice given the issues 
present concern the rights of a minor and matters of equity. Therefore, we will 
address the merits of Ashburn's argument. See Atl. Coast Builders & Contractors, 
LLC v. Lewis, 398 S.C. 323, 330, 730 S.E.2d 282, 285 (2012) (stating that though 
our appellate courts "should follow . . . longstanding precedent and resolve [an]
issue on preservation grounds when it clearly is unpreserved," it is "good practice 
for us to reach the merits of an issue when error preservation is doubtful"); id. at 333, 
730 S.E.2d at 287 (Toal, C.J., concurring in result in part and dissenting in part) 
("[W]here the question of preservation is subject to multiple interpretations, any 
doubt should be resolved in favor of preservation. When the opposing party does 
not raise a preservation issue on appeal, courts are not precluded from finding the 
issue unpreserved if the error is clear. However, the silence of an adversary should 
serve as an indicator to the court of the obscurity of the purported procedural flaw."); 
see also Altman v. Griffith, 372 S.C. 388, 396, 642 S.E.2d 619, 623 (Ct. App. 2007) 
(addressing an unpreserved issue regarding the custody of a minor child because 
"procedural rules are subservient to the court's duty to zealously guard the rights of 
minors" (quoting Joiner ex rel. Rivas v. Rivas, 342 S.C. 102, 107, 536 S.E.2d 372, 
374 (2000))). 
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erred in failing to make an explicit ruling regarding the best interests of Child.3 
As to Ashburn's 60(b)(5) argument, the family court, relying on Mr. G v. Mrs. 
G, 320 S.C. 305, 465 S.E.2d 101 (Ct. App. 1995), noted it is the policy in South 
Carolina that once a case is decided, it should remain decided with certain, very 
narrow exceptions. In proceeding to rule, the family court determined that no
exception applied. Although neither the family court's order nor the parties' briefs
on appeal discussed the application of res judicata or collateral estoppel, the family 
court's effort to distinguish Mr. T requires that we address the doctrines here. 
"Res judicata bars subsequent actions by the same parties when the claims 
arise out of the same transaction or occurrence that was the subject of a prior action 
between those parties." Judy v. Judy, 393 S.C. 160, 172, 712 S.E.2d 408, 414 (2011) 
(quoting Plum Creek Dev. Co. v. City of Conway, 334 S.C. 30, 34, 512 S.E.2d 106, 
109 (1999)). "Under the doctrine of res judicata, '[a] litigant is barred from raising 
any issues [that] were adjudicated in the former suit and any issues [that] might have 
been raised in the former suit.'" Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting Plum Creek
Dev. Co., 334 S.C. at 34, 512 S.E.2d at 109). However, res judicata and collateral 
estoppel "have been subjected to exceptions to their application." Mr. T, 378 S.C. 
at 137, 662 S.E.2d at 418. These "preclusive doctrines are 'not to be rigidly or 
mechanically applied and must[,] on occasion, yield to more fundamental concerns.'"  
Id. at 138, 662 S.E.2d at 419 (quoting People v. Plevy, 417 N.E.2d 518, 521 (N.Y.
1980)). Collateral estoppel or res judicata "may be precluded [when] unfairness or
injustice results, or public policy requires it." Carrigg v. Cannon, 347 S.C. 75, 81,
552 S.E.2d 767, 770 (Ct. App. 2001) (citing State v. Bacote, 331 S.C. 328, 331, 503 
S.E.2d 161, 163 (1998)).
At the administrative conference in 2001, Ashburn waived genetic testing and 
signed an order admitting he was Child's natural father. Based on the results of a 
self-conducted DNA test, Ashburn filed an action in 2014 seeking to disestablish 
paternity of Child. Arguably, Ashburn would be barred by res judicata from
contesting paternity because the 2001 order establishing paternity is between the 
same parties and arises out of the same transaction or occurrence as his current claim
seeking to disestablish paternity.  However, the analysis does not end there because
3 We address the best interests of Child along with the Rule 60(b)(5) analysis 
because, as discussed below, the Rule 60(b)(5) analysis subsumes the question of 
whether disestablishing paternity is in the best interests of Child.   
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it is necessary to address whether the circumstances warrant precluding the 
application of res judicata and granting Ashburn relief from the 2001 order 
establishing paternity. 
Our courts have not directly applied Rule 60(b)(5), whether brought by 
motion or independent action, to relieve a father from a previous order establishing
paternity but have intimated that it is possible. See Mr. T, 378 S.C. at 136, 139, 662 
S.E.2d at 418–19 (reversing a motion to dismiss and remanding for development of 
the record and finding that a previous determination of paternity is subject to attack 
under Rule 60(b)(5) if the appropriate circumstances are met); Evans v. Gunter, 294 
S.C. 525, 526–27, 529, 366 S.E.2d 44, 45, 47 (Ct. App. 1988) (reversing an order 
granting a motion to dismiss by concluding the husband's allegation that his wife
lied to him about his paternity and induced him to sign a waiver form could be 
considered extrinsic fraud under Rule 60(b) and would also "make out a case such 
that it would no longer be equitable" for the previous finding of paternity to have 
prospective application under Rule 60(b)(5)); see also Mr. G, 320 S.C. at 316, 465 
S.E.2d at 107 (Hearn, J., dissenting) (recognizing, in addition to fraud, Rule 60(b)(5) 
may entitle the husband to relief from a previous child support order and finding of 
paternity when he relied on his wife's representation of paternity).   
The courts in Mr. T and Mr. G have provided some considerations pertinent 
to the decision of whether to grant a legal father relief from a previous order 
establishing paternity. The best interests of the child,4 the interests of the parents or 
alleged parents,5 and the financial impact on the alleged father6 are relevant
considerations. In addition to these concerns, this court in Mr. T noted that deciding 
paternity based on finality is troubling in light of the significant changes in DNA 
testing procedures allowing for more accurate determinations and because 
4 Mr. T, 378 S.C. at 138, 662 S.E.2d at 419. 
5 Id. (noting that an accurate determination regarding paternity significantly affects 
the interests of parents and alleged parents); see Mr. G, 320 S.C. at 316, 465 S.E.2d 
at 107 (Hearn, J., dissenting) (acknowledging a legal father bound by a family court 
judgment was subject to incarceration for failure to pay child support, even though 
the legal father alleged the judgment was fraudulently obtained).  
6 Mr. G, 320 S.C. at 316, 465 S.E.2d at 107 (Hearn, J., dissenting) (recognizing that 
by not granting the legal father relief from the previous judgment because the fraud 
alleged was intrinsic, the legal father would be required to pay child support in
excess of $50,000 to satisfy a judgment he alleged was fraudulently obtained).  
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"knowledge of a biological parent is important for purposes of medical history,
genetic defects, [and] inheritance rights."  378 S.C. at 138–39, 662 S.E.2d at 419.   
Similar considerations have been applied in other jurisdictions determining 
whether the circumstances warrant granting a legal father relief from a previous 
order establishing paternity. Paramount are the best interests of the child.7  Whether
under the umbrella of the "best interests of the child" or independently, other 
jurisdictions consider the relationship between the child and legal father,8 the amount
of time that has passed since the previous finding of paternity,9 and whether the 
mother withheld the possibility that there might be other potential fathers.10 
We find, in accordance with the previous paternity cases of our courts and 
instructive decisions of other jurisdictions, there exists in the present case such 
special circumstances warranting equitable relief from the previous finding of 
paternity. See Mr. T, 378 S.C. at 135, 662 S.E.2d at 417 (noting that the structure of 
Rule 60(b)(5) allows a court to entertain an independent action for relief from an 
order "based on such rare, special, exceptional[,] or unusual circumstances that may 
warrant equitable relief, including accident or mistake").   
Certainly, no interest of Child other than financial is served by upholding 
Ashburn's paternity. This is especially true given the statements by the parties that 
a parent-child relationship will not develop between Ashburn and Child. We are not
convinced the financial interest is the determining factor; otherwise, upholding 
paternity would always be in the child's best interests regardless of the relationship 
between the child and putative father. Cf. V.E. v. W.M., 54 A.3d 368, 371 (Pa. Super
Ct. 2012) ("[When] there is no relationship, application of [paternity by estoppel] is 
7 State ex rel. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., Child Support Enf't Div. v. 

Michael George K., 531 S.E.2d 669, 676 (W. Va. 2000).

8 Glover v. Severino, 946 A.2d 710, 716 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008).

9 Id. at 715 (finding that a legal father was not estopped from denying paternity even 

though the child was ten years old). But see Michael George K., 531 S.E.2d at 671–
	
72, 677 ("[I]t is significant that there was relatively little time (6 months or so) 

between [the legal father's] initial acknowledgment of paternity and his contesting 

it.").

10 Glover, 946 A.2d at 715 (noting that legal fathers were not estopped from denying 

paternity in previous cases in which the time period exceeded ten years when the 
 	
mothers concealed the possibility of other fathers).     
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irrelevant to the child's best interests. Absent a relationship, what becomes relevant
is who will be financially responsible for the child."). Therefore, we focus on the 
parent-child relationship between Ashburn and Child.  
We find the family court incorrectly ascertained the emotional consequences 
to Child in upholding the previous order of paternity. The evidence in the record 
shows there is no significant parent-child relationship. Ashburn did not attend 
Child's birth and did not visit Child until she was seven months old, and that visit 
was not voluntary but rather a requirement of the Marine Corps. Thereafter, 
Ashburn, Mother, and Child lost contact. Ashburn was subsequently stationed in
Japan, Hawaii, Iowa, and North Carolina. Ashburn had no contact with Child until 
the visit in Charleston when Child was twelve years old. Despite Child considering 
Ashburn to be her father, there is no evidence in the record showing Child attempted 
to establish a relationship with Ashburn. Because there is no significant parent-child 
relationship, there is a low risk of emotional harm in severing the relationship. See 
Glover, 946 A.2d at 716 ("Estoppel is based on the public policy that children should 
be secure in knowing who their parents are. If a certain person has acted as the 
parent and bonded with the child, the child should not be required to suffer the
potentially damaging trauma that may come from being told that the father he has 
known all his life is not in fact his father." (quoting Brinkley v. King, 701 A.2d 176, 
180 (Pa. 1997))). 
In addition to the absence of a parent-child relationship, we consider what 
financial impact upholding the previous judgment would have on Ashburn. Ashburn 
dutifully paid child support for Child's entire life, sixteen years. Barring any increase 
in child support, Ashburn would have to pay approximately $3,00011 more in support 
until Child reaches the age of majority.12 We also acknowledge the possibility that 
Ashburn could be required to pay college expenses. See McLeod v. Starnes, 396 
S.C. 647, 660, 723 S.E.2d 198, 206 (2012) (noting that a family court is permitted 
to award college expenses incident to child support if certain criteria are met). 
Although more than ten years have passed since the original order establishing
11 This amount is an estimate. Ashburn will have to pay $200 per month until Child 
turns eighteen in October 2018. Fifteen months will pass between August 2017 and 
October 2018, requiring Ashburn to pay a total of $3,000 (15 months x $200/month).  
12 Ashburn is not seeking reimbursement for previously paid child support. In any 
event, Rule 60(b)(5) would not provide retroactive relief, as the rule only pertains to 
the prospective application of a judgment.  
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paternity, we do not believe this alone is sufficient to uphold the previous order given
that Mother did not disclose the possibility of other fathers to Ashburn. See Glover, 
946 A.2d at 715 (noting that legal fathers were not estopped from denying paternity 
in previous cases in which the time period exceeded ten years when the mothers 
concealed the possibility of other fathers). In fact, Ashburn accepted Mother's 
representation that he was the father. In doing so, he declined to contest paternity, 
and he did what many would resist by accepting responsibility for Child. 
Furthermore, we find relief from the previous order establishing paternity is
warranted because the policies that support upholding paternity based on finality are 
not implicated in the present case. See id. at 716 (noting the policy that undergirds 
paternity by estoppel in Pennsylvania is "protection of children and of the family 
unit"). The public policy of South Carolina "encourages and promotes reconciliation 
between spouses." Theisen v. Theisen, 394 S.C. 434, 449, 716 S.E.2d 271, 278 
(2011) (Pleicones, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citing Towles v. Towles, 
256 S.C. 307, 182 S.E.2d 53 (1971)). Additionally, this state's public policy
discourages causes of action that would undermine and destroy family unity. See 
Fowler v. Fowler, 242 S.C. 252, 256, 130 S.E.2d 568, 569 (1963) ("The rule 
prohibiting suit by a minor against the parent for a personal tort is based upon 
considerations of public policy, which discourage causes of action that tend to 
undermine and destroy family unity and parental discipline."). Similar to Glover, 
this state's policies of reconciliation and preservation of the family unit are enforced 
by upholding a previous determination of paternity based on finality. However, the
policies of promoting reconciliation and discouraging actions that would destroy 
family unity are not implicated in the present case because Ashburn and Mother were 
not married, reconciliation is highly unlikely considering Ashburn is married with 
two children, and there is no family unity at risk of destruction.  
In conclusion, given the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard of review, 
the circumstances in the present case warrant granting Ashburn relief because it is
no longer equitable that the previous order establishing paternity have prospective 
application. See Mr. T, 378 S.C. at 131–32, 662 S.E.2d at 415 ("In appeals from the 
family court, the appellate court has the authority to correct errors of law and to find 
facts in accordance with its own view of the preponderance of the evidence."); id. at
135, 662 S.E.2d at 417 (stating Rule 60(b) allows a litigant to seek equitable relief 
from a previous order establishing paternity under special circumstances).   
In light of the foregoing, we decline to address Ashburn's remaining 
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arguments. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613,
518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (stating an appellate court need not address remaining 
issues when the resolution of a prior issue is dispositive).   
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, the decision of the family court is 
REVERSED. 

MCDONALD and HILL, JJ., concur. 
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KONDUROS, J.:  In this criminal case, the State appeals the circuit court's 
decision finding the statement of the victim inadmissible as a dying declaration 
exception to hearsay. The State argues the circuit court erred in (1) finding the 
statement inadmissible as hearsay, (2) making conclusions regarding the medical 
records, and (3) finding the victim was planning to seek revenge.  We affirm.   
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FACTS 
Davon Goodwin, a nineteen-year-old man, sustained a gunshot wound to his 
abdomen on April 26, 2011. Emergency medical services transported Goodwin to 
the hospital, and the medical records indicate he arrived at the hospital "alert" and 
"spitting up or coughing up bright red blood" with a severe abdominal wound 
requiring immediate surgery. Goodwin was intubated and doctors performed 
emergency surgery to repair his abdominal wounds.  Doctors performed another 
surgery the next day, April 27, which included the placement of drains and tubes.  
The medical records indicate Goodwin was extubated on the morning of April 28.  
On April 29, Detective Jerome Fleming with the City of Charleston Police 
Department, went to the hospital to interview Goodwin in the intensive care unit.  
Goodwin identified Marvin Reginald Brown from a six-pack photographic line-up 
as the person who shot him.  On the same day Goodwin made the identification to 
Detective Fleming, Goodwin was moved out of the intensive care unit "to the 
floor." Medical records reveal "the decision was made that he was ready for 
transfer to the floor;" "[h]e is up and out of bed-to-chair and [physical therapy] has 
been consulted to work with ambulation;" "[h]is abdominal incision is closed and 
the skin is closed with staples and is clean, dry, and intact;" and "[h]e has been 
tolerating tube feeds through [the tube] without any difficulty." 
The medical records also indicate Goodwin continued to have pain and was not 
interested in physical therapy. For example, the "[Physical] Therapy Charting 
Report" of April 30—the day after Goodwin gave the identifying statement to 
Fleming—indicates his "[a]verage pain over the last 24 hours" was "8/10," his goal 
was "not [to] do [physical therapy]," and his response to the treatment was noted as 
"fatigued" with impairments of "decreased endurance, pain, limited mobility."  On 
the other hand, the same physical therapy record that day states: "Patient is alert 
and oriented to name, place[,] and date;" he "[t]olerates 5 to 15 minutes of an 
uninterrupted exercise bout;" his physical therapy prognosis is "good;" and the 
long term outcome "as discussed with patient and/or family" includes a notation 
that Goodwin "will be able to return to work/school full time" and "will be 
independent with all self care including driving."  
While still in the hospital, on the morning of May 4, Goodwin was found to be 
unresponsive.  Efforts to revive Goodwin failed, and he was pronounced dead.  
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The medical records include notations that a pulmonary embolism was the 
suspected cause of Goodwin's death and his death was a "[s]udden, unexpected, 
unexplained death." However, the Forensic Autopsy Final Report established the 
cause of death as "[c]omplications of a single penetrating gunshot wound to 
abdomen." Brown was indicted for murder, armed robbery, and possession of a 
firearm during the commission of a violent crime.  Before trial, Brown moved to 
exclude Goodwin's identifying statement to Detective Fleming as hearsay and a 
violation of the Confrontation Clause. 
At the suppression hearing, Detective Fleming described Goodwin as "very weak" 
and "unable to really raise his hands or arms . . . and speak loudly."  Detective 
Fleming answered affirmatively when asked whether Goodwin "was able to 
communicate," "was lucid and alert," and "was able to correct you if you misheard 
something he said." Detective Fleming also testified he had to encourage Goodwin 
to identify the person who shot him, explaining "[i]t is common knowledge, as far 
as a lot of victims . . . they don't want to be identified as being an individual that 
assisted police."  Detective Fleming noted:  
My comments to him [were] that he's the victim here of 
this shooting, and very fortunate at that time to say that -- 
to be alive. And . . . there was no one out there really to 
come forward to say that they witnessed this shooting, 
and he was the only guy that could say -- we could say 
establish who the perpetrator of the crime was and bring 
him to justice. 
Goodwin's family members also testified at the hearing.  Goodwin's grandfather 
testified Goodwin told him he would not be able to ride with him in the car, an 
activity they had enjoyed together: "I was sitting there holding his hand, and we 
were talking about the times we had, and the subject came up about us riding 
around. . . . And he said he wouldn't be able to ride with me, and that my other 
grandson . . . would have his seat."  Goodwin's grandfather also testified Goodwin 
told him "he wasn't going to make it."  However, Goodwin's grandfather could not 
remember with specificity at what point during Goodwin's hospitalization these 
conversations occurred. Of Goodwin's demeanor after surgery, Goodwin's father 
testified Goodwin was 
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[a]lmost like a -- a child just happy to see his parents, 
because . . . he know[s] I'm dad, I'm going take care of 
him, you know.  You know, more like, for example, like 
if your child got in a fight at school or beat up with a 
gang and be happy to see their parents when they see 
them, because they [are] scared.   
Goodwin's father also testified his son "was in a deep stare, and always want[ed] 
you to hold his hand."   
Goodwin's sister testified Goodwin cried while in the hospital, although she had 
never seen him cry before, and Goodwin "seemed tired, and he was ready to go 
home."1  Goodwin's brother testified Goodwin told him "everything will be all 
right," and "the boy shot him."  Regarding the person who shot Goodwin, 
Goodwin's brother said: "I know who he is." 
At a subsequent hearing, the circuit court verbally ruled Goodwin's statement was 
not a statement made under the belief of impending death, noting Goodwin had 
been extubated at the time of the statement; his sister testified "he just seemed tired 
and ready to go home;" and Goodwin was "ambulatory," "screened for a physical 
therapy session," and "everyone thought he was getting better."  The trial court 
further stated this case "was different than the situation in [McHoney2], which was 
the case that was most helpful."  
The circuit court thereafter issued a written order finding Goodwin's statement was 
inadmissible as hearsay.  Specifically, the circuit court found the medical records 
1 At the suppression hearing, the State advised the circuit court that Goodwin's
family sent a note interpreting this statement as follows:  
I received a note from the family.  Take this how you 
will, your Honor. But their interpretation of his 
statement, I'm ready to go home was, I'm ready to pass.  
I'm ready to pass on to Heaven.  And they wanted to 
make sure I conveyed that to you.  That was their 
interpretation of him saying that. 
2 State v. McHoney, 344 S.C. 85, 544 S.E.2d 30 (2001). 
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indicated Goodwin "was improving and was not in imminent danger of death" at
the time he gave the identifying statement.  The order referenced several points in 
the medical record, including Goodwin was "extubated on the 28th," "'adequate on 
the floor, transferred out of [the intensive care unit], was making strides with 
physical therapy, and ambulating in the hall'"; "[h]e received a physical therapy 
consult on April 29th, and began physical therapy on April 30th"; "[o]n that day, 
he tolerated 5-15 minutes of uninterrupted exercise"; and his "May 4th death was 
listed as sudden and unexpected."  The court also found "neither the medical 
records nor the other evidence in the case demonstrates that the victim was aware 
of his imminent death when identifying the photograph of the defendant from the 
six-pack lineup." Additionally, the order stated: "[E]vidence presented at the 
pre[]trial hearing suggested that the victim was planning on seeking revenge 
against his assailant. This is inconsistent with both an awareness of imminent 
death as well as one who has given up all hope of survival."  This appeal followed.  
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"In criminal cases, the appellate court sits to review errors of law only."  State v. 
Baccus, 367 S.C. 41, 48, 625 S.E.2d 216, 220 (2006).  Thus, an appellate court "is 
bound by the [circuit] court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous."  
Id. "The determination by the [circuit] court of the preliminary facts, on which the 
competency of a dying declaration depends, will not be disturbed on appeal 'unless 
clearly incorrect and prejudicial.'" State v. Bethea, 241 S.C. 16, 23, 126 S.E.2d 
846, 849-50 (1962) (quoting State v. Smalls, 87 S.C. 550, 551, 70 S.E. 300, 301 
(1911)). "Affirmance is required when . . . the conclusion of the [circuit court] is a 
reasonable inference from the evidence."  Id. at 24, 126 S.E.2d at 850. 
"The admission or exclusion of evidence is left to the sound discretion of the 
[circuit court], whose decision will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of 
discretion."  State v. Winkler, 388 S.C. 574, 583, 698 S.E.2d 596, 601 (2010) 
(quoting State v. Saltz, 346 S.C. 114, 121, 551 S.E.2d 240, 244 (2001)).  "An abuse 
of discretion occurs when the conclusions of the [circuit] court either lack 
evidentiary support or are controlled by an error of law."  Id. (quoting State v. 
Pittman, 373 S.C. 527, 577, 647 S.E.2d 144, 170 (2007)).  "An abuse of discretion 
occurs when the [circuit] court's ruling is based on an error of law or, when 
grounded in factual conclusions, is without evidentiary support."  State v. Hawes, 
411 S.C. 188, 191, 767 S.E.2d 707, 708 (2015) (quoting State v. Black, 400 S.C. 
10, 16, 732 S.E.2d 880, 884 (2012)). 
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LAW/ANALYSIS 
I. Belief of Imminent Death 
The State argues the circuit court erred in finding Goodwin's statement identifying 
Brown is inadmissible hearsay, asserting the record contains evidence Goodwin 
believed his death was imminent, citing his grandfather's and sister's testimonies, 
Goodwin's demeanor, and his medical condition.  The State also argues the circuit 
court erred in relying on Goodwin's improvement when he later died from his 
injuries and the amount of time a declarant lives after giving the statement is 
immaterial.  We disagree.   
"In a prosecution for homicide . . . , a statement made by a declarant while 
believing that the declarant's death was imminent, concerning the cause or 
circumstances of what the declarant believed to be impending death" is not 
excluded by the hearsay rule when the declarant is unavailable as a witness.  Rule 
804(b)(2), SCRE. Imminent is defined as "[n]ear at hand; mediate rather than 
immediate; close rather than touching; impending; on the point of happening; 
threatening; menacing; perilous." Imminent, Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 
1979). "[D]ying declarations are competent evidence, for or against the accused, 
upon preliminary proof of certain conditions."  Bethea, 241 S.C. at 21, 126 S.E.2d 
at 848. 
The rules in regard to such testimony are well settled:  
1st. That death must be imminent at the time the 
declarations in question are made.  2nd. That the 
declarant must be so fully aware of this as to be without 
any hope of life. * * * And 3rd.  That the 'subject of the 
charge' must be the death of the declarant, and the 
circumstances of the death must be the subject of the 
declarations.   
Id. at 21, 126 S.E.2d at 848-849 (quoting State v. Johnson, 26 S.C. 152, 153, 1 S.E. 
510, 510 (1887)).
"A declarant does not have to express, in direct terms, his awareness of his 
condition for his statement to be admissible as a dying declaration.  The necessary 
state of mind can be inferred from the facts and circumstances surrounding the 
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declaration."  McHoney, 344 S.C. at 93, 544 S.E.2d at 33. "Furthermore, the 
length of time the declarant lives after making the dying declaration is immaterial.  
The focus is on the declarant's state of mind when the statement is made, not on the 
eventual outcome of the declarant's injuries."  Id. at 93, 544 S.E.2d at 34. 
A belief in imminent death is an extreme and powerful belief, as noted in State v. 
Davis, 138 S.C. 532, 137 S.E. 139 (1927).  In Davis, the victim told his doctor: "'I 
don't believe I am going to make it.'" Id. at 538, 137 S.E. at 140.  However, the 
doctor "encouraged him to think that he would recover—with what success is not 
shown." Id.  The supreme court found the victim's statement should not have been
admitted, finding that while the victim "was uneasy and anxious about his 
condition, [the victim] had not given up all hope of life, and in this respect the test 
was not met." Id. 
Here, evidence supports the circuit court's finding Goodwin's statement was not 
made while he believed his death was imminent.  The circuit court's order noted 
specific facts in the medical record "that he was improving and was not in 
imminent danger of death at the time the statements were made."  The order 
referenced portions of the medical record that provide Goodwin underwent 
surgery, was extubated, was transferred out of intensive care on the day of the 
statement, was able to begin physical therapy, and that his death was not expected.  
The court indicated recognition of Goodwin's "serious condition" at the time he 
identified Brown but relied on evidence in the medical record he was improving.  
The circuit court also found "neither the medical records nor the other evidence in 
the case demonstrates that the victim was aware of his imminent death" when he 
made the identifying statement. 
The medical records support the circuit court's finding Goodwin was improving on 
the date Goodwin gave the identifying statement to Detective Fleming.  Physician 
notes from that evening state "[h]e is up and out of bed-to-chair and PT has been 
consulted to work with ambulation."  The medical records establish Goodwin 
successfully underwent two surgeries and was extubated prior to the statement.  
The "Case History" set forth in the autopsy report indicates "[t]he patient improved 
and had begun ambulation and physical therapy," after the second surgery, 
although an exact date is not given.  
In Bethea, the victim identified the person who shot her to the responding sheriff 
and told the sheriff she was going to die.  241 S.C. at 22, 126 S.E.2d at 849.  The 
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victim also identified the person who shot her to a nurse at the hospital and told the 
nurse she was going to die. Id. at 22-23, 126 S.E.2d at 849.  Later, the victim told 
the nurse "'that if she died,'" she did not want the person who shot her to come to 
the funeral. Id. at 23, 126 S.E.2d at 849. The victim's doctor testified "her course 
was progressively downward." Id. at 22, 126 S.E.2d at 849. The supreme court 
affirmed the circuit court's decision admitting the statements made by the sheriff 
and the nurse. Id. at 24, 126 S.E.2d at 850.   
In the present case, however, Goodwin gave the statement identifying Brown after 
he had undergone two surgeries, been extubated, and was able to breathe on his 
own. On the same day Goodwin identified Brown, he was moved out of the 
intensive care unit and began to ambulate.  Goodwin did not identify the assailant 
spontaneously but in response to questioning when Detective Fleming encouraged 
Goodwin to identify the person who shot him.  Additionally, Goodwin was 
reluctant to name the perpetrator, which suggests a fear of reprisal, something 
inconsistent with a belief of impending death.   
The case at bar is also in contrast to the facts in McHoney wherein the victim
sustained a severe cut across her neck and seven stab wounds to her abdomen.  344
S.C. at 89-90, 544 S.E.2d at 32.  After the attack, the victim was conscious but 
could not speak, and identified her attacker by nodding to indicate letters of her 
attacker's name as a nurse recited the alphabet.  Id. at 90, 544 S.E.2d at 32. Even 
though the nurse sought to reassure the victim she would be alright, the victim
"shook her head no." Id.  The victim lost consciousness before being transported 
to another trauma center and never regained consciousness before dying two weeks 
later. Id.  The supreme court found the circuit court "properly admitted the victim's
identification of 'SP' as her killer under Rule 804(b)(2), SCRE."  Id. at 94, 544 
S.E.2d at 34. 
Recognizing the challenge of discerning the state of mind of the declarant, we find 
the record contains evidence to support the circuit court's finding Goodwin's
statement to Detective Fleming was inadmissible hearsay as it did not meet the 
dying declaration exception. 
II.      Findings as to Goodwin's Revenge 
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The State also argues the circuit court erred in finding Goodwin was planning to 
seek revenge against his attacker, asserting no evidence was offered at the pretrial 
hearing to establish such intent. We agree. 
The circuit court's written order stated:  
Furthermore, evidence presented at the pre[]trial hearing 
suggested that the victim was planning on seeking 
revenge against his assailant.  This is inconsistent with 
both an awareness of imminent death as well as one who 
has given up all hope of survival.  Ex. A at 464. 
"Ex. A at 464" appears to be a flowsheet of chaplain services indicating that a 
chaplain visited with the family of the victim on the day he was admitted to the 
hospital and again after Goodwin died.  Brown's argument that Goodwin's lack of 
chaplain visits supports a finding of intended revenge is strained at best.  
Additionally, testimony Goodwin knew who shot him and feared his assailant does 
not support such a conclusion.
No evidence was presented at the suppression hearing that Goodwin planned to 
seek revenge against Brown, and the evidence Brown identified in his brief is not 
evidence Goodwin was planning to seek revenge.  Therefore, we find the 
conclusion of the circuit court as to revenge was erroneous.  However, this error 
did not prejudice the State. 
"The determination by the trial court of the preliminary facts, on which the 
competency of a dying declaration depends, will not be disturbed on appeal 'unless 
clearly incorrect and prejudicial.'" Bethea, 241 S.C. at 23, 126 S.E.2d at 849-50 
(quoting Smalls, 87 S.C. at 551, 70 S.E. at 301).  "To warrant reversal, an error 
must result in prejudice to the appealing party."  State v. Black, 400 S.C. 10, 16-17, 
732 S.E.2d 880, 884 (2012). 
Whether an error is harmless depends on the 
circumstances of the particular case.  No definite rule of 
law governs this finding; rather, the materiality and 
prejudicial character of the error must be determined 
from its relationship to the entire case.  Error is harmless 
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when it "could not reasonably have affected the result of 
the trial." 
State v. Mitchell, 286 S.C. 572, 573, 336 S.E.2d 150, 151 (1985) (quoting State v. 
Key, 256 S.C. 90, 93, 180 S.E.2d 888, 890 (1971)).
We find the circuit court did not rely solely on evidence of revenge to support a 
finding of hearsay but relied on other evidence, including the medical records.  
Notably, the finding of revenge appears in the written order, but the court did not 
rely on the finding of revenge in its verbal ruling.  Moreover, the finding of 
revenge in the written order is an additional reason given by the circuit court for 
finding Goodwin was not aware of his imminent death when he made the 
statement. The circuit court found "neither the medical records nor the other 
evidence in the case demonstrates that the victim was aware of his imminent death 
when identifying the photograph . . . ."  The court supported its ruling by first 
stating: "on April 29th, the victim's medical condition was improving."  The court 
next stated: "Furthermore, evidence presented at the pre[]trial hearing suggested 
that the victim was planning on seeking revenge against his assailant."  Thus, the 
finding of revenge is in addition to a finding of an improved medical condition as 
set forth in the medical records.  As such, we do not find this error prejudiced the 
State and affirm the admission of the identifying statement. 3 
CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, the decision of the circuit court excluding the 
identifying statement as hearsay is
AFFIRMED. 
WILLIAMS, J., and LEE, A.J., concur. 
3 Based on our findings regarding hearsay, we decline to address Brown's assertion 
the identifying statement was inadmissible as a violation of the Confrontation 
Clause of the United States Constitution and the South Carolina Constitution as an 
additional sustaining ground.  See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 
335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (holding the appellate court need 
not address remaining issues when the previous issue is dispositive). 
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KONDUROS, J.:  In this case regarding defective construction, Daniel Island 
Riverside Developers, LLC (DIRD) and Carriage Hill Associates of Charleston, 
LLC (CHAC) (collectively, Appellants) contest on appeal the trial court's award of 
damages to Respondents, arguing the court should have offset the damages with 
the amount Respondents previously received through settlement. Further, 
Appellants contend the trial court should have allocated the damages among the 
various defendants and erred by entering an order prior to Respondents' election of 
remedies.  Finally, Appellants assert the damages were excessive, speculative, and 
not supported by the evidence and constituted a double recovery.  We affirm. 
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Oaks at Rivers Edge Horizontal Property Regime (The Oaks) is located on 
Daniel Island and comprised of six buildings, with six condominium units in each 
building. The Oaks was constructed over a period from 2003 through 2006.  DIRD 
was the developer of the Project.  DIRD contracted with CHAC to be the 
construction manager for the Project.  DIRD sold the units for an average of 
$650,000, although many unit owners paid substantially more for their units as 
they purchased their units or contracts from intermediate third parties.1  DIRD 
appointed board members to the board of the Oaks at Rivers Edge Property 
Owners Association (the POA) until control of the POA was turned over to the unit 
owners on or after December 7, 2006.
Before purchasing their units, prospective purchasers received brochures marketing 
the condominiums.  These marketing documents advertised an "incredible array of 
standard luxuries." The luxuries included things like oak flooring, soundproofing 
1 Many unit owners paid in the $700,000 range up to $900,000. 
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between all units, and an exterior brick-and-stucco façade.  However, numerous 
issues later arose with the condominiums.  The units were not soundproof.  The 
units had numerous leaks caused by air-conditioning units, plumbing, and faultily 
installed windows and doors. The leaks within the walls resulted in the growth of 
mold in the units.  The hardwood floors also warped and separated in multiple 
places in the units.  
Multiple lawsuits arose from the project.  As part of the litigation, in February 
2011, the POA obtained an estimate from Southeastern Construction for 
$11,807,884 to repair the six buildings.  Prior to the scheduled date of trial, several 
settlements occurred among the various parties. The total settlement amount paid 
to the POA was $7,702,552. Of that amount, $3,700,000 was paid by CHAC; 
DIRD; Carriage Hill Associates, Inc. (CHANY)2; the architects on the project, 
Gerald Rumplick and Edward D'Orazio; and Richard Behringer.  The other 
$4,002,552 was paid by Weather Shield; The Muhler Company, Inc.; A.C. 
Construction, Inc.; and Coastal Caulking.
The Memorandum of Settlement stated, "Whether or not CHAC and DIRD will 
receive credit on the judgment for amount paid by CHANY, Architects and 
Richard Behringer in his individual capacity, or any amount paid by other 
defendants in settlement will be determined by the court consistent with South 
Carolina law."  The POA and individual unit owners (Unit Owners) (collectively, 
Respondents) agreed to "dismiss with prejudice claims against [Appellants] only 
for UTPA, piercing, fraud, individual liability, amalgamation, aiding and abetting, 
aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract accompanied 
by a fraudulent act." It further specified, "The remaining claims against
[Appellants] only, are breach of fiduciary duty, negligent misrepresentation, 
negligence, breach of express and implied warranties, including, but not limited to, 
habitability, fitness for a particular purpose, and workmanlike service, and breach 
of contract." They also agreed "not to seek punitive damages or attorneys' fees 
arising out of any cause of action, against [Appellants], only."  Appellants were 
among the signors. 
The settlement agreement and release specified "this Agreement is only a Partial 
Release by the POA as to [Appellants]."  It stated "the POA's release by and of 
2 CHANY was based in New York and formed CHAC to do local construction 
management. 
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[Appellants] is limited to the terms of the Memorandum of Settlement and does not 
in any way apply to the claims currently pending before the [trial court]."  For $3.7 
million, the POA discharged Appellants "consistent with the terms of the 
Memorandum of Settlement and specifically reserving all claims pending at the 
time of this Agreement before the [trial court]."  For $4,002,552, the POA released
Weather Shield, Muhler, A.C., and Coastal Caulking for all damages resulting 
from the design, manufacture, sale, and installation of the windows, window units,
exterior doors, exterior door units, railings, balustrades, framing, and caulking.  
Appellants signed the agreement. 
At the bench trial, several Unit Owners testified about the problems they 
experienced with their units, including sound transmission between the units, mold 
problems, and hardwood flooring separating.  Appellants and Respondents then 
stipulated the remaining homeowners would testify to having the same sound 
problems with their units. Several Unit Owners also testified about their inability 
to sell their units. Others indicated the people renting their units had moved out 
because of mold, the lack of soundproofing, and other safety concerns.  Owners 
who were able to sell the units testified as to the amount of loss they sustained.  
For example, Robert Reece testified that after buying his unit for $716,850, it 
appraised at $940,000, but it sold for only $377,000.3 
Both sides presented expert testimony about what needed to be done to correct the 
problems with the buildings. Dr. Noral Stewart testified on behalf of Appellants as 
to what had already been done to remedy the sound problems.  Mike Parker also 
testified as an expert for Appellants about the leaks.  Respondents presented the 
expert testimonies of Theodore Padgett, who described what he believed needed to 
be repaired in the buildings, and David Willis, who testified as to the costs of those 
repairs. 
The trial court found Appellants jointly and severally liable for negligence, gross 
negligence, and negligent misrepresentation.  It also found DIRD liable to the POA 
3 Other Unit Owners sustained losses when selling their units as well.  Robert 
Graham purchased his unit for $675,000 and sold it for $330,000.  Karen Nelson 
testified she bought her unit for $686,000; short-sold it for $330,000; and paid the 
bank a deficiency judgment of $90,000.  Terry Johnson provided he purchased his 
unit for $670,633 and sold it for $490,000.  Brenda Cook indicated she short-sold
her unit for $350,000.
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for breach of fiduciary duty. It found DIRD liable to the Unit Owners for breach 
of implied warranty of habitability.  It additionally found CHAC liable to the POA 
and Unit Owners for breach of implied warranty of workmanlike service.  
The trial court awarded the POA $7,934,704.06 from Appellants for the cost of 
repair, $793,470.41 for engineering fees at 10% of cost to repair, and $641,520 for 
moving, storage, and replacement lodging.  It also determined DIRD was liable for 
an additional $19,440 for the failure to fund the reserves as promised.  It awarded 
individual Unit Owners differing amounts of damages specific to them.  These 
damages included loss of market access, lost rent, inconvenience, out of pocket 
costs, and costs due to defective floors.  Several of these Unit Owners had to elect 
between damages for loss of market access or loss of rent.  One Unit Owner had to 
elect between damages from inability to refinance or loss of market access.
Appellants moved for allocation of damages and setoff, contending they were
entitled to a setoff equaling the total amount of the settlement.  Appellants also 
moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), new trial absolute, new 
trial nisi remittitur, to alter or amend judgment, and relief from the order, arguing 
the damages award was not supported by the evidence, was speculative, and 
constituted a double recovery.  Following a hearing and further memorandum, the 
trial court denied all of Appellants' motions.  This appeal followed. 
LAW/ANALYSIS 
I. Setoff 
Appellants argue the trial court erred in failing to setoff the damages it awarded by 
the amount previously received by Respondents from the settling defendants prior 
to trial, asserting the evidence presented at trial established the damages were for 
items that were the responsibility of the settling defendants, thereby resulting in a 
double recovery to the Respondents.  We disagree. 
A nonsettling defendant is entitled to credit for the 
amount paid by another defendant who settles.  The
reason for allowing such a credit is to prevent an injured 
person from obtaining a second recovery of that part of 
the amount of damages sustained which has already been 
paid to him. In other words, there can be only one 
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satisfaction for an injury or wrong. However, the 
reduction in the judgment must be from a settlement for 
the same cause of action.   
Welch v. Epstein, 342 S.C. 279, 312-13, 536 S.E.2d 408, 425 (Ct. App. 2000) 
(citations omitted); see also Rutland v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 400 S.C. 209, 216, 
734 S.E.2d 142, 145 (2012) ("A non[]settling defendant is entitled to credit for the 
amount paid by another defendant who settles for the same cause of action."). 
A settlement by a joint tortfeasor "reduces the claim 
against the others to the extent of any amount stipulated 
by the release or the covenant."  Therefore, before 
entering judgment on a jury verdict, the court must 
reduce the amount of the verdict to account for any funds 
previously paid by a settling defendant, so long as the 
settlement funds were paid to compensate the same 
plaintiff on a claim for the same injury.   
Smith v. Widener, 397 S.C. 468, 471-72, 724 S.E.2d 188, 190 (Ct. App. 2012) 
(quoting S.C. Code Ann. § 15-38-50(1) (2005)).
The trial court's jurisdiction to set off one judgment 
against another is equitable in nature and should be 
exercised when necessary to provide justice between the 
parties. A set[]off is not necessarily founded upon any 
statute or fixed rule of court, but grows out of the 
inherent equitable jurisdiction of the court.  Therefore, 
such motions are addressed to the discretion of the 
court—a discretion which should not be arbitrarily or 
capriciously exercised. 
Welch, 342 S.C. at 313, 536 S.E.2d at 425-26.   
The right to setoff has existed at common law in South 
Carolina for over 100 years.  Allowing setoff "prevents 
an injured person from obtaining a double recovery for 
the damage he sustained, for it is almost universally held 
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 that there can be only one satisfaction for an injury or 
wrong." 
 
Riley v. Ford Motor Co., 414 S.C. 185, 195, 777 S.E.2d 824, 830 (2015) (citation 
omitted) (quoting Rutland, 400 S.C. at 216, 734 S.E.2d at 145).  "In 1988, these 
equitable principles were codified as part of the South Carolina Contribution 
Among Tortfeasors Act (the Act), [sections] 15-38-10 to -70 [of the South Carolina 
Code] (2005 & Supp. 2014)." Riley, 414 S.C. at 195, 777 S.E.2d at 830. "[T]he 
Act represents the Legislature's determination of the proper balance between 
preventing double-recovery and South Carolina's 'strong public policy favoring the 
settlement of disputes.'"  Id. at 196, 777 S.E.2d at 830 (quoting Chester v. S.C. 
Dep't of Pub. Safety, 388 S.C. 343, 698 S.E.2d 559 (2010)). 
 
Section 15-38-50 provides: 
 
When a release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce 
judgment is given in good faith to one of two or more 
persons liable in tort for the same injury or the same 
wrongful death: 
 
(1) it does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from 
liability for the injury or wrongful death unless its terms 
so provide, but it reduces the claim against the others to 
the extent of any amount stipulated by the release or the 
covenant, or in the amount of the consideration paid for 
it, whichever is the greater; and 
 
(2) it discharges the tortfeasor to whom it is given from 
all liability for contribution to any other tortfeasor. 
 
S.C. Code Ann. § 15-38-50 (2005). 
 
"When the settlement is for the same injury, the nonsettling defendant's right to a 
setoff arises by operation of law.  Under this circumstance, '[s]ection 15-38-50 
grants the court no discretion . . . in applying a set[]off.'"  Smith, 397 S.C. at 472, 
724 S.E.2d at 190 (alterations by court) (citation omitted) (quoting Ellis v. Oliver, 
335 S.C. 106, 113, 515 S.E.2d 268, 272 (Ct. App. 1999)).  "Section 15-38-50 
grants the court no discretion in determining the equities involved in applying a 
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set[]off once a release has been executed in good faith between a plaintiff and one 
of several joint tortfeasors." Ellis, 335 S.C. at 113, 515 S.E.2d at 272. 
Despite a defendant's entitlement to setoff, whether at 
common law or under section 15-38-50, any "reduction 
in the judgment must be from a settlement for the same 
cause of action." Thus, where a settlement involves more 
than one claim, the allocation of settlement proceeds 
between various causes of action impacts the amount a 
non[]settling defendant may be entitled to offset. 
Riley, 414 S.C. at 196, 777 S.E.2d at 830 (citation omitted) (quoting Hawkins v. 
Pathology Assocs. of Greenville, P.A., 330 S.C. 92, 113, 498 S.E.2d 395, 407 (Ct. 
App. 1998)); see Ward v. Epting, 290 S.C. 547, 559-60, 351 S.E.2d 867, 874-75 
(Ct. App. 1986) (refusing to apply settlement for pain and suffering cause of action 
to judgment in wrongful death action).  
Our supreme court has agreed with the following apportioning approach taken by 
the Illinois Court of Appeals: 
A plaintiff who enters into a settlement with a defendant 
gains a position of control and acquires leverage in 
relation to a nonsettling defendant.  This posture is 
reflected in the plaintiff's ability to apportion the 
settlement proceeds in the manner most advantageous to 
it. Settlements are not designed to benefit nonsettling 
third parties. They are instead created by the settling 
parties in the interests of these parties.  If the position of 
a nonsettling defendant is worsened by the terms of a 
settlement, this is the consequence of a refusal to settle.  
A defendant who fails to bargain is not rewarded with the 
privilege of fashioning and ultimately extracting a benefit 
from the decisions of those who do. 
Riley, 414 S.C. at 197, 777 S.E.2d at 831 (quoting Lard v. AM/FM Ohio, Inc., 901 
N.E.2d 1006, 1019 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009)).
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Here, Appellants argue specifically the trial court should have setoff the amount of 
damages awarded with the amount already paid for the replacement of windows, 
doors, and brickwork as well as damage to sheathing in a settlement with the 
window manufacturer, installers, and framers.  However, the trial court's order 
includes repairs independent of those addressed by the settlement for the issues 
relating to the windows. For example, the brick and stucco would have had to be 
replaced in its entirety to install the missing wall insulation that was not originally 
installed and to fix the incorrectly installed lath.  Further, the stucco was not 
installed according to code in the first place and would need to be reinstalled.  
Additionally, Padgett testified the brick could be lifted out because it was not 
bonded, violated the building code, and lacked horizontal joint reinforcement, 
necessitating replacement.
Padgett also testified the water intrusion to the stucco came from many different 
sources, not just the windows. For example, he indicated the felt that was intended 
to create a water resistant barrier was improperly installed. Padgett's report of 
proposed repairs stated: "The principal avenue of water intrusion behind the 
weather protection system was identified to be the intersection of the single ply 
roof membrane with the roof eave and sidewall."  The report also provided "the 
principal source of water intrusion was observed to be the intersection of the roof 
membrane with the exterior walls.  The excessive level of wall damage is 
attributable to the lack of drainage features within the stucco system."
When asked what was wrong with the stucco, Padgett responded:
Well, the first thing is that there's no head flashing at any 
of the windows or doors. The second is there's no 
drainage feature provided at the bottom of-- at the bottom
of any wall that I found.  And those are important 
because stucco is considered to be a wet material; that is, 
it's going to absorb moisture from the atmosphere and it's 
going to be wet on the back side.  What you have to do is 
provide an avenue for that water to get out of the wall
cross section. Those are code requirements.  Both of 
those are code requirements. 
He testified all of the stucco needed to be removed.  He further provided that even 
if there were no problem with the windows, the stucco would have to be removed 
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due to the numerous code defects.  He also indicated, "The lack of drainage is not -
- drainage is not provided. There would be damage otherwise.  And the rest of 
these, the installation of life goes to long-term performance in things like wind, 
windstorms. So in order to get what they were supposed to, have, all the stucco 
has got to go." 
Padgett also testified he found other problems "with the brick veneer.  These are 
code issues. When we opened up the brick in numerous locations we did not find 
any horizontal joint reinforcement."  He also stated the brick did not meet code 
requirements due to earthquakes and the buildings would be uninhabitable if an 
earthquake occurred. He indicated all of the bricks need to be taken off and 
replaced. He testified this would be the situation even if there had been no 
problems with the windows and stucco.  He additionally explained wall insulation 
was missing in numerous places and the stucco and brick would have to be 
removed to remedy that.  Padgett estimated the windows and doors could account 
for 25% of the brick removal but did not trigger the need for replacing the exterior 
cladding. He noted surgical repairs in stucco are very difficult and the economical 
way to handle the problems is to reclad. 
Willis prepared a cost estimate for the work described by Padgett.  Willis testified 
that all of the stucco and brick have to come off in spite of the windows and doors 
because the plywood and studs were comprised.  He also indicated the stucco 
declad was independent from the windows and doors and there was already rot 
because of the stucco declad's failing. He stated that for stucco it is cheaper to 
remove it all and start over, rather than try to salvage parts of it. He further 
provided entire building had to be decladded due to the missing the brick ties.
Willis stated his estimate included removing and replacing 70 to 80% of the brick 
with a built-in contingency in case more needed to be removed.4 
4 Willis testified he had not calculated the amount of brick that needed to be 
removed that was attributable to the windows.  Upon the trial court's request, the 
parties agreed Willis would prepare affidavit on the amount of brick and stucco 
replacement necessary due to windows and doors.  However, no affidavit is 
contained in the record.  "[T]he appellant . . . has the burden of presenting this 
[c]ourt with an adequate record."  Goode v. St. Stephens United Methodist Church, 
329 S.C. 433, 446, 494 S.E.2d 827, 834 (Ct. App. 1997).
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At the post-trial hearing, Appellants stated "the damages estimate that was 
presented . . . by the plaintiffs excluded the windows."  "[T]here were these 
discussions about, well, they are only going to have to take off 18 percent of some 
stucco and 12 percent of some brick.  And though your order says it's uncontested, 
it was contested. Mr. Parker and Mr. Padget[t] both said more likely than not, all 
of it is going to have to come off."  "Because of the way that [Respondents] shifted 
the windows out right prior to trial, kind of puts the acoustics back in."   
However, Respondents removed from their claim the repairs necessitated by the 
damage caused by the window installation.  Accordingly, Appellants have already 
received a reduction in claims as contemplated by section 15-38-50 of the South 
Carolina Code. Respondents explained at the post-trial hearing,  
When we were going to trial in Berkeley County that 
day, the number we were going to put upon the board for 
all the damages that we claimed at that point was 
$12,988,670.40. That's exclusive of the individual 
owner's claims.  This is just cost to repair and cost to 
replace the windows and everything that -- thereafter that 
was involved in that case. . . .  [W]e settled with certain 
defendants, and then we came to trial.  And the number 
we asked for at trial was $8,728,174.47.  We reduced our 
damage claim by $4,260,497.93.  Those damages were 
what was not put in your case.  
Respondents further explained, "We could have come in and asked Your Honor to 
award the total number that we went for in Berkeley County of 
$12,988,672.40. And we would be in front of you today admitting that they were 
entitled to a setoff of that 4 million some odd dollars."
Although Parker testified the stucco did not contribute to the leaking and all brick 
and stucco needed to come off because of the windows in part because brick is 
hard to match he did not evaluate the brick and stucco to determine if it was up to 
code or evaluate its workmanship.  Parker indicated that when issues had originally 
arisen with the windows and doors and he had recommended replacing them, he 
only believed part of the brick needed to be replaced then.  However, the trial court 
relied instead on Padgett's testimony and found all of the other defects in the 
construction necessitated the brick and stucco replacement.   
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The trial court did not err in denying Appellants' motion for a setoff.  We agree 
with Respondents that Appellants already received the benefit of the 
settlements.  Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's denial of Appellants' motion 
for setoff of the amounts received by Respondents in prior settlements.  
II. Election of Remedies
Next, Appellants maintain the trial court erred in failing to address the allocation of 
damages5 and entering an order prior to Respondents' election of remedies, thus 
resulting in a double recovery to Respondents.  Appellants also contend the Unit 
Owners received a double recovery by the trial court awarding damages for loss of 
market access to the Unit Owners as well as awarding the cost of repairs to the 
POA. They also assert the trial court awarded a double recovery to the Unit 
Owners by awarding damages for loss of quiet enjoyment in addition to loss of 
market value.  Further, Appellants argue the trial court erred in awarding damages 
for loss of quiet enjoyment and loss of market access when the Unit Owners failed 
to meet their burden of proof and establish they were entitled to such damages.  
We disagree. 
"Election of remedies involves a choice between different forms of redress 
afforded by law for the same injury or different forms of proceeding on the same 
cause of action." Austin v. Stokes-Craven Holding Corp., 387 S.C. 22, 56, 691 
S.E.2d 135, 152-53 (2010) (quoting Taylor v. Medenica, 324 S.C. 200, 218, 479 
S.E.2d 35, 44 (1996)). "It is the act of choosing between inconsistent remedies 
allowed by law on the same set of facts."  Taylor, 324 S.C. at 218, 479 S.E.2d at 
44-45. "The basic purpose of election of remedies is to prevent double recovery 
for a single wrong. 'When an identical set of facts entitle the plaintiff to alternative 
remedies, he may plead and prove his entitlement to either or both; however, the 
plaintiff may not recover both.'" Austin, 387 S.C. at 56, 691 S.E.2d at 153 (citation 
5 Appellants argue the trial court failed to allocate damages pursuant to section 15-
38-15(A) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2016).  However, the trial court found 
Appellants were grossly negligent, and section 15-38-15(F) of the South Carolina 
Code (Supp. 2016) provides that the right to allocation does not apply in those 
cases.  See § 15-38-15(F) ("This section does not apply to a defendant whose 
conduct is determined to be wilful, wanton, reckless, [or] grossly negligent . . . .").  
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying that motion.   
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omitted) (quoting Save Charleston Found. v. Murray, 286 S.C. 170, 175, 333 
S.E.2d 60, 64 (Ct. App. 1985)). "Where a plaintiff presents two causes of action 
because he is uncertain of which he will be able to prove, but seeks a single 
recovery, he will not be required to elect." Adams v. Grant, 292 S.C. 581, 586, 358 
S.E.2d 142, 144 (Ct. App. 1986). "As its name states, the doctrine applies to the 
election of 'remedies' not the election of 'verdicts.'"  Austin, 387 S.C. at 57, 691 
S.E.2d at 153.
The plaintiff should have a full opportunity to prove his 
claim to some form of relief, but he should not receive a 
double recovery. The invocation of one remedy 
constitutes an election of remedies that will bar another 
remedy consistent therewith where the suit upon the 
remedy first invoked reached the stage of final 
adjudication. 
Brown v. Felkel, 320 S.C. 292, 294, 465 S.E.2d 93, 95 (Ct. App. 1995) (citation 
omitted). 
Additionally, the trial court did not err in awarding Respondents damages for both 
loss of access to the market and the cost of repairs.  The loss of market access 
damages accounted for the loss Unit Owners experienced in the value of their units 
due to the downturn in the housing market.  Unless the housing market rebounded 
to the place where it was before the market crashed, the Unit Owners could not 
regain the money they lost because they were unable to sell due to the issues with 
their units and the subsequent litigation.  If not for the problems with the units, the 
owners could have had the choice to sell their units before or during the crash.  The 
record contains testimony from the Respondents' real estate appraisal expert— 
Christopher Donato—and the Unit Owners to that effect.  The cost of repairs was
simply the cost to place the buildings and units in the physical condition they 
should have been in when the Developer initially sold them—such as fully in 
compliance with building code requirements, without mold, without leaks, and not 
able to hear activities in other units.  They suffered two separate injuries with two 
different sets of damages. Therefore, the award did not constitute a double 
recovery. 
Further, there is no double recovery for the award of damages for loss of market 
access as well as the loss of quiet enjoyment.  The loss of quiet enjoyment is the 
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loss the Unit Owners experienced in having to live in what was marketed to them 
as luxury condominiums but in reality hearing their neighbors in other units go 
about their daily activities and put up with the bother of moving out of their units 
for several months for repairs.  These are distinct injuries from the loss of market 
access described by Donato. 
These damages are supported by testimony contained in the record.  Unit Owners 
testified they were unable to sell their property before the housing market crashed.  
Multiple Unit Owners testified they tried to sell their units earlier but the buyers 
backed out once hearing about problems from others living there or learned about 
the lawsuits. Some Unit Owners thought they needed to wait for the sound 
remediation to take place so they would not be selling a property with defects.  
Prospective buyers could not get financing with the ongoing litigation.  Some Unit 
Owners were unable to refinance due to the issues.  Several Unit Owners testified 
they could not sell their units because of issues with them.  Brokers showing the 
properties to prospective buyers knew about the issues with the units.  One Unit 
Owner had renters who had the option to purchase but they decided not to because
of sound issues they experienced while living there.  Another Unit Owner testified 
he bought the unit planning to move in but did not because of the problems.  An 
additional Unit Owner stopped renting his unit due to the mold problem.  Several
renters chose to move out because of the ongoing problems.  Some Unit Owners 
had to drop the price they were renting their units for to get tenants. One Unit 
Owner tried to sell her unit back to the Developer for the price she paid for it but 
the Developer did not want to repurchase it. 
Owners of property not in this development had option to sell property before the 
housing market crashed.  Respondents' appraisal expert, Donato, explained the 
Unit Owners were denied market access.  Some Unit Owners listed their units for 
sale and could not sell. Others sold their units at a substantial loss.  Others chose 
not to put their units on the market upon advice they would not be able to sell them 
in the current condition. Several Unit Owners testified about the housing market 
downturn that occurred.  Donato also testified the defects alone caused a reduction 
in value of 30 to 40%.  Based on all of this, the record contains evidence to support
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the trial court's finding these damages were not a double recovery and thus there 
was no need to elect a remedy.6 
III. Damages Unsupported by Evidence 
Appellants assert the trial court abused its discretion in awarding damages that 
were excessive, speculative and not supported by the evidence and constituted a 
double recovery. They contend the award of damages for acoustic repairs/sound 
remediation was not supported by the testimony and evidence presented at trial.7 
They also maintain the damages award of $7,934,704.06 to the POA for the cost of 
repairs was excessive and not supported by the evidence in that it erroneously 
included the cost to remove and replace the stucco and brick ($1,091,971.50).  
Further, they argue the trial court erred in awarding damages for upgrades and 
storage costs when most Unit Owners did not reside in their units and such an 
award was grossly excessive.8  We disagree. 
6 The trial court required some Unit Owners to elect between loss of market access 
and loss of rent damages and one to elect between inability to refinance and loss of 
market access. 
7 Respondents also argue in a footnote that to the extent the trial court relied on 
Padgett's testimony regarding the noise remediation, such reliance was improper 
because Padgett was not qualified as an expert in acoustical noise.  They cite no 
case law for this argument.  Accordingly, this argument is abandoned.  See Bennett 
v. Inv'rs Title Ins. Co., 370 S.C. 578, 599, 635 S.E.2d 649, 660 (Ct. App. 2006) 
(noting when appellants fail to cite any case law for their positions and make 
conclusory arguments, the appellants abandon those issues on appeal).  Further, 
Appellants did not object during Padgett's direct testimony about the 
soundproofing and first moved to strike his testimony regarding acoustical matters 
during their cross-examination.  See Campbell v. Jordan, 382 S.C. 445, 453, 675 
S.E.2d 801, 805 (Ct. App. 2009) (noting the failure to timely object when
testimony was initially offered waives the right to argue any error in the admission 
of that testimony on appeal). 
8 Appellants also assert the trial court misused the term of quiet enjoyment.  See 
Enjoyment, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining quiet enjoyment as 
"[t]he possession of land with the assurance that the possession will not be 
disturbed by a superior title").  Because Appellants did not raise this in their 
motion for reconsideration to the trial court, this issue is not preserved for our 
review. See In re Timmerman, 331 S.C. 455, 460, 502 S.E.2d 920, 922 (Ct. App. 
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The trial court is vested with considerable discretion over 
the amount of a damages award, and our review of the 
amount of damages is limited to the correction of errors 
of law. In reviewing a damages award, we do not weigh 
the evidence, but determine if any evidence supports the 
award. 
Vortex Sports & Entm't, Inc. v. Ware, 378 S.C. 197, 208, 662 S.E.2d 444, 450 (Ct. 
App. 2008) (citation omitted). 
To recover damages, the evidence must enable the jury to 
determine the amount of damages with reasonable 
certainty or accuracy.  However, "proof with 
mathematical certainty of the amount of loss or damage 
is not required." The determination of damages may 
depend to some extent on the consideration of contingent 
events if a reasonable basis of computation is provided, 
allowing a reasonably close estimate of the loss. 
Magnolia N. Prop. Owners' Ass'n v. Heritage Cmtys., Inc., 397 S.C. 348, 374-75, 
725 S.E.2d 112, 126 (Ct. App. 2012) (citation omitted) (quoting Whisenant v. 
James Island Corp., 277 S.C. 10, 13, 281 S.E.2d 794, 796 (1981)).   
In Magnolia North Property Owners' Ass'n, 397 S.C. at 375 n.9, 725 S.E.2d at 127 
n.9, the appellants argued an expert's estimate of hidden damage was speculative 
because his past experience in assessing hidden damage included some buildings 
with stucco siding, while the buildings in the case had Hardie Plank siding above a 
brick veneer. This court found "the fact that this expert's past experience with 
assessing hidden damages included buildings with stucco siding would go to the 
1998) ("When a party receives an order that grants certain relief not previously 
contemplated or presented to the trial court, the aggrieved party must move, 
pursuant to Rule 59(e), SCRCP, to alter or amend the judgment in order to 
preserve the issue for appeal." (citing Godfrey v. Heller, 311 S.C. 516, 429 S.E.2d 
859 (Ct. App. 1993) (finding when a theory of relief was first raised in the lower 
court's order, the appellant must challenge this theory with a Rule 59, SCRCP, 
motion))). 
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weight of the evidence rather than its existence."  Id. (citing Dep't of Transp. v. 
Rogers, 259 S.E.2d 775 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979) (holding there was no error in 
admitting into evidence the testimony of the defendant's expert regarding the value 
of the defendant's condemned property because the fact that the expert had not 
observed the property at the time of the taking went to the weight given his 
testimony by the jury)). 
In Pope v. Heritage Communities, Inc., 395 S.C. 404, 424, 717 S.E.2d 765, 776 
(Ct. App. 2011), the appellants "argued the trial court erred in admitting the expert 
testimony because the methodology was flawed by concluding homeowners that 
were not permanent residents suffered loss of use damages."  In that case, the 
expert "testified he estimated the damages for loss of use by the number of units, 
the size and number of bedrooms per unit, and comparable rental rates in the area.  
[He] included loss of use for all owners, regardless of how each owner utilized his 
or her unit, opining the owners were uniformly affected regardless of their use."  
Id.  "Thus, according to [the expert], an owner who was a permanent resident and 
had to move out suffered the same loss of use damages as an owner that used the 
unit as a second home and could not use it."  Id.  This court found "no abuse of 
discretion by the trial court in admitting this testimony.  In considering the 
evidence, the court recognized Appellants' argument to exclude the testimony was 
based on a belief that the damages suffered by each type of owner were different."  
Id. at 425, 717 S.E.2d at 776. "The trial court found the basis of Appellants' attack 
on [the expert] was the believability, rather than the admissibility, of his 
testimony."  Id.
South Carolina case law "imposes a legal duty on builders to undertake 
construction commensurate with industry standards."  Kennedy v. Columbia 
Lumber & Mfg. Co., 299 S.C. 335, 346, 384 S.E.2d 730, 737 (1989). 
No one is entitled to absolute quiet in the enjoyment of 
his property; he may only insist upon a degree of 
quietness consistent with the standard of comfort 
prevailing in the locality in which he dwells.  The 
location and surroundings must be considered, since 
noise which amounts to a nuisance in one locality may be 
entirely proper in another. The character and magnitude 
of the industry or business complained of and the manner 
in which it is conducted must also be taken into 
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consideration, and so must the character and volume of 
the noise, the time and duration of its occurrence, . . . , 
and all the facts and circumstances of the case.  
Strong v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 240 S.C. 244, 255-56, 125 S.E.2d 628, 633-34 
(1962) (quoting 39 Am. Jur. 332, § 47). 
"As a general principle, a landowner, who is familiar with her property and its 
value, is allowed to give her estimate as to the value of the land and damages 
thereto, even though she is not an expert."  Bowers v. Bowers, 349 S.C. 85, 92, 561 
S.E.2d 610, 614 (Ct. App. 2002). For people other than the owner of real property 
to give their opinion as to the value of real property, it must be shown they are 
competent.  Rogers v. Rogers, 280 S.C. 205, 209, 311 S.E.2d 743, 745-746 (Ct. 
App. 1984). "[T]he source of his knowledge must be revealed to remove his 
opinion from the realm of mere conjecture."  Id. at 209, 311 S.E.2d 746. 
In this case, the trial court denied Appellants' motion to strike Padgett's testimony 
regarding the sound issues, finding:
[H]e testified as to what type of construction should be 
appropriate between floors and ceiling between 
apartments, not as to the sound in the apartments.  Now, 
I'm not sure where we're --you're drawing the line 
between acoustical and actual what is standard in the 
industry in preventing some sound between apartments.  I 
thought he testified that this is what was needed to 
prevent sound and normal in the industry when he 
testified earlier. Now you're trying to move it over to 
noise level. 
The trial court further stated, "[W]hat's the standard in the industry?  That's what 
the question is, not what the decibel levels are or not.  I understand where you're 
coming from, but I don't think he testified to that, so your motion is denied." 
Appellants' attack on Padgett's testimony on the sound issues because he was not 
an expert in acoustic noise went to the weight of Padgett's testimony, not the 
decision of whether to admit of that testimony.
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The record contains evidence to support the trial court's awarding damages to 
Respondents to correct the noise problem.  Numerous Unit Owners testified 
tenants moved out because of the noise or that they themselves experience noise 
problems that interfered with their lives.  Several Unit Owners provided that even 
after Appellants attempted to fix the sound problems, they continued to experience 
issues. 
Although Appellants' expert testified alterations to the ceiling had improved the 
sound problems, he acknowledged further improvements could be made by 
working on the floors. He simply believed it was not worth the cost to do that.  He 
also acknowledged the improvements they made only improved the airborne sound 
issues and not the impact sound problems.  He provided the impact sound 
measurements for the units were not up to the standard that he normally would try 
to achieve. He acknowledged for the purchase price of condos, he personally 
would want to live somewhere with a better impact sound rating.  He also indicated 
the result was typical for a retrofit but not the same quality as new construction 
would be. He also noted sound problems can never be eliminated from a wood 
frame building.9  He thought it was too expensive to put in Gypcrete10 after the fact 
even though it should have been used initially.  He specified the problem with the 
sound transmitting through the floors was created by installing mats under the 
floors with nails, which should have never occurred.  He thought the improvement 
in sound transmission after they made modifications was substantial "under the 
circumstances."  He further admitted the sound remediation that was already done 
caused the ceiling height to be lower than it would have been if the remediation 
had been done another way. 
Appellants stated at post-trial hearing: "It may not be perfect for everybody 
throughout the building, but they were consistently redone throughout all six 
9 The record contains testimony the buildings were stick (wood) buildings instead 
of concrete based buildings.  Willis testified multi-level condominiums would 
usually be built with concrete and he did not know of any other condominium
project in the area at this price point that was constructed like the Oaks.  He also 
testified apartment and condominiums are constructed differently because of cost 
efficiency.
10 Gypcrete is a lightweight concrete that is standard in construction if the floors 
are not solid concrete, even in apartment buildings.  Gypcrete was not originally 
installed in the building here.
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buildings over a long period of time to great expense to [us]. We acknowledged 
the problem.  We did not hide from it.  We went in there to try to fix it."  "Simply 
put, [Dr.] Stewart testified that there's no way to redo the ceiling beyond what we 
have already done. There's just nothing more that they can do."  "[T]here was 
nothing more that could be done."   
Apart from the sound issues, one resident had a problem with his unit having 
chemical odors while another had issues with chemical odors following floor 
repairs done by the Developer.  Many residents had problems with their floors 
warping and separating and developing mold.  There were issues with leaks and 
plumbing causing rotting and mold.  Many residents had issues with mold. There 
was testimony the roof leaked and was not installed properly or up to code.  The 
railings were not primed. 
One of the Unit Owners, Joe Chiovarou, testified at trial about costs for a hotel, 
storage, and movers based on estimates he had obtained on behalf of the Board, 
and a spreadsheet he prepared with those estimates was admitted into evidence.  
Respondents also argued because the Unit Owners would be staying in a hotel, 
they would need money for meals out because they could not cook.  On cross-
examination, Chiovarou testified he paid $3,500 per month for a rental house on 
Sullivan's Island during the winter season.  But he specified that it would be 
difficult to find enough available and acceptable houses to rent at one time for all 
the Unit Owners. Padgett testified that owners would have to hire a mover and 
rent storage and a place to live while repairs were being made.  Appellants did not 
present any witnesses to testify on their behalf about rental home availability or 
costs or alternative pricing for hotel rooms.11  Based on this testimony, particularly 
in light of the fact Appellants did not present any evidence of contrary prices, the 
record contained evidence to support the trial court's amount for damages for these 
items. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the trial court is  
11 Although Appellants' attorney stated they had documentation showing 
Appellants had paid a lesser price for movers for the previous remediation, the 
record does not contain any such exhibit or any testimony relating to this price.  
Additionally, Chiovarou was not cross-examined about the previous price. 
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AFFIRMED. 

LOCKEMY, C.J., concurs. 

MCDONALD, J., concurs in result only. 
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